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Pacification is the term commonly used in Viet Nam
to refer to efforts of the central authorities to assert or
restore control over villages.
Rather a different such explanation is sought, an
exploration in the realm of politics, specifically the links
between peasants, local leaders and the national government.
The problem is unsolvable with money or force because it in-
volves questions of the distribution of power and more spec-
ifically the need to replace the traditional model of village
government. The failure of pacification was the failure to
provide local institutional arrangements which satisfied the
needs of both village and state. The Mandarin model of the
autonomous, viable village is shown to be inadequate and to
lead to an even larger gulf of mistrust between peasant and
government. This lack of trust is shown to account for much
of the Viet Cong success, through their use of techniques
which are here called political judo.
This thesis, through an analysis of the military aspects
of pacification, attempts to explain why so many men and so
much money failed to provide effective rural security. This
thesis argues that pacification requires effective local
organizations. A detailed assessment of the Government of
Viet Nam's two major local organizations, village and hamlet
officials and the village militia, or Popular Forces, under-
scores the inadequacies of traditional explanations for the
non-viable nature of peasant organizations. The study provides
illustrations of techniques which have turned conventional
weaknesses, such as "amoral familism", inadequate childhood
socialization, fatalism, and localism, into strengths.
After 1965, the rural organizations suffered a massive
dislocation as a result of several related developments: an
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economic boom, search and destroy operations, and refugee
flows. Although these developments helped to bring more
population under government control, the local system itself
was often weakened in the process.
Nevertheless, significant organizations can be
developed: an analysis of more effective platoons of Popular
Forces shows that the family is the key to commitment and
village identification the key to effective military action.
Analyses of the operating methods of these units suggest
that the keys to pacification are security, trust, justice
and rural development. It is shown that the family orienta-
tion, poverty and localism of the PF make it relatively
economical to motivate them to perform within the village.
It is also suggested that the general problems of
pacification could have been solved if the rural develop-
ment program, village elections and PF were integrated into
a coherent framework.
This thesis concludes that security for peasants and
a concern for their welfare have never been items of high
priority for any Saigon government. It is suggested, however,
that if the war had been fought as though protecting the
peasants were more important than killing Viet Cong the
result would have been far less favorable to the Viet Cong
than the peasant strategies have been.
Thesis Supervisor: Ithiel de Sola Pool
Title: Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis deals with the response of the
governments of the United States and the Republic of
Viet Nam to the problem truly crucial to their war
effort, that of rural security -- the pacification of
the countryside.
Pacification is the term commonly used in
Viet Nam to refer to efforts of the central authorities
to assert or restore control over villages. In its
effort to aid the government of Viet Nam in this task
the United States has invested an extraordinary amount
of military force and economic resources since the year
1954. Militarily, the returns have been less than ideal.
If the military side of pacification has not been a
total success, the established powers have only demon-
strated that money and force cannot solve a problem that
is political in essence.
The central problem of pacification is the
translation of economic resources and military force into
village control, clearly a political and not a technical
problem because it concerns the distribution of authority
among various elements of society. Specifically, it
0009
derives from the inability of the central authority to
develop formulas for successfully linking itself to the
village in such a way that the ends of both the village
and the state can be served. Even more narrowly, it
implies the problem, never successfully resolved by any
Saigon government, of finding a replacement for the
traditional model of village authority that could satisfy
the needs of the state and still be accepted within the
village.
Central to the problem is the fact that neither
the use of collective punishment nor economic growth is
enough to ensure the development of village organization
which can meet the needs of war. Organization can only
be created by developing links of trust from peasant to
government through local leadership acceptable to both.
Neither force nor money are sufficient.
As we will show, war, especially collective
punishment, does not of itself draw a people together.
Sometimes, when massive force is applied to a population,
solidarity, cohesion and the ability to perform complicated
communal tasks increases --- but only where there are accepted
and trusted leaders around whom the citizens can rally, as in
the Battle of Britain. The exoerience of war can also be
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profoundly disorganizing, atomizing not integrating
society. A Londoner upon leaving a bomb shelter could
turn to a trusted figure for advice and consolation. A
Vietnamese peasant whose village has just been bombed,
however, finds no one who can explain why or help him to
reconstruct the damage or avoid further attack. He may
find, as indeed happened in Hue, that the persons whom he
expected to aid him are looting his home, the doctors he
expected to help him fleeing with their families and the
provincial authorities in hiding. The fear of mass attack
is a unifier only if there is a meaningful alternative to
the horror of war and someone to rally the people, someone
who can be trusted.
If a military threat cannot weld a people together
and gain their compliance for the demands of national
survival, then neither can the strategy of the carrot, the
massive distribution of economic resources without the
development of organization. This economic "bribery" can
make the state more tolerable or acceptable than any
alternative states, but there must still be some one with
the authority behind him to risk enforcing necessary but
unpopular decisions locally, and more essential, to provide
the protection for prosperity to flourish. Even a rich man
alone in Central Park at night is vulnerable, no matter how
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much money there is in his pocket; and in a whole
community of well-to-do peasants someone must be willing
to "tie the bell around the cat's neck." Only the
support of an organized higher authority with open
channels of communication can bear him out. In the end,
of course, the force of the state must be behind him.
Raising the standard of living may be essential
before the GVN can develop any interest or willingness
to organize within a village, but no one may be willing
to join or lead such a local organization unless it has
some control over the distribution of the nation's re-
sources, both economic and military. In fact, local
organizations are viable only to the extent that they are
not autonomous but instead have some link with the national
government.
Despite their policy of pacification as security
plus development, those in power in Saigon, according to
a special United States report by John Vann, have tended
to ignore a hamlet once it has been considered pacified.
"The village government, which is elected by the DeoDle,
is not readily accepted by the district and provincial
government, which is basically a military government." 1
The inevitable conclusion is that Saigon has lost sight of
1As quoted in Roberts, op. cit.
the need to link village authority with the national
government.
Organization is crucial to mobilizing support in
rural Viet Nam -- both for the Viet Cong and for the
Government of Viet Nam. As Douglas Pike has noted:
The organizational weapon promises the
communists victory. Only the counter-
organizational effort can turn back this tide.
This means the creation of viable organizations
that reach from the capital to the village,
organizations that provide a payoff to the
villagers, either in material or non-material
personal benefits, organizations which once
established legitimately, cn be used as
channels of communication.
The Saigon government does, in fact, have organ-
izations reaching from village to capital. This thesis
will show, however, that they are not viable. With the
exception of the villages totally under the control of
the Viet Cong, virtually every community has had a
village chief responsible to Saigon acting as the head of
a village council and in addition one or more platoons of
soldiers recruited locally, militia men known as the
Popular Forces. 3
2 Douglas Pike, Vietnam: Communication Factors of Revo-
lutionary Guerrilla War. Cambridge, Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1965,
p. 8.
3 In the future, the Popular Forces will be designated by
the abbreviation PF, the Regional Forces by RF, and the
special Revolutionary Development team by RD. ARVN will
stand for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the national
force; GVN is the Government of South Vietnam.
The dealings of the Saigon authorities with the
councils has consistently harked back to the days of the
mandarins. Add to this their misunderstanding and mis-
management of the Popular Forces and it becomes clear
just why all the contested villages are in fact contested,
why 500,000 Americans, 600,000 Vietnamese soldiers, and
millions of dollars in aid have not, even mobilized
enough strength to neutralize their recruitment,
propaganda and intelligence operations.
The basic techniques and policies of the Viet Cong
have been well documented, 4 but much less has been
written about the village operations of the Government of
Viet Nam and the ways in which they have contested control
of the villages with the Viet Cong. This has contributed
to a distorted view of the Viet Cong. That the Viet Cong
are a remarkable organization with extraordinarily ability
and even genius is not be be disputed here. It must be
pointed out, however, that the misguided efforts of a state
backed by over 500,000 American soldiers and billions of
dollars in aid must be at least somewhat responsible for
the success of the Viet Cong. It is rare for the flyweight
champion of the world to do so well against even an average
heavyweight.
4See the bibliography for work by Burchett, Pike,
Conley, Joiner, Davison and Zasloff.
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The problem of creating viable local organization
has been poorly understood and poorly solved by the GVN
pacification program. The implementation of pacification,
has meant first clearing an area of the Viet Cong, next
making it secure from attack, and only then instituting
programs to improve the life of the peasant and assure
his greater loyalty to Saigon. 5
Two assumptions implicit in this program have
been the source of its limited success. First, it has
been assumed that the problem has been one of greater
loyalty to the government on the part of the villagers,
and second, it has been accepted that security is possible
before development.
Loyalty to the government on the part of the peasants
is a rather meaningless phrase because in an internal war
loyalty to a nation in the absence of trusted local
officials through whom the loyalty can flow is of no avail.
The problem is best put that the government has not been
loyal to the peasants. It has given them inadequate
defenses and then destroyed the village when the Viet Cong
entered. It has given unresponsive officials and provided
no channels for redress of grievances.
5 Gene Roberts, "Broad Changes in Pacification Uraed,"
New York Times, May 24, 1968.
Nor can security occur without development. The
basic security system was not capable of generating the
information flow or military coordination to keep an
area secure.
Because it has failed to understand the true state
of affairs in the countryside and the hopes and
frustrations of its oeasant population, the Saigon gov-
ernment has been unable to transform a city state into a
nation. Historically, the peasant looked to the capital
and the emperor for direction. Even today, it would be
a mistake to believe that his allegiance has been wholly
captured by the Viet Cong movement; for the most part the
peasant waits, he is "attentiste". It is obvious that
looking up to the mandarins is no longer the kind of
loyalty that can insure tranquility and order in a
modernizing state. Before the peasant can be loyal to the
nation of Viet Nam he must have someone to whom he can be
loyal, someone he can trust. For pacification to succeed,
a bargain must be struck which will bind the villagers to
the nation and put them, in fact, more under national
control than any set of military-administrative directives.
This has seldom happened because village organizations have
seldom been capable of generating enough trust in the
village to provide the government with a basis for an
integrated strategy.
Ooi,
The explanations advanced in the literature on
political development to account for the inability of
peasants in particular, or developing nations in general,
to achieve effective and adaptive organizations usually
are phrased in terms of inadequate childhood socialization,
peasant fatalism or "amoral familism". This thesis
suggests that these general explanations need not be
hindrances to effective organizations and that the failure
is not cultural, but political.
Explanations of organizational failures involving
socialization generally consider childhood socialization
the key to the ability to enter into the kinds of agreements
and relationships modern organization requires. 6
Explanations of the failure of peasant organizations
stressina "amoral familism" suggest that family loyalty
and an unwillingness to trust anyone outside of the family
are the cause of failure. 7 This is also sometimes stated
in terms of society being a "zero-sum game" namely that
peasants do not cooperate because they fear that anything
one man gains another man loses.
6Lucian Pye, Politics Personality and Nation Building.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, p. 51.
7Banfield, E.C., The IMoral Basis of a Backward Society.
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958.
Explanations of organizational failure voiced in
terms of fatalism usually stress that peasants are passive,
apathetic, pessimistic, acceotant, pliant, evasive, and
conservative.
Childhood socialization cannot explain the problems
of the RF/PF for their basic value system emphasizes de-
pendence and the group over the individual. Further-
more the exceotional PF units demonstrate that later
socialization can be effective in overcoming the family
orientation of the peasant and developing a public
orientation.
Nor can fatalism explain the problems of organization
for as Hendry has shown, Vietnamese peasants are conservative
with respect to risk not change. 9
Nor is amoral familism sufficient. Even in
Banfield's village, there were two peasant organizations--a
burial society and a recreation association. One has only
to notice the complex infrastructure of the Viet Cong in
order to realize that civil war can be an equally viable
catalyst to peasant organization.
8Niehoff and Anderson, "Peasant Fatalism and Socio-
Economic Innovation", "Human Organization", Winter 1966.
9Hendry, on. cit.,
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Each of these general basic explanations is
inadequate to account for the general passivity and
defensiveness of village soldiers because it fails to
give sufficient credit to the fact that the Vietnamese
peasant, what ever else he may be, is extraordinarily
flexible--at least to the extent that he can endure or
be a part of widely varying organizations. As the
scattered successes of effective PF platoons demon-
strated, peasant are easily manipulated by those who
understand the priorities of peasant existence and have
the political power to meet these minimal requirements.
In this thesis it is suggested that the failure of
the pacification program was a failure of politics, a
failure to provide institutional arrangements which could
have satisfied the requirements of both village and state.
The thesis thus focuses on the operation of the institu-
tional machinery designed to utilize the superiorities of
force and material resources to achieve military victory
and produce a unified national state. Chapter II discusses
the formal design and operational elements of the Saigon
and Viet Cong military systems. It seeks to show the
manner in which institutional arrangements reveal the
widely different conceptions of the war in Saigon and among
the Viet Cong. Chapter III analyzes the village as it was
viewed by Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors. Basically,
Diem's view of the village was based on the traditional
model of the village as it was established before the
French came to Viet Nam. In Chanter III we discuss the
original mandarin model of government and suggest that
the essential conditions which gave the system what
viability it once possessed were no longer present. The
growth of cities, strong central government, and in-
dividual taxation led to conditions in which village
government had no real political power and autonomous
villages were unable to command the allegiance of
peasants. The village was merely a geographic entity
and not a community with the ability to mobilize the
oeasants.
In the early years of the war the misconceptions
about the viability of the traditional village led to a
situation in which the Viet Cong were relatively un-
impeded when confronting autonomous villages with no
meaningful links to outside authority. Chapter IV
emphasizes that the Viet Cong were able to grow largely
by exploiting the inability of the government to react
to them without aiding them, a situation that could not
be prevented because village soldiers stood alone against
the Viet Cong, peasants were unprotected from the gov-
ernment, and the reaction of government officials be-
yond the village to the possibility of personal betrayal
tended to leave the peasants more and more distant from
the government. Each government official acted in a
fashion that minimized the chance of personal betrayal
by subordinates. This caused the local base of support
to narrow steadily. The linkage of trust between
peasant and government steadily weakened.
Chapter V identifies the basic operating
characteristics of the village security system after the
American buildup in 1965, showing that the security
system was lacking in the capacity for strategy and was
in a defensive posture where the Viet Cong could be
impeded but not stopped or made to retreat.
Chapter VI explains the basic problems causing
the weakness of the system by showing that the military
system was not congruent with the realities of marginal
men, the miserably poor, landless, family oriented men
who were the only peasants willing to suffer the abuse
from all sides that befell village soldiers. Chapter VI
explains in these terms why these men were unable to
provide the military prerequisite to pacification.
Because the rural security system was not viable
large Viet Cong units could intrude into the populated
oO,~ j
areas. This brought large numbers of American, Korean
and ARVN soldiers into contact with villagers and
created large flows of refuaees and a war boom of
considerable proportions. Chapter VII discusses how
the excesses and brutalization of the large units when
combined with the economic boom produced a situation in
which the basic rural security system was drastically
weakened by the destabilizing effect of these dis-
locations.
Finally, Chapter VIII discusses the requirements
of pacification in light of the lack of commitment to
security from the government and establishes that
marginal men could become effective only when their
basic values were taken into account by the military.
The reasons why the RD program and the village election
made so little impact on pacification is discussed in
light of the process via which some leaders were able
to achieve pacification.
War is not a popularity contest or an election in
which the victor can be predicted from opinion polls. Nor
is war soley a matter of force in which the victor is
always the belligerent with the most military strength.
Potential support can be mismanaged; force without in-
formation is inefficient. And even with information a
meaningful understanding of society and an empathy for its
people may still be needed.
Americans often forget the British experience in
the American Revolutionary War. When the Redcoats first
arrived in force they found so many loyalists that they
decided there could be only a few revolutionaries and
dissatisfied men. Thus, at first the British ignored the
loyalists, and when they finally realized that local par-
ticipation was essential, it was already too late to make
the necessary arrangements. In a paragraph all too re-
miniscent of Viet Nam, one historian has stated: 1 0
In dealing with the loyalists, Britain made
two palpable errors: she turned to them for
assistance much too late, and then relied upon
them much too completely. Basic ignorance of
colonial conditions and sheer incomDetence, to
be sure, lay at the core of these errors.
Equally, however, they were committed because
government was not at any time entirely at
liberty to conduct the war on purely military
grounds. Thus foreign interventions, political
1 0 Paul H. Smith. Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in
British Revolutionary Policy, Chapel Hill, University of
North Carolina Press, 1964, p. 172.
oressures and poor inteDllicence led to
adoption of a policy which had major limit-
ations at best and grave defects at worst.
Never free to wage total war in America,
Britain inaccurately gauged the possibilities
and limitations of the restricted warfare she
was free to pursue. Only vaguely aware of these
subtle limitations, she relied upon a series
of inconsistent plans of which her loyalist
policy was the least well managed. That
confused policy stands as a monument to the
hazards which inhere in the conduct of limited
war.
The war had certainly numbed and disoriented
millions of peasants, but the remarkable and tragic thing
was how many peasants still cared enough to talk, complain,
plead, or gossip. When this writer first arrived in
Viet Nam, he adopted as his 'working position' the view
that most peasants were pro- Viet Cong and that only
massive American force was holding down 'the people'.
Since most contact was to be with U.S. and GVN military,
this view was adopted as a rather primitive check against
too hastily assimilating the views of those groups. In
the end, this writer's position was quite different from
either of these extremes: it was that while the Viet Cong
were remarkable and .admirable in many ways, they did not
have all the good men and they no longer had very much
peasant support; n3vertheless they would probably win -
or at least endure - anyway, because the U.S. - GVN effort
appeared so hopelessly far from being able to mobilize the
resources of peasant society. It seemed that if only
trivial and small changes were made they could make
extraordinary differences in a hurry. What looks like a
'small change', however, can often mean a total re-
orientation - a 'technical' inch may be a 'political' mile.
Freedom without justice can mean a aood life, but it cannot
draw a people together. Lasting peace can only be possible
when private accomodations of fragmented groups merge into
a single public policy.
Localism and family-oriented attitudes have sim-
ultaneously decreased the effectiveness of the GVN's
village organizations and orecluded the constructions of
a unified society, but these are not merely symptoms of a
general anarchism. The same cultural pattern which contains
these views also holds an intensely communitarian strain.
Family-oriented peasants can be made public-oriented as
well, if the system seeking to co-opt them can only inspire
their trust and dependence.
But for the larger system to make such an effort
requires that its basic views include, in a position of
high priority, the task of gaining peasant trust. There is
little indication, in practice, that the Vietnamese
government ever placed great emphasis on such a priority.
As a story from one peasant's TAT stated:
This is a beggar asking alms. And the
other is well off but not charitable. He
looks down upon the beggar. And the wife is
suffering from the attitude of her husband.
Before, Viet Nam had been under many
inequitable regimes, the ponulation were
then wretched, ragged but there were at
the same time some who were too rich.
The beggar is thinking of the inequitable
society. Human beings don't love human
beings. The rich man is thinking how to
chase the beggar. His wife, being a
charitable woman, is suffering in seeing such
a thing.
The beggar would leave them without
receiving alms, because at the present time,
there is still injustice.
(0179V)
CHAPTER II
THE STRUCTURE OF RURAL WARFARE
Viewed in terms of formal organization, the political -
military systems of the GVN - U.S. on the one hand, and the
Viet Cong - North Vietnamese on the other, are strikingly
similar. On paper, both systems are complex structures
designed to meet the varied contingencies of a multilayered
war. Power and responsibility for different phases of the
war are theoretically delineated in much the same fashion
by both sides. Yet, these formal similarities conceal
basic and fundamental differences in the two structures,
as well as differences in the way the two sides have seen
the priorities of the war. To understand these areas of
contrast, it is necessary to compare the manner in which
the two systems evolved. While the GVN started from the
top with a national army and only grudgingly came to
recognize the need for effective local units, the Viet Cong
began with small guerrilla forces and worked its way up
to large military units. The Viet Cong were organized
to fight a village war; the GVN, prepared for large scale
warfare similar to Korea, have been unable to develop the
organizational integration necessary to meet the Viet Cong
challenge in the village.
The purpose of this chanter is simply to detail
the elements of the two systems and explain the basic
systems of corridors and bases necessary to both sides.
This will make it possible in later chapters to con-
centrate on the interaction of the two systems in the
villages without having to stop for explanation each
time a new element is mentioned.
Elements of Government System
The military system develoned after 1954 was better
suited to face a Korean type invasion than an internal war
against enemy units supported by guerrillas, liberated
villages, and extensive local intelligence. Ever since,
a major problem has been an unsuccessful adaptation to an
internal war.
The Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) was
always considered to be the key to South Viet Nam's
defense and was supported from 1954 by the United States.
At the time of the Geneva Armistice there were 200,000
Vietnamese under arms in support of the French fight against
the Viet Minh, but the initial United States decision was
that 85,000 men would be sufficient for South Vietnam's
needs. In fact, with ultimate irony, the initial U.S.
design, according to Lt. General John W. O'Daniel, head of
the Army Advisory program for training was for the army to
be "... a police force capable of spotting communist
guerrillas and communist efforts at infiltration."l
This initial decision was changed, and ARVN ultimately
emerged not as a mobile rural police force but as a
1New York Times, February 13, 1955, page 1, as quoted
in William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam,
Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and
Public Affairs. New York: Praeger, 1966, p. 42.
150,000 - man army patterned along U.S. lines and prepared
for a Korean type invasion.2 While the move was certainly
prompted at least somewhat by U.S. memories of Korea, where
an 85,0 0 - man constabulary was quickly overrun, Diem's
traditi nal attitude played a major role, since he
consider d a large army to be a symbol of prestige. 3
At first no conscription of enlisted men into the
national army was necessary, as the army's pay was sufficient
to keep many of the original forces in the service and to
attract enough more men. A draft for officers was needed
even then, however, because other opportunities were
available for the holders of the baccalaureat, the
prerequisite for officer's training. If a number of men
did in fact become career officers, they were likely to join
when the diversion of more and more U.S. commodities to
Army channels made being an officer a more lucrative position.
The original basis for ARVN" was a colonial army which
had tolerated, if not actually encouraged, officers to
profit from their rank. As Jumper noted in 1956, the
military profession in Viet N.am has always had "strong venal
overtones,"• and "in the past, Vietnamese officers fought with
the French for what they could individually get out of the
relationship. "4
2Duncanson, op. cit., p. 289.
3Ibid., p. 254.
4Roy Jumper, "The Communist Challenge to South Viet Nam,"
Far Eastern Survey, XXV (1956), p. 165.
From 1961 to 1967, ARVN grew to nearly 300,000
men. The army made virtually no use, during this expansion,
of the more highly skilled and effective NCO's to expand
the officer corps. ARVN thus remained primarily an army
of peasants with inexperienced urban officers.
ARVN is, however, but half of the Vietnamese Armed
Forces. The other half consists of the Recional and
Popular Forces, each with about 150,000 men in 1966-67.
The RF and PF were at least as active as the national army.
The Regional Forces developed from the French Garde
Civile de Cochinchine, an all-Vietnamese corps organized
in units directly controlled by the French province chiefs. 5
Reconstituted as the Regional Forces under Diem, their
size dropped to 40,000 in 1959 and would have dropped even
further had it not been for the Viet Cong uprising. In fact,
the RF reached a strength of 72,000 by 1963 and 150,000
by 1966.
The precipitous reversals in RF strength stemmed
from unresolved differences among the Saigon leadership
and their American advisors over the role of the RF. Diem
wanted a potent counterweight to the Army, the CIA police
advisors to the Michigan State University Advisory Group
wanted a rural police force, and the U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) opposed any force which might deflect
men and resources from ARVN.6
5 Duncanson, op. cit., p. 101.
6 Duncanson, o0. cit., p. 288.
Because of these disagreements over the RF's role,
most U.S. aid was withheld; but Diem was not prevented from
building a counterweight to ARVN, which he manned largely
with officers and NCO's inherited from the national army
itself. According to Scigliano, these men were of inferior
quality.7 By 1959, the Michigan State Group had stopped
working with the RF; and in 1960, under the public safety
division of the U.S. Operating Mission (now U.S. Agency for
International Development), a program was instituted to
strengthen the RF and give them counter-guerrilla training.
Before the program could be implemented, however, the RF
were transferred from the Department of the Interior to
the Department of National Defense concomitant with
transfer of U.S. responsibility to Military Assistance
Advisory Group. The RF were now to be a junior version of
ARVN. Nighswonger reports "confirmed evidence" that the
USOM efforts to create a rural anti-guerrilla force were
"deliberately obstructed" by elements in LAAG and in the
U.S. military command. 8
The RF, then, became a junior version of ARTVN, or-
ganized into companies generally controlled by Province and
District Chiefs. Their national command structure and
7Robert Sciqliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964, p. 164.
8William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam,
T. 44.
training remained separated from ARVN's until
September 21, 1966, when all Vietnamese military commands
merged under ARVN. While their pay and privileges were
less than those of the national forces, most RF members
had the advantage of serving their native provinces and
districts.
The third major element of the Vietnamese Armed Forces
is the Popular Forces - in effect, the little brothers of
the RF. Organized on a platoon basis, the PF receive lower
pay and fewer privileges than either ARVN or RF. PF units
are always stationed within their home district, however,
and usually in their home villages.
The PF developed out of diverse village and hamlet
level defense groups, most of which were seldom armed
with anything more than sticks and clubs. Originally the
PF were "peasant by day, soldier by night" village
defenders, but in 1961 they, too, were transferred from
the Department of the Interior to the Department of National
Defense, and a program was instituted to place them in
full-time military service. In 1966, the PF and the RF
were placed under ARVN command.
The years 1958 to 1967 saw the progressive militarization
of local Vietnamese administration. Increasingly, province
and district chiefs came to be chosen from among career
officers of the national army. Only one district studied
in 1967, An Nhon in Binh Dinh, had a civilian district
chief, and all 9 provinces studied had military province
chiefs. District Chiefs controlled the RF and PF units
in their districts and held nominal authority over all
district-level administration. Although national RF/PF
training centers were scattered throughout Vietnam, many
RF/PF received their training within their own district.
As military commander, the district chief had great
latitude in determining the type of training his RF/PF
received, the military and political tactics to be used
within his district, and the role to be played by religious
and community leaders.
Parallel to the Vietnamese district and provincial
system, a chain of American military advisors developed
after 1961. At the district level, the American team
typically consisted of two officers and three enlisted men.
The two officers, generally a major and a captain, were in
theory to work as advisors to the district chief and his
assistant in charge of RF/PF. The enlisted men were usually
a medic, a radio operator, and a local intelligence liaison.
Depending on district needs and personal tastes, they acted
variously as air and artillery controllers, logistics teams,
checks on corruption, liaison with American units in the
area, and evaluators of local security.
0034
ARVN and RF had both been originally conceived as
militia forces. When they were militarized, a police
force to replace them was developed only in the large
cities. Finally, in 1963, Washington agreed to support
an increase of the National Police from 21,000 men to
72,000 and to extend it into rural areas. The police
did not reach this strength, however, until 1967. By
this time, in the aftermath of Diem's fall, ARVN had
already brought the police under control and partially
militarized them.9
After 1965, another important presence on the rural
scene was the much-publicized Revolutionary Development
Teams. These 59 - man teams, which for security often
work in conjunction with an ARVN battalion or and RF
company, spend several months in a single hamlet. The
purpose of the teams is to improve the peasant's life,
win his Icyalty to the government, and improve security by
moving villagers to defend themselves.
9Duncanson, on. cit., p. 258.
Elements of Viet Cong System
The element that has been central in the Chinese
experience and in both Vietnamese revolutions has been
that system of cadres usually called the infrastructure.
The infrastructure is the elite of the revolution, the
men who guide the masses, keep them involved, spread
knowledge of the revolution, and administer the complex
variety of functions that any shadow government must
perform. In Viet Nam, the infrastructure "controls local
guerrilla bands, collects taxes, orders assassinations,
sets up organizations in villages, spreads propaganda,
collects intelligence, recruits soldiers and provides
guides for North Vietnamese units staging an attack in
the area." 10
Beyond the initial cadres, another need of the Viet
Cong has been to develop an army, a control system, and
a system of base areas and corridors. They have filled this
need through their ability to work with and control peasants.
Thus the second central conception of their strategy is the
development of a "People's Army" needed to protect the revo-
lutionary communities. The "People's Army," is radically
different from an "army of peasants": the former stresses
political education as well as military training and depends
10William Brucher, "Viet Cong agents 'Target of Drive'"
New York Times, August 4, 1968, p. 8.
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on service to revolutionary goals, on satisfying and
rewarding relations between officers and men and on
help for the peasants at home to build its dedication
and effectiveness.
While the Viet Cong, later Viet Cong, and PAVN
(People's Army of North Viet Nam) military system
functions and meshes quite differently than the GVN - U.S.
system, the units are roughly equivalent. Viet Cong main
force units, local forces, and guerillas are the rough
equivalent of ARVN, the RF, and the PF.
Before the Viet Cong organization was extended
throughout the countryside into all villages, however, the
main focus of the cadres was on villages in and around what
were to become base areas and supply corridors. This
differential treatment was a consequence of the fact that
villages vary greatly in tactical importance. In general
terms, the two most important kinds of villages from
the standpoint of either side are villages in base areas
and villages along supply corridors.
Both the Viet Cong and GVN military organizations have
extensive transportation and logistics systems that must be
kept open to allow free circulation of men, equipment and
food for their war effort and for the basic economy of their
area. The GVN must exert maximum pressure to keep certain
villages under its control because these villages lie along
major highways. An Nhon district in Binh Dinh, for example,
has been a high priority area for the government because
the highway from Quinhon to Pleiku split the district in
two. If the Viet Cong could gain control of this district
today, they would isolate Pleiku and the American troops
in the Highlands.
Similarly, the Viet Cong have their own routes that
must be kept open to insure communication between their
own strategic areas and to transport their men and supplies.
Both sides are prepared to do incredibly brutal and bloody
fighting to keep their corridors open. A token of their
importance can be seen in the attitude of one PF outpost
in Long An situated in a Viet Cong corridor. Its men quite
simply refused to take their stations; and, although the
district chief tried every punishment short of execution, he
could not persuade them to face what they considered certain
death.
Both sides have base camps that they will protect to
the bitter end. Since neither side can hope to gain control
of all the population at once, a base area is a necessity for
a prolonged effort. Saigon is obviously the GVN's most
important base, and it is easy to understand why Long An
and Dinh Tuong were such important early targets for the
Viet Cong: these two provinces control the roads and
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waterways that give access to the delta from Saigon.
Some of the bloodiest fighting of the war has gone into
the Viet Cong base in Northern Binh Dinh. The base areas
and supply corridors together constitute the vital system
which either side needs to progress in an effort to control
the population. For the Viet Cong:
The system functions in response to the
needs of the three-tiered armed force. It
provides lodging and rest areas for units
in motion, cached supplies of food and
munitions, routed communications, transit
points, staging areas and medical facilities.
In the more remote regions facilities for
training, and for we ons manufacture and
repair are included.
As the insurgency progresses, the base area system
which the revolutionaries control begins to expand into
populated areas, what the Viet Cong call the liberated
areas.
At this point, a note of clarification is necessary.
A certain amount of confusion about the local war in
Viet Nam has resulted from the fact that the American
news media, unfamiliar with the Vietnamese countryside,
have failed to bring out a crucial complicating factor
in the fight to control the rural order: the difference
between the Vietnamese village and the hamlet. The Viet-
namese hamlet is the living group most like the small
11Lt. Colonel William J. Buchanan and Lt. Colonel Robert
A. Hyatt, Counterquerrilla Operations. A special study con-
ducted at the U.S. National War College, March 19, 1968,
pages 1-12.
face-to-face communities which the word village brings to
mind for Americans, whereas the village is more like a
township or a very small county containing an average of
6 hamlets in an area of about 4 square miles, which
form a unit of national administration.
South Viet Nam consists of about 2,365 villages
containing about 13,000 hamlets, the number varying as
administrative lines change. The average hamlet contains
about 250 families and 1000 people. The size vary
considerably, however, with some hamlets near Saigon or in
populous parts of the Mekong Delta containing as many as
5,000 people and some isolated hamlets containing no more
than a few hundred people.
Because each village is composed of several scattered
living areas, security and control varies greatly within a
single village which may well shelter soldiers from both
sides. Usually, in the areas studied, the GVN controlled
the hamlet which served as village headquarters and the
hamlets nearest to it One or two hamlets farther from
the village headquarters would often be controlled by the
Viet Cong both day and night. Even when there were no
hamlets totally under Viet Cong control, there were usually
one or more hamlets to which they had easy access at night.
If a hamlet had once been under total Viet Cong control
and then changed hands or at least fallen under partial
government control, declared Viet Cong cadres would be
stayina elsewhere, but the villaae would still harbor
covert Viet Cong supporters and members of Viet Cong
families. On the other hand, Viet Cong hamlets were
usually not "homogeneous" either, often containing
families with men in ARVN or RF/PF, even an occasional
ex-village official, and many villagers who did not
favor the Viet Cong.
CHAPTER III
THE MYTH OF THE VILLAGE
" . . . The world of the individual peasant is
one of suffering and repressed dissent,
reflecting the response of the average
individual to coercive authority, the
inefficient guidance and unchallenged power
of elders, the prescriptive nature of pea-
sant virtues, the severe character of rigid
mores, and the confinement of standards based
upon identification by kin affiliation."
Beqiraj, Mehmet, Peasantry in
Revolution, Cornell Research
Papers in International Studies
- V, 1966, D. 1.
A fundamental failure of all Dacification efforts in
Viet Nam since 1954 has been the lack of development of a
workable system for linking village institutions to those of
the larger society. This failure is deeply rooted in
Vietnamese traditions which emphasize village autonomy and
village self-sufficiency. These traditions are unworkable in
a modern national system. They were developed at a time when
central government was weak, there were no cities and village
problems were largely solvable within the village.
This chapter deals with Diem's nodel for organizing the
village political framework and his fundamental misconceptions
of the traditional system, especially his assumption that the
traditional institutions worked in the past, and could work.
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in the present, on a basis of altruism, community spirit,
and traditional legitimacy. Not understanding the impact
on the village structure of changes taking place elsewhere
in the country, Diem regarded the village wholly as an
expression of the traditional system and values of the
mandarin era. He believed, then, what is referred to here
as "the myth of the village". By clinging to this
traditional interpretation he destroyed the possibility of
establishing a viable relationship between the central
government and the village, thereby contributing to the
internal disintegration of the village structure; he thus
gave the Viet Cong the opportunity to establish their own
sysitem of control.
This thesis of the "myth of the village" will be
explored in the remainder of Chapter II. We shall discuss
village organization in three recent phases of Vietnamese
history - the mandarin period, the period of French
colonization, and the political system under Diem beginning
in 1954. This discussion will attempt to show that the
central government was successful in maintaining control
of the village only when its authority over the village was
based on power elements directly tied into the village
economic and social system itself. When the central
government tried to exert its authority through elements no
longer integral to the village, the government failed but
the village structure itself was irreparably damaged.
Villages in the Mandarin Period
Vietnamese village history is often interpreted as
showing great altruism and community spirit. Existence of
a primitive village welfare system, the ability to provide
self-defense, and collective responsibility for building
and maintaining irrigation systems are taken as evidence of
great community spirit and village devotion. They have
also led many modern Vietnamese to believe that the same
village institutions and traditions could be successful
today. The "last Confucian," Ngo Dinh Diem, had faith that
"village traditions, if once reinstated, would of themselves
expel the Viet Cong like natural antibiotics."l An examination
of traditional village life illustrates, however, that this
idyllic view was seriously inadequate.
Before the French colonization, the sentimentalists
argue, the villages of Viet Nam were autonomous and viable.
To a certain extent this description does hold true of the
pre-colonial setting. At that time, Viet Nam possessed a
very weak central government whose role was more to oversee
than to execute the functions of government. Administration
of taxation, welfare and public works was the affair of the
village. The traditional elite of the village council
controlled the formula determining individual shares of the
village tax assessments; they determined the distribution of
1Dennis Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam.
New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1968
Or~B:$ ,:
communal and cult land, the planning of irrigation systems,
the storage of rice against famine, the maintenance of
public ways and buildings -- in short, everything that
comprised government in the village.
As for the imperial government, in the words of
Paul Mus:
It was authoritarian, but it preserved a
ritualistic distance between itself and its
subjects ... The Vietnamese state kept aloof
from too pressing material obligations by re-
serving for itself the right of verification
and eventual repression, but not of execution
... The state was a coordinator. Its object
was to prevent the smaller community from
going astray and its chief ministers were a
kind of high tribunal sitting in judgment
before lapses from the Confucian model. 2
The emperor based his legitimacy upon the "mandate of heaven,"
a polite expression for the identification of rightful
authority with power, which provided no theory of succession
or revolution. The winner of Dower was a king; the loser,
a bandit.
The mandarinal examinations were the main road to status
and power in pre-colonial Viet Nam, a country which lacked
developed cities with their ponulation of absentee landlords
and their opportunities for the making of urban fortunes. As
many as 5,000 aspirants would present themselves at these
examinations, supposedly held triennially but more often
2Paul Mus, "Vietnam: A Nation Off Balance," Yale Review,
Summer, 1952.
disrupted by war, palace coups or general instability. 3 Those
who nassed thnem were accented into the administration as
mandarins and were sent out into the countryside as agents of
the government.
Paradoxically, those who failed the exams were probably
as important to the well being of the state as its regular
servants. Those who failed and these were the majority -
nevertheless returned to their villages with new prestige, and
with tax exemptions for their families. They became the
school teachers who provided the cultural continuity of the
country and filled out the society of village notables.
Nearly every village had a retired mandarin or a failure who
knew how the affairs of government were conducted and how to
talk to its representatives. Still more important, these
failed candidates usually had successful friends from school
days who might be able to smooth the way for some important
business of the village. Today, by contrast, government
officials are recruited from the bourgeoisie, live in urban
areas, and enjoy the modern life befitting their respected
nosition. As yet, no one has taken their place in the villaqe.
The village has, consequently, less linkage to central
authority than under the mandarin system.
The mandarin system, understandably, emphasized the
values of loyalty and tranquility, even at the expense of
honesty, justice and harmony. As long as he suppressed
3Buu Duong, "The Role of Confucianism in the History of
the Vietnamese Mandarinal System," Harvard University
Graduate School of Education, Ph.D. thesis, 1958.
bandits, raiders, and rebels in his province or district,
the mandarin was required only to deliver the taxes to the
imnerial administration, keeping what may have been as
much as two thirds of the revenue for himself.4 Miany
villages regularly practiced tax evasion by falsifying
thLeir tax rolls. The behavior of the mandarins becomes more
understandable, however, when it is observed that they
probably received no regular salary before the year 1839, 5
and that although he kept a large share of the taxes to
meet his own expenses, he probably found it necessary to
use another portion to make accommodation with the local
village notables whose support was necessary to preserve
the order and tranquility upon which his career depended.
As long as the countryside was quiet, his communications
with the emperor were less working reports than expressions
of loyalty. Mandarins were left to their own resources to
deal with local disturbances; and, although they were
nominally only agents for the transmission and execution of
the imperial ordinances, "Tn practice, ... they enjoyed a
(reat deal of authority because even the most urgent
communications between Hue [the capital] and the frontier
provinces required a minimum of eight days."6
4Roy Jumper, Political and Administrative History of
Vietnam, M.S.U.G., 1962, p. 53.
5 Alec Woodside, "Some Features of the Vietnamese Bureau-
cracy Under the Early Nguyen Dynasty." Harvard Papers on China,
1964, p.22
6Roy Jumper, op. cit., p. 32.
Life in the countryside before the French, therefore,
was a picture far from the tranquil pastoral ideal commune
which some twentieth century Vietnamese still imagine it
to be. The village was relatively self-sufficient and
self-contained, but it may also have been a self-contained
little world of seething resentment, frustration and rancor.
Its harmony was, at best, superficial. Every peasant had
"a place in the sun," but this usually meant not security,
but dependence without recourse on the village notables
who determined who would supply corvee labor, who would be
drafted, and who would pay taxes.
Village closure, or self-containment, in fact, had been
imposed on the villagers from above during the occupation of
their land by the Chinese, who used the village as their unit
of population control. Since families were not allowed to
leave the village, their place in the village again represented
a hidden form of coercion. A place in the village meant no
chance to move.
Confucian values were meant to provide the restraint
necessary to assure an equitable life for all; but in fact
the members of the village council could be expected to look
out for themselves first when deciding who would supply
corvee labor, who whould be drafted, and who would pay
taxes. An example of the opportunities for petty corruption
and exploitation on the Part of the village elite appears
in the court record of the early nineteenth century. Village
communal lands, held at the disposal of the landless in each
locality, were co-opted by the villacre leaders of Binh Dinh
province in the first years of the century to form large
private estates. This abuse came to the attention of the
court as early as 1803, but it was 1839 before any corrective
action was taken.7
The absence of cities meant that landowners and men
familiar with the mandarins from their school days lived in
the village. Decentralized government and the leeway
available to the mandarins meant that these upper class
villagers could bargain and work with the mandarin to control
their villages. Serious problems in the village could
bring the aid of outside troops. -More easily, however, their
control of lands and individual taxation gave the village
leaders great opportunity for oraanizing villagers to
perform communal works. Recalcitrant villagers, for example,
who might protest that the oligarchs were not paying their
'fair share' of taxes or aiding in maintaining irrigation
systems might lose their land rental rights, or the village
leaders might hire other peasants to subdue the protesters.
The "oppressed proletariat" whether rural or urban, are not
necessarily united. As Jay Gould once remarked in the U.S.,
"I can hire one half the working class to kill the other
half."
7Roy Jumper, Notes on the Political and Administrative
History of Vietnam, M.S.U.G., Saigon, 1962.
8Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups New York, 1968, p. 70
There was also an effective way for the mandarins to
control the village leaders. Should the elite of a village
fail to keep order or go beyond the bounds of propriety,
rather effective sanctions were available to the mandarins
in the form of collective punishment. A village that
became the scene of a riot, refused to oay its taxes,
or harbored even a single dead body was subject to
destruction. 9 Since there were no cities, and other villages
were closed to the disobedient villacrers, village destruction
meant a long trek to new lands and starting life over.
Everyone suffered, including those who had started the
trouble.
Even in its most perfect form, then, the mandarinal
government by the "morally just individual" did not always
approximate the ideal. Just as important, however, was the
fact that the system at its best was never adequate to the
needs of a modern state. The mandarinal system was not
oriented to the execution of policies. As in China, the
mandarin class undertook and were accorded responsibility for
specific governmental acts. They were accountable for the
discharge of these government duties, but they were
autonomous in their choice of means. Heaven, in the Chinese
sense, was not a policy-making agency.10
9 Duncanson, op. cit., p. 57
10Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and
Contemporary Perspectives, p. 75.
Villaaes Under the French
Under the French, the rise of urban centers, the
influence of a stronger central government, and the
introduction of a ssystem of absentee landholding with its
clientele of city landlords and money-lenders changed the
life of the peasants considerably. The country was divided
into new provinces and major social changes were wrought
by the transformation of traditional Viet Nam into a colony
of one of Eruone's most rigidly centralized powers.
To streamline their administration, the French
"destroyed the Confucian balance between ritualistic state
and autarchic village."ll Agents of the French usurped the
functions of the local councils along a wide front: they
created a regular system for registering births and deaths,
for example, and they took control of the village budget so
that the peasants became individual taxpayers instead of
contributors to the collective village levy which had so
often been the object of local manipulation. They even
attempted to replace the traditional village council
system of co-option through the introduction of elections.
In large measure these innovations were successful.
With the census and tax rolls subject to outside scrutiny
and with matters of budget and taxation themselves under
national control, the councils were stripoed of the source
llPaul Mus, "'Tietnam: A Nation Off Balance," Yale Review,
1952, p, 11
of much of their former prestige which derived from the
ability to protect the village, or some strata of it,
against outsiders and their demands.
Yet the French did not ultimately succeed in setting
the village entirely within a national framework: their
plan to substitute elected, nationally responsible officials
for the informal coterie which had held power in the village
foundered on the opposition of the notables who took-
advantage of the political inexperience of their fellow
villagers. The local influentials retained, informally, the
power to select candidates for office, since even if outside
authorities appointed the village officials, the new local
governement would be obstructed at every point if it deviated
too much from the desires of the local, economically
powerful elite. As Paul Mus has written, "Without coming
forward themselves, the notables maneuvered other men into
position and then conducted a veiled-opposition to all the
measures recommended by the colonial administration."l12
The French, then discredited the local councils
and alienated their suDport, but they were unable to replace
them as the controllers of the rural order. The embodied
authority of the traditional village structure remained as
before. The failure of the French to effect a legitimate
12Paul Mus, Sociologie d'une guerre, Chanter II, p. 5.
transfer of this power and authority to their own officials
resulted in a continuation of the existing village structure
and in the failure to develop a meaningful political
identification with the central government.
This process of the weakening of the village was
accelerated by institutional changes introduced by the
French. The mandarin examinations were allowed to lapse
and the whole of the mandarin system was finally abolished
in 1915. The Chinese characters which had served as the
medium for Vietnamese culture were replaced by quoc nu
the romanized script developed in the early 1600's by
Alexander Rhodes, a French Jesuit of sephardic lineage.
Land became an item of commerce, to be bought and sold
in the money economy that was developing alongside barter in
the countryside. Whereas the peasant had contributed labor
to the irrigation system under the mandarins, he was now
required to contribute through taxes. City administrators
demanded taxes in money, not in kind, so the peasant was
forced to deal with the middlemen who would trade a little
of that scarce commodity - money - for the villager's rice.
The rhythmn of rice cultivation had always left the
peasant periods of free time, thus making labor exactions
relatively easy to fulfill: the money tax was thus a
qualitative change from and a heavier burden than, corvee
labor.
In short, faced with the loss of their local
administration and their local intelligentsia, the
villagers were left on their own to cope with social
chanae.
French colonialism, then, did not simply replace the
mandarins with French and Vietnamese personnel selected by
colonial criteria. The French made fundamental changes
in the administrative and social systems of Viet Nam
which destroyed the conditions under which the village
could be simultaneously mandarin, autonomous, viable and
capable of mobilizing peasants for collective action.
Strong central government and the rise of urban centers
and towns meant a separation of the village from those who
made the decisions affecting the villagers lives. Individual
taxation and the rise of absentee landlords meant a further
loss of bargaining power available to the village government.
Urban centers also meant less personal contact and common
experience between village and national officials, even
further weakening the power relations which had helped
account for what stability existed before the French.
Villaces Since 1954
Two contradictory themes run through the literature
about the history of South Viet Nam's villages since 1954.
On the one hand, Ngo Dinh Diem is accused of destroying a
500 year old tradition of "village democracy." On the other
hand, he is pictured as having done little or nothing to
alter village life. As far as can be seen, villages that
had remained fairly whole and unscarred by the Indochinese
war were little changed by Diem, while villages in disarray
were plunged even further into chaos.
Khanh Hau, the one village studied extensively during
the Diem era, is revealing of the limitations of the Diem
system of village government at its best.13 Although it
was chosen as representative of the Delta, Khanh Hau was an
unusual village in some respects: it was the site of a his-
toric shrine of which the villagers were justifiably proud
and of a new school built as oart of a special pilot project.
Desnite these material advantages there seemed to be no sense
of village solidarity, no strong bonds between the members
of the community. There was no purpose that united them:
the village council seemed to lack the desire or the ability
to create either a feeling of national allegiance or a
sense of urgency and dynamism among the villagers.
13See Gerald Hickey, Village in Vietnam, New Haven,
1964, and James Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau, Chicago,
1966.
Positions on the village council were bureaucratic
drudgery, involving a staggering amount of paperwork and paying
next to nothing. Council members were still expected to up-
hold their status by various forms of conspicuous consumption,
such as throwing huge banquets. Thus only an upper class
villager with both the time and the money to participate
actively in the political life of the village could hold
a council position. The council served the ambitions of the
"haves," who consented to the indignities and inconveniences
of serving a term on the village body only because it
represented the road to the informal local oligarchy, the
village Cult Committee.14 The "have nots" had no role in the
direction of village life; and, as in most traditional
societies, the young numbered among the have-nots. The only
young person who was involved at all with the work of the
Khanh Hau village council was a twenty-one year old boy who
was hired to serve as clerk for the council members who
were becoming increasingly irritated by the demands their
positions made on their time.
Anyone who was young or held ambitions of a career with
a chance for advancement had two choices before him: Saigon
or the Viet Cong. In villages like Khanh Hau, Diem had done
little for the institutional development of the village.
14The French had strioped the village council of its
religious functions, but village notables kept the Cult Com-
mittee, responsible for certain communal ceremonies,
functioning on their own.
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Politics was still conducted as under the mandarins. The
village oligarchy, who saw themselves as the judges of who
should govern, tried to cushion the village from outside
demands and powers. But they could not use the sanctions
and instruments of control which were formerly their most
effective weapons.
The tradition-oriented village leaders could rule
only to the extent that their legitimacy was based on
traditional values. As Hickey reported from Khanh Hau,
"A group of older men, many of whom had served on the council,
laughed heartily when one noted that the people used to be
the servants of the Village Council, now the Village
Council is the servant of the people."l15 They had none of
the options open to their ore-colonial Dredecessors because
all taxation was uniform and large landowners were drifting
away to the city. This meant that they could neither
manipulate rental agreements to coerce a peasant into
"voluntary" action or gain a peasant's gratitude by
intervening on his behalf with the landlord. Nor could the
old "nunish-the-village" attitude work when everyone was not
tied to the village. Now that there were in many villages
groups or persons inspired by a powerful ideology who had
come to owe primary allegiance to a community wider than
the village and were willing to let the village be destroyed
rather than to compromise their aims, "punishing the village"
that harbored rebels needed to give way to the kinds of
15 Hickey, 1964, p. 185.
participation in village life that could persuade the
villagers that their homes were worth defending.
Nor could the occasional dedicated village chief
necessarily develop a following if he chose to compete
with the Viet Cong for local allegiances. Cities, absentee
landlords, and strong central governement meant that the
most important influences on the peasant were beyond the
reach and influence of village officials. Diem's model
cast the village chief as representative of the government
to the people, not as political representative of the
people to the government. The village was less well
represented than in the days when village notables had the
real possibility of working out policy adjustments with
the mandarins.
If the village was quiet, it ra.s also stagnating.
Diem could not move Khanh Hau with appeals transmitted
through the old oligarchy. His nation building in Khanh Hau
consisted of requiring more paper work from those aspiring
to become venerables.
Villages in a great many areas of South Viet Nam did
not fare even so well as Khanh Hau during the years of the
Diem administration. Elsewhere, especially the areas con-
trolled by the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects and in the old
Viet Mlinh areas 16 with a population of between two and three
16See Appendix B for a map of Viet Nam in 1953.
4) ~
million peasants, the purpose of Diem's appointed
administrators was to discredit rival local religious and
political elites. In the areas of the sects or of Viet
Minh strength, Diem often appointed administrators from
outside the village. When they were not outsiders, they
were often local influentials who had been discredited and
humiliated by the Viet Minh. Forced once to flee their
villages, they returned with predictable grudges and
vendettas to settle. Since there was no check on their
behavior they were, on the whole, corrupt. Loyalty to
Diem, who styled himself a "leader of superior moral
fiber," had nothina to do with service to the peasant
population. The embezzlements of these new leaders became
a pledge of loyalty to Diem; and, in fact, given the wait-
and-see attitude of his compatriots in these areas, it is
possible that Diem would never have filled his government,
if he had not looked the other way at corruption.
In dealing with the supposedly stable villages,
especially in the early years of his rule, Diem was
conservative to a fault in relying on traditional institutions
and where he did find himself forced to replace or destroy
unacceptable organizations, extensive corruption resulted.
Between the two of these policies, he succeeded in plunging
all of Viet Nam into chaos. The traditional elite could
produce no dynamism for national programs, and the arbitrary,
repressive officials whose job was to bring recalcitrant
areas under control only put dynamite in the arguments
and strategies of the Viet Cong. A striking example of
the way in which "strong government" action often
backfired for the national government is contained in
the story of one defector from the Viet Cong:
In 1956-57 life was pretty easy, villagers
had motorcycles. Then came law 10-59.
Under this law Diem was given the right to
cut off heads of persons suspected of being
VC sympathizers. This actually happened in
hamlets near mine. Many people were worried.
In March 1960 there was a big football game
between my team and another team. The two
teams fought and were mad with each other.
Because the families of some of the boys
worked for the government, I really believed
that they would take revenge on me. I was
afraid and I tried to hide. I went home. The
VC knew that I had won the game and they came
to propagandize me. They said, "Look at you,
you have got to hide, but you can't really
hide. You have no arms. The people will
catch you and hurt you." The VC dug a
shelter for me to hide in ...17
Ironically, the areas that Diem did his best to destroy
emerged from the Diem period as viable areas. The Hoa Hao,
the Cao Dai, and the Viet Minh all survived his attacks.
Khanh Hau, however, did not survive his benevolence. In
March of 1967, three of its hamlets were totally under
VTiet Cong control and there was heavy fighting around the
entire village.
Thus while the inhabitants of Khan Hau shared a
common tradition they did not have the strong social bonds
17Studies of the Chieu Hoi Program: Interviews with the
Hoi Chanh. Simulmatics Corporation. Sponsored by Advanced
Projects Agency; Washington, D. C. 1966, Interview No. CH-24,
on. 5-6
or the sense of solidarity which Diem interpreted as
intrinsic to the traditional village. As Hickey noted,
solidarity or communalism could not be attributed to the
village. 18 The social and political system of the village,
then, did not naturally and automatically provide as base
for collective action.
The Government leaders, then, fell back on a
sentimentalized picture of an ideal village Viet Nam and
made themselves its guardian. They extolled the virtues
of a Viet Nam which probably never was. While the Viet Cong
took on the task of attempting to form a nation, Ngo Dinh Diem
and his successors often have seemed to be walking backwards
into the future. Many of them have attributed the decline
of the traditional commune to the "corruption" of the French
and the "evils" of city life. Many prominent Vietnamese
still hold these view, though all evidence contradicts them.
Less than a year ago, Ton That Thien, the new GVN Minister
of Information, wrote that before his plan of pacification
could be effective in the provinces, "these provinces should
be all but cut off from the rest of the country to avoid
the corrupting influence of the cities."l1 9 Pacification and
control was taken to mean a return to the nre-colonial
situation in the villages, a return to the old, integral,
1 8Hickey, op. cit., p. 278
1 9Ton That Thien, "Town versus Country: A Basic Source
of Tension and Conflict in Vietnam." Saigon, n.p. 1967. mimeo.
)0CIO
harmonious communes of the past, a past without cities or a
strong central government, a past in which neasant problems
were infact soluble within the village.
It has become fashionable to talk of the breakdown of
the village and the loss of the qualities and virtues it
once possessed. This is romanticism; this is the "myth of
the village." Ways of life that may have existed only for
lack of alternatives are extolled as virtues. Peasants who
have nothing to wear and who go hungry are assumed to have
a rich spiritual life. When a son sticks to his father for
the sake of survival, this is called filial piety. TWhen
people in one village do not talk to their neighbors in
another, this is called village solidarity. Somehow what
might only have been the necessities and oppressions of one
era seem to have become the traditional values of the next.
The success of the traditional institutions need not
be attributed to solidarity or community spirit, but instead
to the constraints governing the relation between the state
and the village which made it possible for the village
institutions to work: a weak central government, no cities,
and a taxation system which assessed taxes upon the village
and not the individual. These constraints, missing under
Diem, produced the necessary incentives and sanctions for
both leaders and peasants to make the village institutions
work.
Villages under mandarin government may have been
autonomous, but they were not, therefore, necessarily
cohesive and organic. Autonomy, viability and organic
solidarity are not interchangeable concepts. Even under
the mandarins, when autonomy was glorified, solidarity
and viability sometimes resulted from an outside cadre
who brought the village viability and solidarity by
breaking down autonomy, creating linkages to organizations
transcending the village. As with latter day revolutionaries,
the success of Portugese, Spanish, and Dutch Catholic
priests from 1550 onward was at least partly due to the
absence of organization within villages. The priests,
working in the language and idiom of the village and with
local cadres, brought about the organization necessary to
meet the local problems:
... the chretiente offered the converts
mutual support against bullies, extortionate
moneylenders and the bailiffs of absentee
landlords, in a land where the government
could not yet be counted on to keep order or
to uphold law, and it afforded that organization
for mutual defense against both brigandage and
abuse of authority ...20
Diem, when he turned from city to country problems,
behaved like a political "Jekyll and Hyde." A superb
manipulator of those around him, he failed to understand
that manipulation and bargaining were also essential for the
2 0Duncanson, op. cit., p. 80.
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traditional system he tried to impose on the village to
work. He counted on traditional values and myths to
legitimize rural government and ignored the need of men
in the village to have some Dower or influence over the
representatives of the state. In effect, he built a
government that counted on all men to deal justly with
those under them, without supplying the rewards necessary
to motivate this kind of behavior.
At times his view of [that] society was
revealed in manipulation of subordinates that
went so far in making use of defects as to border
on the cynical; at others he exposed himself to
setbacks through a falsely idealized image of
Vietnamese society. The logic of this distinction
was that one standard of oolitical action was
appropriate to the life of the village-stronghold
of tradition and all that was essentially Vietnamese
and the proper care of the mandarinate -- while
the other developed as an accommodation to
modernity and the corrupting intrusion of
politics and economics which ... threatened to
turn more and more Vietnamese villages into
21towns.21
To a great extent, this oolicy of the double standard
and the chaos it produced still survive in rural Viet Nam.
The plethora of tangled and conflicting agencies, an army
that is often the peasants main problem, numerous non-
cooperating military and intelligence units, endless
corruption, and a belief that the next pacification program
will work -- all these are still with the peasant who has not
2 1Duncanson, on. cit., p. 214
left for the city, who holds fast to his familiar farm and
village. The problem that must be resolved in pacification,
both for the GVN and the Viet Cona, is the fact that
villages are not automatically cohesive, organic communities.
The potential for "villagism"' exists and is even increased
by the brutalities of war, but the actual fact of villagism
cannot be assumed. Indeed, as will be developed later, the
task of developing villagism through communal organization
is a key aspect of pacification. The model used by the
Vietnamese government, however, was inadequate for the task.
Security and stability will not come from turning back
history. A country which has started to modernize cannot be
pacified by a return to the past. As Paul Mus noted nearly
twenty years ago:
It is necessary to desist from efforts to
pacify the country by reestablishing traditional
village institutions as part of a political and
military security network -- a concept which ...
is economically and socially obsolete.22
In fact, the successfully pacified areas have been able to
transform themselves to meet the demands of a Hobbesian
world by involving their own people in a search for a new
life and new ways to govern. This has brought them security.
22Paul Mus, "The Role of the Village in Vietnamese
Politics," Pacific Affairs, Seotember, 1949, p. 271.
The failure of pacification in the others may be blamed on
the lack of patterns of communication, institutional
participation and Political coercion and bargaining that
would bring the village community into the nation state of
the twentieth century.
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF DISTRUST: GROWTH OF THE VIET CONG
Diem's faith in traditional village institutions led
directly to the success enjoyed by those Viet Minh cadres
that remained south in developing a working civil-military
organization throughout South Viet Nam. The GVN system
failed to protect the peasants from G1VN cadres and soldiers,
its cadres from the Viet Cong, and, ultimately, its
soldiers from the Viet Cong. The system failed because it
was oriented at every level to satisfying the demands and
fears of higher officials whose criteria did not meet the
needs and realities of the village. It was based almost
entirely on destroying the Viet Cong directly through
force, as opposed to destroying the Viet Cong indirectly by
competing with them in order to take away their strength.
This attrition approach failed because it expressed military
thinking that placed more emphasis on the Viet Cong military
threat than on the Viet Cong political system. The system
did more harm to the peasantry than did the Viet Cong,
emphasized large units rather than anti-guerrilla tactics,
and proved unable to develop effective intelligence.
Peasant communities in general are a valuable potential
resource to any would-be revolutionary. If they can be
mobilized, their economic situation and work habits allow
them to provide insurgents with large quantities of both
material goods and human labor. Peasants, as conventional
wisdom stresses, are very poor, very conservative, and very
suspicious of outsiders. However, they can also be bored
and frustrated: they can become'the source of an extra-
ordinary amount of labor and capital. It was Mao's
genius to develop a systematic way to tapping and utilizing
the potential resources of the peasantry in order to turn
them into a revolutionary force.
Mobilizing the peasantry is by no means an easy
matter, and to say that Mao, the Viet Minh or the Viet Cong
"filled a vacuum" or "satisfied the needs" of the peasants
is to underestimate the magnitude of the revolutionaries' task.
Needs are not fixed and invariant, and vacuums are
theoretical constructs. The successful revolutionary must
be able to convince the poor, down-trodden peasant first,
that he is, in fact, poor and down-trodden, and secondly
that there is a way for him to improve his situation.
Peasants may be short of land, but it is not necessarily an
easy task to convince a peasant that he could possibly
own the land he needs. When Mao wished to mobilize the
peasantry for participation in the revolution he first
introduced them to a revolutionary ideology which explained
the causes of their misery, drew out their resentments,
excited their enthusiasm and directed this enthusiasm toward
the goals of the revolution. He then developed an
organization to channel this mobilized peasant energy and
placed strong emphasis on self-criticism and continued
study in order to keep enthusiasm high and prevent a return
to peasant passivity.
A peasantry which supports the revolution is willing
to contribute money, produce, and labor to the cause. Once
convinced, the peasant can be a remarkable source of support,
especially if conditions are such that absentee landlords
cannot exert immediate pressure on the peasant to ensure
delivery of his dues. If a peasant pays 40-50% of his
yield in rent, for example, then a single village of 3,000
people can produce a rice surplus which is easily large
enough to feed at least 100 men for a year and give each
peasant a much larger share of the yield than previously.
Even if there are no absentee landlords on whom to capitalize,
the peasants can produce an exploitable surplus for the
revolutionaries by "putting the squeeze" on other outsiders.
If the insurgents can force money lenders to charge lower
interest rates, fertilizer merchants to charge lower prices,
or rice merchants to pay more for the rice they purchase,
the village can begin producing for the revolution.
Thus, as Duncanson has pointed out, "even when total
VC strength had reached 300,000 men, their consumption of
paddy would still only be 30 percent of the annual surplus
of Cochinchina normally exported overseas."1
A better life for the peasants and an exploitable
surplus for the revolutionaries can only be created if the
latter can convince the peasant to act without fearing
retribution from the "predators" whom the revolutionary
seeks to control or remove from the village. The peasant
clearly needs protection; but here again, an unexploited
resource of the peasant community itself can provide all the
military manpower needed. This resource is idle time.
Peasant life is hard, but for rice farmers the workload
is concentrated at planting and harvest times. In
South Viet Nam, for example, as much as 40% of the rural
labor force has been estimated to be idle 8 months per year,
as much as 20% idle for all but a few weeks in the planting
and harvesting seasons.2 Thus if the revolutionaries could
redirect the traditional institutions of village life -
ownership, finance and labor mobilization - large gains of
manpower and other resources could be obtained with
negligible capital investment. In short, the portion of
rural production generally exported from the village to the
iDennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam,
New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 408.
2John McDermott, "Is Nation-Building a Good Strategy?"
University of Chicago, Adlai Stevenson Institute, June 4, 1968,
D. 8.
city is large enough for the needs of both the revolution
and the peasants, and their freed labor is more than sufficient
to form an army, construct new buildings in the village, and
even to produce weapons if the required tools are available.
Small arms production factories have been in operation
throughout Viet Cong zones, producing grenades, mines,
mortars and even ammunition. This local arms production
did not end with the influx of arms and equipment from the
North. A military sweep in Kien Giang uncovered a factory
still functioning in August 1968. 3  Nor were the rural
factories limited to weapons production. They manufactured
everything from pajamas for wounded soldiers to cloth for
local consumption and fertilizer for increased cultivation
of secondary crops. 4 And the peasants' own methods of
manufacturing these items can sometimes produce better
results than more modern techniques. Some attempts to
modernize this rural production have backfired, as occurred
in Phu Thu district. Punji stakes for hidden traps on
footpaths are usually made of fire-hardened bamboo; but in
one hamlet PF on an operation discovered 1,500 punji stakes
made from barbed wire. The wire punji stakes turned out to
be incapable of penetrating a shoe when they were stepped on;
3lew York Times, August 10, 1968, p. 4.
3urchett, op. cit., Chanter I, "Of Arsenals and Hospitals,"
pp. 73-80.
they were vastly inferior to the traditional punji stakes.
The revolutionaries, then, can do very well for themselves
just by taking advantage of the hidden "natural resources"
of the rural order; a mobilized peasantry was a rich
potential prize for the Viet Cong.
These natural peasant resources presented themselves
as an especially rich prize in view of the fact that
insurgents possessing a fair amount of this labor and talent
do not necessarily need universal public support in order to
survive. How much and what kind of rural support is
absolutely indispensable to the revolutionaries depends to
a large extent on their strategy and on the ability of the
government to work with people who never supported the
revolution or who have become disillusioned with it.
Revolutionaries can survive with support from only some of
the peasants if the government cannot capitalize on the
potential of the others.
A revolutionary war is not an election or a popularity
contest. Without some popular appeal, neither side could
last for long in a rural area, especially if, like the Viet
Cong, they hope to inspire a sense of mission and dedication
to a cause. Simply gaining "the hearts and minds of the
people," however, cannot guarantee success to either side.
People must be mobilized and organized to support a cause
effectively, and the great failure of Saigon in its attempt
to transform Viet Nam from a city state to a nation has been
its inability to effect such a mobilization.
When the revolution is nascent, still weak, only great
popularity can ensure its survival. WVhen the revolution
has progressed, however, strategy may change; the
revolutionaries may be just as able to strike a crippling
blow with fewer villages in the revolutionary community
than before. This situation has occurred. Although the
Viet Cong controlled fewer villages in pre-Tet 1968 than
they had controlled a year before, their villages still
were well enough coordinated to form what served, in effect,
as a highway into Saigon. According to the December 1967
map of village control,5  the Viet Cong villages, while
numbering only about 25% of all Vietnamese villages, were
so distributed that one could literally travel to any area
of Viet Nam without ever leaving Viet Cong-controlled
territory.
If insurgents can skillfully direct the peasant support
which they do possess, they can provide themselves not
only with peasant goods and labor, but also with the all-
important resource of intelligence. If their information is
good, they can compete successfully with the existing
5See Appendix B.Dee Appendix B.
government even without widespread peasant support for the
revolution. Food, money, men, weapons, can to a large
extent be supplied from outside, if an intact infrastructure
is available to guide, hide, and supply local intelligence.
With good intelligence and mobility the Viet Cong have
survived for long periods in areas militarily dominated by
Government forces either because the intelligence they had
was often sufficient to kill or kidnap anyone who provided
comparable information to the government or because GVN was
too poorly organized to use any intelligence it received
without innumerable delays and inter-agency frictions. 6
Thus not only did the peasantry provide valuable natural
resources for the Viet Cong; the insurgents did not even
need a majority of peasant loyalties to fight a South
Vietnamese army unable to make efficient use of its own
intelligence. This situation made it even more crucial
for the GVN to prevent Viet Cong mobilization of any
sizeable portion of the peasant's talents.
Unfortunately, Diem's view of the village, which was
discussed in the previous chapter, incapacitated him for
the job of stemming the Viet Cong exploitation of the
peasantry. As has been seen, Diem tried to retain old
forms of village social organization without restoring to
6William Brucher, "Viet Cong Agents Target of Drive,"
New York Times, August 4, 1968.
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these villages their pre-French links with and control over
the central government. This combination of policies
provided the Viet Cong with a large reservoir of potential
young recruits and weakened government support among
villagers in general.
7Whether the Viet Minh, or Viet Cong, had always
planned to re-emerge or whether the exclusion of former
Viet Minh from all participation in political life under
Diem was responsible, the insurgents had early and easy
success in recruiting.
Whether village life is hard or easy, and whether
villages are, in fact, cohesive or anomic, one thing is
certain -- they are boring. Rice cultivation requires
intense back-breaking labor for short periods of time.
During the rest of the year, great numbers of men can be
sitting around their homes with little or nothing to do.
In Viet Nam this is especially so in the Mekong Delta where
irrigation is accomplished mainly by rainfall and not manual
labor.
When Viet Cong agitprop teams came to the villages,
they were first welcomed more as a source of entertainment
than of political education. Over time, of course, after
numerous visits the talk would turn to politics and men
would be recruited for Viet Cong organizations. 7
7?or elaboration of the entire organizational comples,
see Pike, op. cit.
It was especially easy to recruit Vietnamese village
youth in this way. The Viet Cong was the only organization
offering both status and psychological security to the
peasants. The youth were offered excitement and adventure,
security and a chance to advance. They may have faced
regimentation within the Viet Cong, but they were "freed
from the freedom to perish in neglected and harassed social
isolation."8 As one youth described "recruitment" to
the revolution:
The Viet Cong taught me to sing songs. I
enjoyed being with the Viet Cong at night because
at night they had a group that would sing. It
was a group of young people my age, about 12 years
old. They would go to the temple. There a Viet
Cong teacher would teach us to sing. They would
sing a phrase and then the people would sing a
phrase.
What the Viet Cong emphasized, above all, was that
the poor didn't have to be poor forever, that people
didn't have to accept the rule of the mandarins and remain
in their social stations. By simply interesting youth in
careers and their own advancement, the Viet Cong undermined
a village political system based on the acceptance of the
status quo and rule by elders. As one Viet Cong remarked in
8Harry J. Benda. "Reflections on Asian Communism."
Yale Review, LVI, 1 (October 1966), pp. 1-16.
9 Studies of the Chieu Hoi Program: Interviews with the
Hoi Chanh. Simulmatics Corporation. Sponsored by Advanced
Projects Agency, Washington, D.C. 1966, Interview No. Ch--15.
an interrogation:
In the past the rich and the bourgeois
used to tell us that the poor were simply
those not blessed by heaven. But the Viet
Cong worked very hard to change this. They
said the people were poor because they didn't
have any land to till; heaven had nothing to
do with economics. So the people listened
and decided that if heaven did not affect
their economic life they did not have to go
to the shrine and pray f8 r a better life, and
they stopped going ...
Thus the persistence of village structure offering
little promise to the young was an important aid to Viet
Cong advances. Just as important, though, as what Diem
preserved of the mandarin system was the relationship he
did not preserve: a connection between national force and
village power. The absence of any such linkage has made
it relatively easy for the Viet Cong to maneuver effectively
in gaining control of and security within the villages.
They used this control and security to accomplish what
they saw as their primary task: educating peasants faith in
the political possibility of challenging what the Viet Cong
presented as arbitrary national rulings imposed on the
villages from above.
The government possessed a national army, to be sure,
but a national army is relatively powerless against assassi-
nations; and the village notables, the way traditional culture
defined their roles, did not often develop a strong enough
local power base to resist.
10Quoted in David Halberstam, "Voice of the Viet Cong,"
January 1968, Harper's Magazine, p. 48, emphasis added.
During the Diem period, especially before 1961, there
was very little attempt to involve the villagers in government;
the participation of the masses as a style of politics was
anathema to traditional Viet Nam. The place of the village
council was to do the administrative work of government,
not to make its decisions. Its members, the village elders,
were more concerned with their status in the village than
with the prospects for dynamic change. Too much activism on
the part of the council might even have threatened their
status, since it would inevitably break down village
parochialism. Village government was mandarin, elite and
passive:
The basic Chinese suspicion ... was that
insurrection occurred when people got notions
in their heads and became confused in their minds.
The function of government, for the mandarin,
was largely to keep people from endless scheming
about life and calculations about how to improve
one's life. Good government should train people
to keep to their stations and to accept the
structure of society. 11
The Viet Cong may have been popular in their early
years, but they were still weak and could not operate
openly without risking capture. There were no village
police, however; and the Viet Cong were able to cut the
district officials off from most intelligence by the
assassination of village officials. It made no difference
11Lucian Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency," in Harry Eckstein,
Internal War (Free Press, 1964), p. 161, emphasis added.
whether the murdered official was upstanding or corrupt
elected or appointed. The imoortant fact was that an
organized group with force behind it opposed the central
government and that government did not, or could not,
stop them. The village elites responded in the traditional
fashion -- accommodation.
... when the incumbents were unable to
respond to village needs for security, it
was usually both convenient and advantageous
for villages to come under the protection of
political movements opposing the prevailing
dynasty. 12
Military officials in charge of province and district
government could do little about the Viet Cong underground
network because they were almost totally removed from what
government intelligence there was. Intelligence services
were purposely fragmented and kept separate from the military,
so that no one chief could control all sensitive information,
and so that the army could both be better spied on and con-
trolled. The militarization of government thus did not
protect the village officials or improve village services.
... no force existed that was willing to
struggle for the allegiance of the local popu-
lation and for the safety of the village chiefs
and local officials being murdered in increasing
numbers; the American and Vietnamese military
refused to deal with the situation because it did
not fall within the definition of "external aggression.,"l3
12John McAlister, "Historical Context of Revolution in
Vietnam," mimeo. p. 24.
13Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams (Praeger, 1964), first
revised edition, p. 326.
There was little pressure on military men from their
superiors to protect the local officials, both because other
considerations were more important to the army and because
in many cases, even concerned district chiefs did not have
sufficient intelligence to act against the Viet Cong.
Thus the Diem government not only permitted the persistence
of a non-action-oriented village leadership but failed to
supply any additional support from the central government
to protect the villagers. As a result, villagers learned
that the central government could not be depended on as a
counterweight to the Viet Cong. Little by little, then, with
almost no opposition, the Viet Cong were able to undercut
Diem's government and develop their own infrastructure.
This absence of effective village control over the
central government also displayed itself in non-military
areas. This lack of response has played its role, along
with the inadequate military response, in alienating peasants.
The Viet Cong could exploit this failure by encouraging
peasants to make demands upon the government, then emerging
as champions of the people when the government delivered
its expected rebuffs to the villages.
In recent years, for instance, peasants have been
encouraged to ask for protection from ARVN pillage; and
when their requests have been ignored, the Viet Cong has
had an opportunity to propose its solution: laying traps
around the hamlet so that while ARýP4 stepped around the
hidden traps, peasants would have time to hide their ducks.
Viet Cong success has always been at least partially
attributable to their ability to enforce and carry out GVN
proclamations; it is ironic - or tragic - that so often
only an illegal group has had the capability or opportunity
to do so. Every social arrangement will give rise to
legitimate grievances, and every society has some sort of
an underclass. In Viet Nam, however, the government has
had grave difficulty in either containing, crushing or
diffusing dissent because of the shortcomings of its
institutional arrangements.
Consider, for example, the execution of Diem's land
reform. There is no doubt that the Viet Cong profited from
the land problem; but they did not profit simply because
Diem was a reactionary or oppressive ruler. They were able
to use the land reform and transform it into a political
issue, turning a seemingly arbitrary set of decisions which
peasants did not feel morally obligated to accept into a
question of politics. The problem is far more complex than
the simple situation of the Viet Cong's giving everyone
land, thereby gaining universal support.
The failings of the Vietnamese system of land tenure
can be exploited in many ways. There are the problems of
rent ceilings, market prices, interest levels, fertilizer
prices -- all of which can be manipulated so as to improve
the welfare of an individual farmer.
Diem's policies for dealing with these failing were
often sound ones: maximum rent ceilings, provisions for
displaced persons, loan programs whose terms would not
frighten peasants who had never borrowed from a government
before. But even when he did, as in these cases, understand
the subtle interplay of the factors involved, his mandarin
notion of morally just administration precluded the
possibility of effective enforcement mechanisms for his
policies. For many peasants, therefore, the Viet Cong
easily emerged as the champion of the just cause simply
by exploiting the government's inability to do what it said
it was doing, by encouraging peasants to test the government's
policies and exploiting the disillusionment that resulted
when the policies were not carried out as promised. This
task was particularly easy for the Viet Cong in the
early days of the insurgency because there were so many
problems and issues that could be exploited merely through
hard work and serious discussions: enforcing rent ceilings,
helping the aged and infirm with heavy labor, or keeping
away tax collectors.
As John McAlister has noted, "The real source of in-
surgent strength comes from exploiting those conflicts and
cleavages within a society which cannot be resolved by
existing institutions."l14 Insurgent strength does come from
exploiting conflicts and cleavages, but what must be kept in
mind is that the heart of Viet Cong strength lies in its
ability in some sense to create such conflicts, that is, to
turn traditional resignation or apathy into consciousness of
a salient conflict or cleavage.
In insurgency, as in all political struggles, the
key to a successful strategy is to maneuver into a position
where the opposition, no matter what it does, strengthens
your side. This is what is meant by political judo, the
art of turning the opponent's force against himself, and
this has been the continuing paradoxical result of the
state's reaction to communism in Viet Nam.
This technique is not new to Viet Nam. In 1930-32,
for example, Viet Nam was hard hit by economic depression,
so hard hit that provincial authorities were given the
right to cancel taxes on the peasantry at their discretion.
Before the officials, whose communications with the peasantry
were poor, could announce and publicize the new policy, com-
munist party cadres in the Mien Tay area organized marches
to protest economic conditions and demanded that taxes not
be collected that year. The cadres in the Mien Tay area (on
the coast between Rach Gia and An Xuyen) thus got credit with
the peasantry for what the government had already granted.
14John T. McAlister, Jr., Review of Defeating Communist
Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. By Sir
Robert Thompson, American Political Science Review, September
1967, p. 773.
The next year other cadres organized the same move in Ha Tinh
and Nghe An provinces of An `am. To avoid the loss of
prestige suffered by other officials the previous year, the
government officials in this area refused to remit the taxes
this time. The unrelieved hardship led to an uprising in
which the first revolutionary communities were developed by
the party -- the famed but short lived "Soviets of Nghe
An. "15
The Viet Cong were certainly popular with many
peasants in the early years, but popularity alone cannot
explain how they mobilized men to an active participation
in the movement. Their success in mobilizing men lay
very much in the fact that they exploited, and helped to
create, the wide gulf of mistrust and suspicion between
formal government authority and the peasantry.
A great part of Viet Cong recruitment came about
through placing peasants in a position where they were
afraid not to go with the Viet Cong. When Viet Cong
were in a village, for example, they would renew contacts
with old friends or make friends with a peasant, or even
simply act like a young man they wanted was already their
friend. Suspicion and mistrust between peasants and
village leaders then did the rest. Once the government
officials thought someone might be a Viet Cong, they treated
15Duncanson, op. cit., p. 136.
him like one. Given the arbitrary treatment the government
accorded suspected Viet Cong, the peasant often literally
begged the Viet Cong to take him.
In other words, while it is correct to say that the
Viet Cong exploited the weaknesses of the governement,
namely lack of any true integration and trust between
peasants and government, they also served to create the
particular distrusts which aided in their recruitment by
being friendly. If they had been brutal and arrogant
when they entered villages and talked to people, it is
doubtful that they could have turned suspicion and distrust
to their advantage.
Later, according to interviews, the Viet Cong were
aided in more coercive drafting of men by still being able
to exploit peasant fear of the government. For example,
the Viet Cong would frequently ask a youth to join the
Viet Cong and then, if he refused, destroy his identification
papers. The peasant then had to choose between asking for
new papers, joining the Viet Cong or face potential arrest
as a Viet Cong because he had no papers.
This situation most vividly illustrates the
impossible bind a government is in when it tries to rely
on formal rules rather than accurate intelligence or personal
intermediaries trusted by both government and peasant.
There is no way for the government not to be exoloited in
such a circumstance unless there is someone that the peasant
knows and trusts and who is also known and trusted by the
government. Suppose, for example, that whenever a peasant
came to the district administration and asked for new
papers, they were politely issued. Then, Viet Cong would
have an easy way of obtaining identification papers. They
could simply buy or steal them from other peasants. On the
other hand, if the government, to prevent this, always
refused to issue new papers, the Viet Cong would still
win because they would have gained a recruit.
The tangle is unraveled only when there is a way of
taking motives and circumstances into account. This
requires intermediary linkages of trust between government
and peasant.
Such intermediaries, trusted by both government and
peasant were and are seldom present in South Viet Nam. In
their absence the consistent pattern of government officials
has been to minimize the chance of being duped personally
by the Viet Cong. The result has usually been far more
disastrous to the state than if they had been willing to
assume trust in the peasants and accept that occasionally
they would be personally embarrassed.
The standard operating procedure of the government
from 1954 through the present (with the partial exception
of village elections discussed later) has been to try to
maximize the relationship between the village leaders and
their superiors at the expense of the relationship between
the officials and the peasants. This has led not only to
the lack of trust between peasant and government but to
the weakness and poor quality of government intelligence.
Village leaders not truly a part of the communications
system of the village have been hardly better than no
linkage at all in being able to separate circumstances and
motives in peasant behavior.
It appears that the dynamics of insurgency are such
that any government not consciously trying to expand
participation is apt to find that the base of popular
support is constantly narrowed. The personal operating
code of individual actors, such as district chiefs, will have
the cumulative effect of increasing the distance between
peasant and government. To guarantee that they will not be
personally betrayed by village officials, district chiefs -
consciously or unconsciously - have tended to rely more and
more on village officials whose loyalty and/or incompatibility
with the Viet Cong was assured. Men most likely to be least
acceptable to the Viet Cong - hence least likely to be
traitors - may also be the men least likely to be trusted by
the lower bases of peasant society and the least likely to
try and overcome the distrust. Village chiefs have tended
to be Catholic, urban, old, conservative, landed or
Drofiteers.
Maximizing the linkage of trust - or minimizing the
chance of personal betrayal - between district chief and
village official, then, has tended to increase the gulf of
effective communication and trust between peasant and
governmental power, i.e. the district chief. Seeking village
leaders closer to the peasantry and then learning to work
with and trust them may be a far more productive policy
for the state, but in the short run it has always appeared
far more threatening to the life and/or career of any
particular district chief or higher official. The less
chance there is for a peasant leader or spokesman to
personally betray the district chief, the more likely it
is that the peasantry will be isolated from the government
and be available to the Viet Cong.
Viet Cong exploit linkages to their advantage by
building up local cadres ties. By making the local cadre
the man you depend on as protection from the Viet Cong
"system;' they literally have been able to create situations
where you hate the Viet Cong so much that you will do
anything to satisfy the local cadre. A widow in one village
who had fled the Viet Cong area gave a cogent example of
how coordinated use of force could aid Viet Cong village
cadres. Sometimes, a peasant would be informed that his
Viet Cong taxes had been raised and would protest to the
local cadre that he could not afford the increase. The local
cadre would say he would take it up with his superiors. A
few days later the cadre would return saying he had gained
permission to lessen the increase a bit, but that was all
he could do. The peasant would end up paying a higher tax
than before and the local grass roots cadre would appear
as a man who had just done a constituent a favor because
he had a voice at city hall. The widow, related this story
as an example of how local cadres could do favors and not how
the Viet Cong used the threat of force to enforce local
demands, or how a local cadre tricked her. A great many
peasants denounced Viet Cong policies but few ever complained
about the individual cadres, while for the GVN the reverse
was true.
The success of this mechanism, demonstrated time and
again, depends on the peasant's view of the individual
cadre. As long as the cadre himself is viewed as possessing
superior virtue and moral fiber, in the peasant's eyes, he
cannot be blamed personally for the policies he enforces.
The peasant may hate the Viet Cong, and even actively hope
the Viet Cong cadre is unable to enter the village, but that
does not necessarily mean he wants the cadre eliminated.
What is the key to the peasant's evaluation appears to be
whether or not the cadre is personally corrupt and exploiting
the peasantry or whether he appears as the trustworthy and
virtuous representative of a tough, coercive and tyrannical
government.
Thus in the civil sphere, both the distance of the
central government from the peasant and the rigid
conception of administration which this distance permitted
opened an easy route by which the Viet Cong could establish
their authority in villagers' minds in place of that of the
government. Time and again, it has seemed that the TViet Cong
needed simply to announce they were championing a cause or
initiating a protest against a policy to close off the
ability of non-Viet Cong to champion or protest a true
grievance.
Village alienation from the government stemmed from
more, however, than simply the lack of civil redress and
military protection. In many cases the government troops
were not only inadequate guardians but also appeared as
marauders themselves.
In most of the rural Viet Nam government presence
has traditionally meant little more than tax collectors,
decrees and speeches. For the last few years, of course,
the majority, if not all of the contact between peasants
and GVN has been with soldiers; and the attitude and
behavior of the soldiers is crucial both to the kinds of
cooperations that develop between them and to the attitudes
of peasants toward their government. Thus the behavior of
soldiers cannot be overemphasized as a key political
element in the Viet Nam war.
In general, the excellent behavior of the Viet Cong
cadres and soldiers has been a major element of Viet Cong
strength. It was possible for the Viet Cong to keep soldiers
recruited in one village based elsewhere because their
personal behavior did not alienate the population. In fact,
Viet Cong soldiers, when in a hamlet, spent time helping the
populace with small tasks.
The petty thievery and general roughhouse attitude of
government soldiers was bad enough to make it worthwhile,.
in early days especially, for peasants to help the Viet Cong
fortify their hamlets. A hamlet surrounded by punji stakes
and pits might only slow the entrance of government soldiers
by 10 or 15 minutes; this would be plenty of time, though,
to meet the needs of both Viet Cong and peasants. While
the peasants were using the few minutes to scurry around
hiding their chickens, the Viet Cong would have time to
hide in their secret tunnels. The soldiers' behavior
also frightened or alienated some men enough to lead them
into the Viet Cong. As one soldier noted:
People who followed the Viet Cong, most of
them, were discontented elements; for example
they have suffered the government's oppression,
the soldiers' disturbance and pillage activities,
therefore they were scared and followed the
Viet Cong. (9334PF)
The Viet Cong were in trouble in 1966-67, when this
study was made, because the pressures of war had forced
them to raise their taxes higher than the taxes in GVN
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areas; and this circumstance caused them to lose much, if
not most, of their popular support. Even so, many peasants
were still being alienated from the government by the way
they were treated. As a. peasant in Kien Giang stated:
The Viet Cong collect higher taxes but
they know how to please the people; they behave
politely so people feel that they are more
favored. They behave politely and nicely to
the people in order to make people like them.
They do not thunder at the people like the
government soldiers.
People like the government because of
freedom, but there is no equality even though
the taxes are lower than the Viet Cong's.
The thing the people don't like in the
government is their behavior. For example,
the soldiers often arrest and oppress the
people only because of revenge--in short
it is banditry. (0319V)
By far the most important manifestation of the lack
of village-central government links, however, was the lack
of trust the government displayed toward the peasants. It
was this lack of trust which kept the government con-
stantly on the defensive, trying harder to protect itself
against possible exploitation by the peasants than it did
to involve the peasants in an effective self-defense effort.
In the early years the Viet Cong were very weak
militarily. By the time the first guerrilla actions of the
war occurred the precursors of the Popular Forces, today's
village military, were being organized in villages around
the country. The Viet Cong still were able to proceed with
their task and to extend their control. Establishing a
small village force with no meaningful links to higher
authority did not solve the problem for Diem, because
exploiting the lateral social ties between villages
gave the Viet Cong an advantage an autonomous village
did not have.
Peasants aren't as fixed and rooted to their village
as conventional wisdom implies. By a conservative
estimate, about half of all peasants in Viet Nam probably
had relatives or friends in other villages, even before
the major displacements of the war. In Khan Hau, Hendry
found that 44 of the 100 families in a random sample had
a total of 67 relatives living outside Khan Hau. 16 Similarly,
a study of refugees in Phu Yen province showed that 54% of
the natives of the hamlets in which refugees from Viet Cong
areas settled had friends or relatives among the refugees. 1 7
All these contacts could be of use to the Viet Cong
in two ways: helping them to extend their own infrastructure
and intelligence net and serving as an informal channel for
disseminating news of their activities. The government
may have had soldiers in every village, but the Viet Cong
could still look the stronger. As Max Clos noted in 1961,
1 6Hendry, Small World, p. 27.
17Terry A. Rambo, Jerry M. Tinker and John LeNoir,
The Refugee Situation in Phu-yen Province, Vietnam. (Abridged
Version) McClean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc.,
July 1967, p. 65.
The Viets are not very numerous, but
terribly active. Several posts are attacked
simultaneously. Then the bands move on and
start their cersecution seven miles further
away. As a result, the population believes
that thousands of Communist soldiers are en-
gaged in many actions simultaneously through-
out the province (Kien Hoa)." 1 8
This situation arose because village soldiers were
placed in an impossible situation that they could not
deal with in the absence of outside aid. In 1960, the
Viet Cong were dependent for nearly all their armament on
what they could capture. This made it dangerous to arm
the village soldiers adequately. As long as the Viet
Cong were calling the shots so completely, they could
mobilize a large enough unit in any area to overwhelm a
single PF unit. The alternative to arming the PF adequately
would have been to insure very good communications
between PF and Civil Guard or ARVN. This course was even
more dangerous, however, from ARVN's point of view, because
radios were real prizes for guerrillas, increasing immensely
their combat capability. The village soldiers, then, were
usually poorly armed and had no sources of reinforcement if
attacked. The village, on its own, was pitted against
coordinated efforts of the Viet Cong; and through 1962
nearly all casualties in the war were village soldiers. 19
18Max Clos. "Vietnam Threatened." In "Reports from Asia
and Europe on Southeast Asia." Atlas I (1961), 12-16,
emphasis added.
19Duncanson, op. cit., p. 305-6.
Until 1964 the village soldiers and civil guard, now PF and
RF, were rarely admitted to ARVN hospitals. 20
Thus, the paradox! Trying to keep the Viet Cong weak,
the village was also kept weak. And with the villages weak,
the Viet Cong did not need to be as strong!
Here again, the ways in which individuals made certain
they would not be exploited tended to narrow the basis of
government strength by alienatincg the peasantry. Trying to
minimize the flow of weaDons to the Viet Cong the recruitment
into local military units tended to favor those least likely
to defect to the Viet Cong and this, according to the
interviews, tended to fill local villaae forces with enemies
of the peasantry - local thugs and bullies unacceptable to
the Viet Cong. Of course, anti-Viet Cong soldiers without
adequate intelligence may cause even more weapons to be lost.
Failing to attempt broadening the base of the government
again narrowed it.
Diem eventually did try to adjust his policies but
by the time a real effort was mobilized against the Viet Cong
in 1962, their infrastructure was well established and their
traditional base camps, notably Camau, Plain of Reeds, and
War Zones C and D were reopened and secured.21 By the end
of 1961, all of the Delta was well enough provided with
corridors and bases for groups of 50 to 100 men to be guided,
20Ibid., p. 301.
2 1Ibid., p. 303. See also Appendix B for map of 1961
Viet Cong base areas.
fed and dispersed among the provinces. Thus the lack of
trust which the government displayed toward the villagers
made them incapable of preventing the Viet Cong from
developing their infrastructure throughout the countryside.
Viet Cong growth, however, was not a story of
continuous success. The 1962 strategic hamlet program was
one act of government "oppression" with which they could not
easily deal, and if it had not been for the urban oroblems
that led to the Buddhist protests, the Viet Cong might
actually have been stopped. The combination of strategic
hamlets and helicopters was deadly, and according to
Wilfred Burchett, a major chronicler of the NLF, "there was
a period when Front leadership almost decided the price was
too high, that resistance in the Delta should cease and
regular Front armed forces should withdraw to bases in the
mountains. "22
The strategic hamlet program consisted, in essence, of
grouping the scattered peasants into tight population centers,
heavily guarded and surrounded by barbed wire and fencing.
The program was never well implemented or supported
militarily, and it was unpopular with the peasants - forcibly
uprooted and moved to what were often execrable living
conditions. 2 3 Yet the program did hurt the Viet Cong, in the
short run.
2 2 Burchett, op. cit., p. 193.
2 3 Milton E. Osborne. Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam:
Data Paper No. 55. Southeast Asia Program, Department of
Asian Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.: n.p. April,1965.
Diem's overthrow in November 1963 brought deterioration
of GVN's rural structures as the strategic hamlet program,
already over extended, fell apart and the Army turned evermore
to politics. Viet Cong mass support declined temporally, but
the breach between national force and village power widened,
and while the new government may have been popular for
overthrowing Diem and ending the excesses of the strategic
hamlet program it was unable to stop the Viet Cong's
progress in extending control. The contradictory demands of
forestalling a coup and stopping a revolution made meaningful
civil government or coherent military policy impossible.
By the end of 1964, the Viet Cong were able to operate
openly in nearly all of the country as they extended their
liberated zones to include large rural areas which cut into
the heart of the GVN corridors themselves. According to the
Los Angeles Times map of territorial control 24 for December
1964, the Viet Cong were in control of a large portion of
the countryside and could easily gain access to nearly every
part of the country. Because U.S. Government maps and claims
of population control are so often questioned, it should be
noted that the 1965 Los Angeles Times Map, which is obtained
from U.S. Government sources, agrees almost exactly with the
251965 map published in Hanoi. The only noticeable difference,
in fact, is that the Hanoi map gives slightly more territory
2 4 See Appendix B.
2 5 eSee Anpendix B.
in the central highlands to the GV(N.
From 1965 on, the entire character of the war changed
markedly as the influx of men and materials from Hanoi and
Washington increased steadily in volume. The guerrilla
war began to be eclipsed in the public eye by the ever
mounting number of deaths, casualties, and refugees resulting
from the growing number of search and destroy missions, as
well as from bombing and defoliation. "Viet Nam was the
arena of a new war, with new actors, new ground rules, new
tactics and strategy, new definitions of victory and defeat."26
As the scale of U.S. intervention increased it became
clear that Viet Cong would not be able to win a military
victory against the huge U.S. military machine. Yet a
comparison of the yearly LA Times Maps from 1964 until 1968
does not indicate a very marked increase in areas under
government control. The exodus of refugees from enemy areas
left the Viet Cong with less population under their control
than in 1965 but they still retained the ability to strike
at the major cities and provincial capitals as they did during
Tet, 1968. By 1965 when U.S. units began engaging in major
battles against PAVNr27 units, the Viet Cong already controlled,
or at least had extensive influence in the vast majority of
South Viet Nam's villages and had a well developed cadre
26Pike, op. cit., ix-x.
27PAVN - People's Army of Viet Nam.
system and infrastructure. Viet Cong endurance and the lack
of village security, must be credited to this system and not
to North Vietnamese soldiers.
Whilst for purposes of public relations
it might be asserted by the U.S. Government
that this massive intervention by the DRV
was responsible for the Viet Cong's domination
of the countryside, the truth was that cause
and effect were the other way around; it was
the collapse of Ngo Dinh Nhu's security system,
with all its weaknesses, that had put the Viet
Cong organization into a position to receive,
conceal, feed and deploy reinforcements from
General Vo Nguyen Giap's Army ... 28
Many of the PAVN units are based in Laos or Cambodia
or across the DMZ in North Viet Nam and have their own
separate supply systems. To do any damage inside South
Viet Nam, however, they must still move from their base
camp to populated areas. ýWhether their bases are in
South Viet Nam or across the border, the units must still
cross large stretches of territory to reach cities or
densely settled rural areas. Government forces can deny
the enemy the value of a base camp either by destroying
the base, destroying the troops or by making their movements
in and out of it more difficult. If the villages around a
base had no Viet Cong infrastructure, soldiers leaving it
would be especially vulnerable to roving patrols or randomly
positioned and repositioned ambushes. The introduction and
execution of such a strategy, however, would have depended
2 8 Duncanson, op. cit., p. 367, emphasis added.
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on a substantially improved coordination of the attrition
and pacification strategies and marked reforms in the RF/PF
forces which already existed. Instead, attrition,
pacification and economic development worked against the
integrity of the RF/PF system and helped the Viet Cong
viable.
CHAPTER V
RURAL WARFARE: BACKGROUND TO PACIFICATION
Even with more than 500,000 foreign troops in their
country, the major day to day confrontation with the war,
for most peasants, has come from the Vietnamese Regional
and Popular Forces and the infrastructure, hard core and
irregular guerrilla units of the Viet Cong. These are the
main units which have confronted each other in the villages
in the struggle for control of the peasants: Viet Cong
infrastructure and guerrillas against RF and PF.
Because this is obscured by attention given to large
battles and to the special pacification teams, it should be
noted that a major part of American fighting through 1967
was in the Central Highlands -- relatively unpopulated, or
in I Corps, especially around the DMZ. Until recently,
most extensive large unit ground action in and around
villages has been in attempts to clear Viet Cong units out
of areas they have controlled for as long as 20 years,
such as Quang Ngai, northern Binh Dinh and Quang Nam, parts
of Lona An, Binh Duong and Hau Nghia provinces, and War Zones
C and D.
At the end of 1967, in fact, the IV Corps area of
Viet Nam, for example, contained 5.8 million persons and
4.9 million of the 10.7 million "rural" Vietnamese, rural
being defined by the Hamlet Evaluation System as inhabitants
of villages with less than 20,000 persons. This area
contained one 5,000 man U.S. Brigade, assigned to the
waterways and canals, and three ARVN divisions.
Nor do the Rural Development pacification teams
(RDC - also sometimes called Revolutionary Development)
have the major impact on most peasants. At the end of
1967, there were less than 600 of these teams stationed
in hamlets, and there are 13,000 hamlets.
Taken as a whole, ARVN, the RF and PF give GVN, on
paper, a three-tiered security system parallel to that of
the Viet Cong. In theory, while the U.S. engages the
large scale PAVN units, ARVN deals with Viet Cong main
force units, keeping them scattered and away from the villages,
the RF deals with district and provincial guerilla units,
and the PF protects the villages from the Viet Cong ir-
ru-lars, part-time guerillas and cadres. Practice and theory
have borne little or no relation to each other. What has
happened instead is that the system has tended to work in
exactly the opposite way. RF/PF have sometimes been used to
relieve ARVN and protect the bigger units. More often they
find that there is a big unit in their area against which
ARVN is of no help because Viet Cong intelligence and
mobility is so much better than ARVN's. Together, the RF/PF
comprise about 49% of all GVN military personnel--during this
study over 300,000 men--and consistently, year after year,
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have taken a larger number of casualties than ARVN and have
also killed more Viet Cona than ARVN. 1
Halberstam, for examrle, reported that in the period
when John Vann was senior advisor to an ARVN division in the
Delta, (approximately spring 1962 to spring 1963), 96% of
the casualties in the division's area of responsibility
were sustained by the RF/PF. 2 Duncanson has even suggested
that one impetus toward the November 1963 coup was a stiff
note from Diem to the ARVN generals demanding an explanation
for such an imbalance in casualties and fighting burden
between ARVN and the RF/PF.3
Even in more recent times this has been true.
Consistently, month after month, there have been individual
RF companies and PF platoons that account for as many Viet
Cong casualties as entire ARVN divisions. The 25th ARVN
Division, for example, lost more soldiers in 1966 through
traffic accidents than it did in battle4 despite the fact
that Viet Cong were exerting very heavy pressure against the
RF/PF in its area.
1Military Assistance Command Vietnam - RF/PF, information
sheet, obtained May 1967, n.d., n.p.
2op. cit., p. 175.
3 on. cit., o. 306.
4William Corson, The Betrayal, New York: Norton, 1968, p.98.
The much publicized battle of Ap Bac in 1962, for
example, was a battle in which a dug-in, well-disciplined
Viet Cong battalion badly punished a multi-battalion
government force which had them surrounded, destroying several
armored personnel carriers and helicopters in the process,
and then completely escaped. Three months later 5,000 ARVN
soldiers returned to AP Bac in search of the same unit. An
RF company was sent ahead of ARVN as a combination scouting
party and decoy and was ambushed by the same Viet Cong
battalion. While ARVN hung back, the Viet Cong unit again
escaped.5
As noted earlier, RF and PF in the early stages of
their use were kept virtually immobilized by their lack of
weapons and radios. Even when the PF were supplied by the
U.S. Military Assistance Program, however, they -- and to a
lesser degree the RF also -- were still resented, slighted
and short-changed by both ARVTN and the U.S. Part of the
reason was ARVN's desire to neutralize any political counter-
balance to themselves, part was the traditional disdain of the
professional military man for less professional units, and part
was the military's belief that local units hurt more than
they helped. 6
This reflects the shortcomings of traditional military
dogma in an internal war. The attitude of Viet Cong cadres
5David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire. New York:
Random House, Inc., 1965, p. 162.
6 Based on interviews with Nguyen Ngoc Tho, vice president
under Diem and Prime Minister after the November, 1963, coup,
U.S. advisors to RF/PF central directorate and IV Corps
Headquarters, and officers of RF/PF central di
toward the PF indicates their potential and the concern t.
create for cadres attempting to exert Viet Cong control i
areas where the PF operate. As one defector stated:
... Although the nature of their organizations
are different, the PF are considered more danagerous
than the ARVN because their activities may have
harmful consequences on our efforts in the
provinces.
hey
n
Q: In what ways are PF particularly dangerous
to the Viet Cong?
The PF are dangerous in the eves of the Front
because of their daily contact with the activities
in the province and the basic local area. The
ARVN troops commit themselves in large scale
operations only and upon completion of that opera-
tion they withdraw, but the PF remains within the
village or hamlet all the time. And while the Front
tries to exert a tight control or to win the hearts
of the villagers, then the PF try to do the reverse,
that is to break our local installation, and to do
things that may break the unity between the Front
members and the villagers.?
Although they are so often ignored, the RF and PF,
constituting most villagers daily contact with the war and
capable of dealing direct blows to the Viet Cong village
organization, actually plays a major part in the war
efforts of the South Vietnamese government. This research
found that absolutely essential conditions for a village or
hamlet to be pacified and kept secure was an aggressive,
mobile and disciplined platoon of PF. Only where such a
platoon existed could villagers be persuaded to place trust
7 Studies of the Chieu Hoi Program: Interviews with the
Hoi Chanh. Simulmatics Corporation. Sponsored by Advanced
Research Projects Agency; Washington, D.C. 1966, Interview
No. CH-5, August 1966. Emphasis added.
in the government for their own security and only where
such trust existed would there develop the intelligence
and information flow that was necessary to counter the
Viet Cong permanently.
Gaining information and trust from the local population
was especially important because of the Viet Cong's mode of
operation. They generally operated through steady, low
level activity rather than through open military encounters.
It was not an easy job for the Viet Cong to gain total
control of a village guarded by even a moderately efficient
platoon. To destroy or drive away a PF platoon required a
bloody battle.
During this study, however, it did not seem that the
Viet Cong were actively trying to place many more hamlets
under their total control. It appeared instead that their
major concern was to keep control of the villages in and
around their network of bases and supply corridors so that
their system remained viable and to keep the GVN from making
any true progress of its own. This meant a steady war of
nerves against villages in the contested category so that the
village officials could not draw the population together. An
occassional attack nearby or an assassination in the village
was sufficient in most cases for the village security
situation to benefit them.
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Though the Viet Cong seldom risked open confrontation
with the PF, nevertheless few areas were completely
closed to them because of the numerous weaknesses in the
GVN civil administration and the very poor coordination
of RF and PF and the very poor intelligence, if any at all,
that the PF in villages could expect to receive from
outside sources. The Viet Cong could not control the
area but the GVN, as will be seen, was often little more
than an "Army of Occupation."
The Viet Cong were aided in this tactic by their
system of intelligence. While the Viet Cong are generally
thought of as insurgents, their strength is derived just
as much from the fact that they are also excellent counter-
insurgents. Once they gained control of an area they were
generally able to establish a most effective covert
intelligence net. This meant that even after they had left
an area, no one could be sure they were truly gone. Or,
if the guerrillas and overt cadres were hiding during a
government operation, no one could be certain that it was
safe to divulge their whereabouts.
The information available to the Viet Cong, moreover,
must be carefully differentiated as to when it is received.
Information can be obtained during the day fairly easily
because -there is so much movement of people into and out
of any hamlet or village. People move into fields, go to
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markets, transport goods via road and canals and generally
have hundreds of opportunities to contact Viet Cong in
person or leave hidden messages.
Daytime information flows, however, cannot with
certainty tell the Viet Cong where and how to enter the
hamlet or where the "people's enemy" will be after dark-
either officials or soldiers. It can, however, tell how
many soldiers are in the hamlet and identify informants or
peasants who openly support the government.
Information obtained after dark, however, is most
vital. First, via many simple signals such as a light in
a window, a loud cough, etc., one person can signal whether
or not it is safe to enter. Secondly, in the amount of
time available after a few Viet Cong have entered a hamlet,
what can be done depends on whether they have fresh
information. With current information the Viet Cong can
quickly locate specific tartets - a hiding official, a rice
cache or a potential recruit. If not, they must either
make a slow and largely ineffective search or they can make
propaganda and distribute leaflets.
This distinction is essential. It adds one more
dilemma to the problems faced in securing a hamlet. Wide-
ranging patrols and movement around the perimeter of an
area can cover more territory - extending security - but if
there is signalling to the Viet Cong then wide patrolling
not only may not cut intrusions but it may drastically
increase the damage that can be done by any given intrusion.
Thus whether PF patrolling and mobility helps or
hurts their village depends on how much help the Viet Cong
are receiving from inside the PF's area: with no information
flow to the Viet Cong, -or only a daytime flow- patrolling
helps, but with an information flow it can actually hurt the
hamlet or hamlets they are protecting. This makes the
internal situation in their area most important because a
wrong estimate can easily backfire.
This also recalls the earlier discussion of the
linkages of trust between district chief and village (or
hamlet) chief and from the local official to the oeasants.
The tendency of district and province officials to maximize
their linkage leaves the local linkage most doubtful and
further serves to increase defensiveness because local
officials obviously are not going to encourage the PF to
roam far if they feel a knife at their own back.
It is this counter-insurgency aspect of the Viet Cong
that has made the lack of reliable government intelligence
agencies so critical at the local level. Depending on
information volunteered to them on operations meant that
soldiers often got no intelligence at all. More and more
as this happened, they tended to adopt the attitude of
"punish the village," using artillery on villages where
any sniping took place. This tactic only aggravated the
peasants' distrust.
Thus, the Viet Cong operated by keeping the government
off-balance, even in areas nominally under GVN control;
they succeeded because of the high quality of their
information, the inadequacy of GVN intelligence, and the
fact that peasants simply did not trust the government to
provide them with long-term protection. If the RF and PF
were to keep the Viet Cong out of the villages, they
had to generate peasant trust and peasant information.
While this research found that security and pacification
could not occur without aggressiveness, mobility and
discipline it is not a priori clear that this should be so.
The RF/PF system, in fact, was designed without any serious
intention that the PF, or even the RF, would need to be
aggressive or mobile, let alone disciplined.
The rural security network, on paper, was intended to
keep the Viet Cong away from populated areas with little
need for an offensive capability from the PF. The system
was supposed to consist of approximately 1 PF platoon for
every two or three hamlets, 1 or 2 R•F companies to secure the
district town and relieve beleagured PF and, in areas with
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small Viet Cong base areas, an RF company to be posted
nearby. In addition about 10% of the P• platoons were
placed in outposts where their job was to stop movement
through Viet Cong corridors and inform the district
chief whenever a large Viet Cong unit was near.
The plan was totally unworkable. The outposts
became little more than hostages of the Viet Cong. A
good portion of PF were moved from villages to protect
bridges and roads, and the district chiefs were seldom
able to reinforce any PF that were attacked because the
risk was very real that the Viet Cong were waiting to am.Tbush
the RF, the strategy of "harass the outpost and annihilate
the reaction forces." Further, the priorities facing the
district chief from his suoerior were 1) don't let the
district town be hit in an attack, 2) don't lose any bridges,
and 3) don't lose any RF companies.
Many PF platoons were in outposts that could serve no
function whatsoever--because they were isolated--other than
that they had been outposts since the French were in Viet Nam.
Province and district chiefs could not abandon these posts
even when they were totally indefensible because such orders
could only originate from the corps commanders.
Many of the outposts that were totally useless were
in important locations and would have served an important
function if they were linked to reaction forces and were
generally tied in to a security system. To have done so, however,
would have meant centering the whole military system on the
outposts and leaving the villages wide open. This actually
happened in one district that was traversed lengthwise by
both a highway and a railway line. The province chief
was responsible to corps for every road and railway bridge
in the district with the result that 350 of the 400 RF and
PF in the district were defending bridges while the other
50 defended district headquarters. The province chief was
even subject to a symbolic 8-day jail sentence every time
a bridge was blown, the jail sentence meaning an automatic
loss of six months seniority on the ARVN promotion list.
Even under such severe pressure, the province chief
could not secure the bridges, for the PF and RF brought
their families with them. The men would not disperse
widely around the bridges because that would leave the
outpost open to the Viet Cong, and the outpost was where the
wives and children gathered. Why not order the men to leave
their families behind in the villages? As one U.S. advisor
who spent 3 years in Viet Nam said, "We never were able to
successfully force the men to keeD the families away from
the 'outposts'." A major aspect of this was that the men
could trust no one else to look after their families in
their absence from a contested village.
When PF were placed in isolated outoosts that Corps
commanders wanted manned it not only did no good, but it
wasted a platoon needed elsewhere. One platoon in an
isolated outpost in one such province was in an impossible
situation. They were placed squarely in the middle of a
major Viet Cong corridor through which batallions regularly
moved on the way to attacks elsewhere. If the platoon put
up a fight it was clear what would happen--they would never
be able to leave the outpost without being ambushed. For
several months this particular platoon had been sent to the
outpost every evening to stop infiltration. Regularly,
once or twice a week, they reported they were under attack
and called for artillery fire. When, after three months, no
Viet Cong dead had been produced, an American advisor flew
over the outpost during an 'attack' to see what was happening.
The platoon was over a kilometer from the outpost, safely
encamped in a secure area from which they were calling for
artillery. Not only was a platoon being totally wasted,
but every platoon in the surrounding area had been waiting
nervously for the attack they felt certain was pending
because such heavy infiltration into the district had been
reported.
In addition to RF and PF immobilized in indefensible
or useless outposts there was a manpower shortage of about
30% for the other RF and PF units. Many RF companies,
which should have had at least 120 men, had no more than
30-40 and virtually no RF/PF units were at more than 80%
of reported strength. A conservative estimate would be
that actual RF/PF strength, taking account of men in training,
men on leave or wounded, etc., was closer to 225,000 than
the 300,000 officially reported. Corruption, however, was
only part of the answer. The RF/PF could not compete
successfully against the Viet Cong, ARVN and an inflated
economy for manpower.
Besides the missing manpower, there were also a
class of 'privileged' soldiers, young men who had paid their
way into the RF/PF to escape an ARVN draft and who then
paid someone to let them return home to work. This, at a
very rough estimate, would total about 5% of the RF/PF.
Overall then, an estimate would be that actual RF/PF
strength during this study was probably 215,000 men, of whom
no more than 190,000 were in meaningful positions. Thus, it
was not only the Viet Cong which had manpower problems.
Because the RF/PF was far below its listed strength
and because little was done on the ground in most areas to
deny the Viet Cong their system of corridors and bases, every
PF unit had to be prepared for both harassment from scattered
guerrillas and an attack from a large, well-equipped Viet
Cong main force unit.
As long as the PF even thought a large Viet Cong unit
might be in their area, the cumulative consequence of each
platoon's acting as if it were the only platoon in the area,8
destroyed the system and increased its own danger.
with the exception of an area totally saturated with
troops such as Binh Dinh to be discussed later.
A large Viet Cong attack in an area is generally
accompanied by small, relatively harmless attacks by
local guerrillas on all PF platoons in the area. These
attacks are sufficient to draw the platoons in more
tightly around their families and headquarters. This makes it
easier for the big Viet Cong attack to proceed, since the large
unit can then move unhindered through the areas that have
been left uncovered by the actions of the small guerrilla
units. At the same time if every platoon worries only about
defense against the large units, small units of Viet Cong
will not only do better, but will in the long run make the
large units even more dangerous by increasing the precision
with which any single platoon can be attacked.
Things that looked so illogical and wrong from the
outside--to the district advisor, for example--were very
"rational" to the PF's locally oriented point of view,
especially when the PF had little trust in the district
chief. It was especially frustrating to American advisors
that PF often set up their ambushes in the same place very
night. In fact, whenever this occurred there was always
a strong suspicion that the PF were doing this purposely so
as to avoid any unnecessary contact with the Viet Cong.
The PF logic often seemed to have been far more
complex than simply trying to avoid all contact with the
Viet Cong. If the only problem a platoon faced was a few
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scattered guerrillas then it made sense to shift ambush
positions every night so that the local guerrillas could
be caught off guard. If, however, the PF felt there was
any danger of a surprise attack by a large Viet Cong unit,
then shifting ambush positions every night was very, very
dangerous. It meant that on some nights PF would be a
long distance from their post when they were suddenly
confronted by a large force of highly trained Viet Cong
regulars walking into their ambush, and a squad of PF would
be no match--even in a prepared arbush--for 30 or more
Viet Cong regulars. So the PF could not--from their point
of view--use all possible ambush places on a random basis
if they were to assume they were an isolated unit. An
ambush position was only acceptable if the PF could safely
get back to their fort should they suddenly find themselves
confronted with a surprise attack. Yet, if they never moved,
a big unit with intelligence from local guerrillas would have
a much easier time destroying them. This tended to happen.
Once a platoon began to worry about the possibility of
a big attack, the Viet Cong could bluff and didn't
necessarily need many big attacks to get at the villages in
an area. Once a platoon had adopted a defensive mentality,
the Viet Cong, if they were daring, could make propaganda
as often as they desired and then occasionally make a rice
or manpower raid. Two quotes from one such platoon indicate
how the process worked.
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Once about every three nights the Viet Cong
come to this hamlet. Usually they come to see
where we are so as to make propaganda with the
people. They did not collect taxes. They only
told the people not to help the soldiers, not
to live near the soldiers for fear of grenade.
They came here last night. They shined a
flashlight everywhere. We only took defensive
measures and would fire if they came close to
us. We did not fire because we feared that they
could locate us when they were in the distance.
(9459PF)
The Viet Cong, however, were setting the PF up for
a grand bluff with this strategy. Not even sure how many
Viet Cong were coming to make propaganda and being a
generally poor platoon, the PF sat back to be safe. Once
this pattern was established, however, the Viet Cong made
a good raid on the other hamlet the PF were supposed to
be protecting,when they were huddled at night in their
watch towers:
About a month ago they raided the next
hamlet for rice. Dogs barking, alternating
with cries of 'Thief! Thief!' from the villagers
alerted us. Knowing that it was the Viet Cong
I led my men out to search the enemy... (9454PF)
These PF did react to the Viet Cong raid, but the
Viet Cong knew that the men would be gathered around their
outpost and it was easy for them to get the rice with
minimal danger. Two guerrillas pinned down the PF while
porters carted off the rice. "A firefight broke out when
we were still 300 meters from the Viet Cong who withdrew a
little later." (9454PF)
This stresses the absolute need for mobility, that
is, extensive patrolling, because in order to secure their
areas the RF/PF had to be able to keep the Viet Cong off-
balance. They did not have the men to always beat off
attacks. Patrolling and frequent movement in fact make it
much harder for the Viet Cong to successfully stage an
attack.
The traditional ARVN approach to guerrilla warfare is
to find targets big enough to attack and destroy with
battalions. Units like RF and PF are viewed as defensive
forces to protect villages and bridges while the Army does
the killing. What is necessary for security in the country-
side, however, is not simply that large numbers of men or
large units be destroyed, but that they be kept from forming
out of widely scattered smaller groups, or that they be kept
enough off balance so that the units cannot, with any
certainty, develop plans for future attacks. As Clutterbuck
has stressed, it is not simply how many enemy soldiers there
are, but the size of the units in which they can operate?
From the point of view of security, keeping the Viet Cong
off balance is almost as good as destroying them, and much
less counter-productive than search-and-destroy missions.
The impression easily gained is that Viet Cong
soldiers do more fighting and maneuvering than ARVN, RF/PF
9 Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counter
Insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1966,
n. 66.
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or U.S. units. Far from true -- Viet Cong main force units
generally are in battle about two days a month -- or even
less -- except perhaps for intensive periods such as the
Tet offensive of 1968.10 The rest of their time is spent
planning, training and rehearsing the next operation.
Viet Cong military operations are as delicately choreographed
as a ballet. For a large Viet Cong unit to attack, small
units of men must disperse from a base camp, and pass via
couriers and liberated villages to secondary rallying points
where the large units reform to move on to their target.
After the attack the same complex movement must be performed
.in reverse. To move small units through an area safely and
secretly requires countless bits of information from a wide
area. Every time an area of potential danger is crossed
information is needed as to which way to go.
Viet Cong attacks are so well planned and rigidly
organized, moreover, as to be easy to unsettle. One American
Colonel likened Viet Cong attacks to the mating of storks,
"One wrong move and they have to start all over."
Because of their strict central control, Viet Cong
operations can be thrown into confusion if they can be
disrupted at the right time - between the time they leave a
base and the time they reform and move to the attack. In
1 0 Willi;m R. Corson, The Betrayal. New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., Inc., 1968, p. 148.
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this period the men can become easily disorganized and
confused if caught in small groups. When this happens
the Viet Cong unit must start the long preparation
process all over again. This emphasizes the importance
of mobility by government troops, especially RF/PF.
When troops move frequently it is much more difficult for
small Viet Cong units to move easily through an area to
an attack point without detection. More information is
needed by the Viet Cong, and their information becomes
outdated more rapidly.
For example, to the extent that RF/PF units adopt
a defensive posture geared mainly to the protection of
their own families and immediate area, Viet Cong villages
are not attacked. This relieves the Viet Cong of the
need to expend much energy in system maintenance.
Occasional bombings are not a good substitute because
once the shelters are built, an airplane does not tie down
soldiers in a defensive posture similar to that of the
PF. Forcing the Viet Cong into a more defensive posture
could be an extremely important factor in achieving
military success. If RF/PF information is perfect and
their own villages are secure, then RF/PF units could
easily reduce Viet Cong attack capability by launching
counter-attacks whenever the Viet Cong leave their areas
relatively unguarded to attack a GVN outpost or village. But
if all of the RF/PF forces are constantly tied down by
families, then a single Viet Cong unit can roam at will,
hitting where it pleases, constrained only by the threat of
air and artillery.
What can be done to reinforce a PF platoon once it is
attacked depends on how much the Viet Cong know in advance
about the location of the reaction forces. If the Viet Cong
know where the reaction forces will arrive from, they can
set up an ambush for them, thus effecting a strategy of
"attack the platoon and annihilate the reaction forces."
Once the Viet Cong have shown they can do this, there is
no point in sending a reaction force to the aid of the
beleaguered platoon and simply losing more men.
With aggressive and semi-mobile RF/PF there still
could be other ways to gain something out of a Viet Cong
attack that would decrease total damage in the long run.
After an attack a Viet Cong battalion has to get back to
its safe area before dawn, because as soon as it is light
the battalion can be caught in the open by air and artillery.
If every PF platoon between the point of the battalion's
attack and its safe area could slow the battalion's retreat
by 30 minutes with sniping and ambushes, battalions might
be delayed long enough to be caught in the open. If the PF
were skilled enough they could track the battalion's retreat,
calling in artillery each time the battalion crossed
through an unpopulated expanse.
If the GVN started a tactic of "let the battalion
hit but keep it from getting away," then the Viet Cong
would have to use more local guerrilla units along the
battalion's escape route to keep the PF units out of the
way. But then either these guerrilla units could be
attacked or the PF could take advantage of their absence
to find their tunnels, lay ambushes for them or make
propaganda in the Viet Cong hamlets. What might be done
depends on the aggressiveness of RF and PF. What can
actually be done deoends on the quality of local intelligence
and on the quality of communications between PF and the sub-
sector. Therefore, given a situation in which it was
rare for a PF platoon to ever be certain how many guerrillas
were in its village, and in which there were PF platoons
in every district with radios that weren't working, or
platoons where the platoon leader could not read a map well
enough to call in artillery in case of attack, the range of
possible actions that could be taken to reduce Viet Cong
strength and attack capability was narrow indeed.
The PF could not all leave their hamlets and villages,
however, because there were guerrillas and cadres everywhere.
Outside of An Giang, over 80 per cent of the PF estimated
that the Viet Cong regularly came within a mile of their
headquarters at night; 65 per cent of them estimated the
Viet Cong soldiers were within two miles during the day;
less than 15 per cent said there were no Viet Cong within
their villages; and less than 10 Der cent said it was safe
to walk half a mile after dark. 11
Just as significant is the fact that the PF in a
platoon rarely agreed on exactly how many guerrillas and
cadres were in their villages at any time. While less
than 15 per cent said there were none in their village the
estimates given in any one platoon were never very precise.
The Viet Cong could move around well enough at night to
make it impossible for most PF to k]now how many there were
in their village. This did not mean that the PF did not
receive any tips from villagers--it simply shows what a
sophisticated and complex job it is to collate countless
tips and turn them into a complete enough file to know
how many guerrillas there are.
This stresses the importance of discipline, because
police and military intelligence were very inadequate and
1 1There are, of course, always the exceptions. In one
very insecure area no PF and only one of 10 peasants
interviewed was willing to leave the hamlet after dark:
"One night I wanted some soup so I walked 12 Kilometers
[a long way] for a bowl of soup. I sang all the way so the
PF men would know not to shoot me." (8342V)
the PF, if they were truly to pacify their area needed a
constant flow of intelligence. Whenever a large attack was
pending PF were usually aware. Few peasants wanted a large
battle in their hamlet and they were much more willing to
report a pending attack then they were to keep in regular
communication with soldiers that didn't have good discipline.
Even when the soldiers were not alerted they could often
tell an attack was imminent by the way peasants scurried
around making sure their children were safe and away from
danger.
There can be no doubt that discipline was essential
in developing an information flow. One village in Long An
had an exceptional PF platoon and was near a very poor RF
company. The RF, when interviewed, admitted no one ever
helped them. One peasant suggested part of the reason:
"The people here love the PF so if the Viet
Cong come to attack suddenly the people go to
tell them. If people don't love the soldiers
the soldiers wouldn't do a good job. For example
here they love the PF and they don't want them
to die. When they see Viet Cong approach they
signal with their eyes to the PF in order to
protect them...
This PF unit doesn't bother the people here,
they do a good job for people but only the IR
company bothers people here. Last Sunday when
people went to vote for local councilmen the
RF company went to each home and stole food, rice
and poultry. People live in dark misery because
of war and now must also worry about avoiding
the RF company. (8801V)
While the PF often caused little trouble in their
own local areas, they seldom tended to be either very
aggressive or very mobile. As suggested above, the
difference between a system where every platoon is mobile,
aggressive and disciplined and a system where every platoon
merely adopts a defensive posture is immense. The more
platoons that fulfill the ideal, the less large Viet Cong
attacks can take place, the fewer intrusions querrillas can
make into any area, and the fewer hamlets will become part
of the secondary Viet Cong system within any small area.
Thus, this research found that a meaningful
security system that made a continuous and sustained long-
term effort at steadily reducing Viet Cong effectiveness
was not possible when the RF/PF were pitted against an
infrastructure backed by local guerrillas and occassional
attacks by main force or even better provincial force units.
The fact that RF and PF generally fought exceptionally
well when attacked hid the fact that the system was
essentially lacking in any true integration. GVN could not
establish a more coherent system because PF could not be
moved into a less defensive posture. This meant that the
Viet Cong system remained coherent and viable - that the
Viet Cong could move through the area, transporting men,
supplies and ammunition elsewhere, helping them to keep
their entire system functioning. Thile bombing, defoliation,
and very high taxes may have been depopulating Viet Cong areas,
they still had a working system. Even more important, when
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when they chose to do so, they could move a battalion into
every district studied - except Binh Dinh.
Yet, if one were to compare total GV7 strength
and Viet Cong strength for all these districts, the
GVN would have had at least a 20 to 1 advantage in manpower.
The Viet Cong could keep battalions (or reinforced companies)
in very few of these districts on a permanent basis, but
every district had a battalion sized attack at least once
during the time of this study. This emphasizes the extent
to which kill ratios, population secured, hamlets secured,
and troop ratios may be of little true advantage in
pacification unless there are mobile, aggressive and
disciplined troops in an area, backed by the constant flow
of information necessary for pacification.
In fact, few RF companies and PF platoons acted with
enough aggressiveness and discipline to stimulate the level
of trust needed for self-sustaining pacification. This
failure stemmed from the fact that the RF and PF themselves
received little trust or consideration from the government
and themselves had low personal political motivation. To
understand what kind of support these soldiers needed to
perform successfully it is first necessary to know about
their situation and their needs.
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CHAPTER VI
ýMARGINAL MEN: REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES
Last year, when the VC attacked this hamlet
the reinforcement forces came so late that our olatoon
was encircled. The assistant olatoon leader Huong
was hit by four bullets in the chest; and though
the wound was serious he tried to take care of Xuan,
a comrade in arms who was very seriously wounded.
But toward the end Huong was too weak to do any-
thing for him and so he let him die and left his own
rifle as well as Xuan's behind. Yet when we got
back to the district we were bawled out for leaving
the dead and the weapons behind. Well, I know that
the duty of a soldier is to fight off the enemy,
but if by bad luck you get run over not only are
you not comforted but you are scolded; it really
is disheartening. In family you have the wife to
comfort you, in the service there are the leaders.
They do not encourage our soirit. They do not
comfort us. They chew you out. It really is
sad. (9335PF)
As chapter V showed, the RF/PF system was often
little more than defensive. It could impede the Viet Cong
and stop them from gaining control of more villages. It
could also reduce the ease and frequency with which the
Viet Cong could enter any area. But the majority of its
energies were spent in a passive, defensive posture. What
the system lacked was the capacity for strategy. To react
to the Viet Cong successfully required more information and
trust than the system could generate.
The problem, however, was not a lack of man~ower and
firenower as much as it was the incongruence between
peasant life and military life. The RF/PF failed not
because they were peasants but because there was such a
gap between their world view and prior experiences and the
military system to which they belonged. They were expected
to perform according to standards they could not meet and
to follow leaders with whom they could not communicate.
They were expected to act with discipline when they were
without food and leadership. They had never absorbed their
training because it had been little more than dry lectures.
They never trusted in their support because it was so bad
and they never were nice to others because no one had ever
been nice to them!
To understand this it is necessary first to look at
the characteristics of the men of the RF/PF and to see how
their needs and values were left in conflict by the military
system. Basically, the men who joined the RF/PF were those
men whose prior life had been so unrewarding - by peasant
standards - that the RF/PF, despite its abuses was tolerable
in comparison. They were also men whose life experience made
them ill-equipped for their military role.
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To comprehend the problems faced in developing the
military prerequisites to pacification it is necessary
first to understand the economic and social situation of
the soldiers.
RF/PF, especially the PF, were miserably paid. The
dire condition of the PF was so obvious, even to the other
villagers, that when asked what the government should do
to help the RF/PF with their mission, 65% of all villagers
interviewed suggested they be given a pay raise.
The yearly income of a PF in 1966-67 was 16,800
piastres, raised in the spring of 1967 to 26,400 piastres.
This was approximately half of what an ARVN or RF soldier
would make with his higher base pay, rate differential
and family allowances.
The economic straits of the PF and the poverty in
which they lived can easily be shown. In 1964, before
the huge American buildup and the resulting inflation, the
average income of a rural household was 20,0001piastres.
A PF in 1967, then, after the raise, was making 20% more
than the 1964 household average. By the end of 1966,
however, rice prices had doubled from their 1964 level!
iRobert H. Stroup, Rural Income Expenditure Sample
Survey. Department of State, U.S. Mission in Vietnam, 1965.
Using the 1964 price of rice at provincial rice mills as
a base, the 1966 price was 210% higher in the Delta and
250% higher in Central Viet Nam. 2
Another indicator of RF/PF poverty is the family
landholding situation for the RF/PF in Central Viet Nam.
In Central Viet Nam, family landholdings are a very good
index of wealth since land pressure is so intense that
profit levels per unit of land are relatively small even
without subtracting rent payments. Therefore, a peasant
who must rent a large proportion of the land which he
farms is rarely able to accumulate any substantial amount
of wealth.
In an analysis of RF/PF landholdings it was found
that so few RF/PF owned any land of their own that it was
necessary to ask how much land their family owned - as
opposed to the individual RF/PF. A secondary analysis of
the 1964 Stroup data 3 by Anthony Russo indicates that only
18% of all households in Central Viet Nam own no land at all.
.Among the RF/PF the percentage of men coming from families
owning no land is 43% in Thua Thien, 45% in Binh Dinh and
60% in Binh Thuan. The very poorest of peasants also
2 Republic of Vietnam, Agricultural Statistics Yearbook,
1965, p. 113 and 1966, p. 109.
3Stroup, Rural Income Expenditure Sample Survey,
on cit.
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appeared to be over-reoresented in the delta. 4
The RF/PF was not attractive to young ambitious men.
The median age of the PF studied was 29 years, and the
median age for RF was only a year less. Fifteen per cent
of the RF/PF in fact were older than 35. Just as noticeable
among the RF/PF was that less than 1 of 10 were under 20
years of age. Young men were either in the Viet Cong or
ARVN: in many cases it was the Viet Cong -- which directed
its major appeals at the young. 5
The only strong commitment or identification prevalent
among the RF/PF was to their families. Eighty-three
per cent of the RF/PF had wives and families, and 70% of
them had at least one parent still alive. This family
motivation was primary to most PF members. Their only
reason for being in their village was that their family
was there. When there was danger they cared about their
family not their village and if they could protect their
family better elsewhere, they deserted. In Long An, many PF
4Inadequacies in the questionnaire make a similar
comparison impossible for the Delta. The meaning of land
units, cong, sau, mau, etc., vary greatly within and between
provinces and were not accurately distinguished on the study.
In addition renters very often have a higher living standard
in the Delta, (see Stroup, op. cit.) and no question was in-
cluded about the amount of land rented by the family. From
what partial comparisons were possible, however, and from an
analysis of the reasons men gave for being in the RF/PF, it
appears certain that the very poorest oeasants were also over-
represented in the RF/PF in the Delta.
5Pike, Viet Cong, op. cit., p. 243.
sent their families to live in nearby Saigon or Cholon, less
than an hour by bus. Once this happened, however, their
ties to the village were weakened and they had much less
motivation to perform well. Instead they very often deserted
to a better paying military branch.
RF/PF had little positive feeling for their government,
their district officers or for ARVN. The one group about
which they made the most positive statements was the
Americans, both military and civilian. Attitudes toward
Americans were very much a reflection of the shortcomings
in the way they were treated by their own government and
especially the support they received from it. Americans, and
American troops, meant better medical care, better artillery
support, the possibility of helicopters for the wounded, and
better logistics. This was especially true for the worst of
units, whose poor performance was very much a function of a
nonworking support system.
This can best be summarized by looking at the overall
percentages of soldiers (there were no differences at all in
attitudes between RF and PF on these questions) who could say
nothing positive about ARVN, local officials, American troops
and American civilians (AID). 6
6
6Throughout the general interviewing, a non-positive
answer, such as "I am neutral" or "I cannot say" seemed more
indicative of true feelings than just the per cent of
negative responses. Only in the case of ARVN did many
soldiers actually state a strongly negative response. On
the cross-validation study, when interviewers were much
better trained, and more time was spent on each question,
the PF were much less reticent about expressing their feelings.
Per Cent of Interviewees with
Nothing Positive to Say About These Groups
Local ARVN GVN U. S. Americans
Officers Troops (AID)
45% 50% 67% 24% 25%
There could hardly be a strong sense of what
Viet Cong control of the nation would mean since the
soldiers had so little sense of national identity or
cause to begin with. When one platoon leader was asked
what his concerns for the future of his country were
his answer was, "I worry that the Viet Cong will come
back to my village." In Long An, a few extra questions
were asked of 12 squad leaders - specifically to say the
first two lines of the national anthem and to draw the
national flag. Three squad leaders did not know the
national anthem and two of them could not draw the national
flag. A local orientation, though, did not mean a local
dedication, it simply meant that the only place the RF/PF
cared about was the place where they and their families
were located.
While some peasants felt that it didn't matter who
won and that they just wanted peace, the soldiers were
identified as partisans, albeit minimally, of one side
and saw their future as tied to that side. That the
RF/PF had relatively positive things to say about the
Americans did not mean, however, that they understood
the war, or that reports of bombing, defoliation, and
misbehavior by Americans were overstated. The RF/PF
were in the war on a definite side and saw that side as
better off with Americans present. At the same time they
were aware of incidents between American troops and
civilians and had great bitterness about such incidents,
especially in Binh Dinh and Long An.
It was the Americans that held Viet Nam together
in the minds of the RF/PF. When asked on the self-
anchoring scale about Vietnam's position today versus
Viet Nam's position five years ago the typical answer was
the equivalent of "Five years ago the Viet Cong were
winning. Now we have the Allies to help us," or "Five
years ago we lived under Mr. Ngo, who was not a family man.
Today we have many allies." What the RF/PF were saying,
in effect, was,"our families used to hate the government,
now the government has strong allies." In that light their
acceptance of the Americans makes more sense and it also
explains why some men could make very strong statements
about American excesses and still be glad the U. S. was
there.
The attitude of RF/PF, and RF/PF wives and villagers,
was not "If the Americans go home the war will end." It
was more often "If the Americans go home the war will get
worse (because each village will have another big battle
or because the Viet Cong will win)."
One villager, a specialist in Chinese medicine,
stated the situation the PF were in as soldiers and
marginal men, recognizing their debt to the Americans:
The present government has done pretty well
but they haven't resolved the troubles yet. There
are still a lot of troubles because this general
wanted to overthrow that general. Viet Nam only
fears these men, they cause a lot of trouble for
the people. . .
U. S. saw our country is small and that the
communists oppressed us. They're afraid we couldn't
resist alone so they arrived to help us. . .
The PF do a lot of work, but their wives and
children didn't receive anything from the government.
People should collect gifts for RF/PF like other
countries have done. (0184V)
One thing the RF/PF agreed on was that none of them
wanted to live under the Viet Cong. Their reasons were
seldom ideological or political, however. It was rather
that they didn't "like" the Viet Cong, and felt they would
receive bad treatment after having been government soldiers.
Most important was the fact that beyond knowing that Viet Cong
victory would mean a "black future" for them, there was no
sense of expectation that they would be better off because
of any contribution or part they had played in the war.
None of the RE or PF ever saw the country as worse off
than five years previous and themselves as better off. A
good many men, however, did see a gap between changes in the
01 $~
national posture and changes in their own position. In fact
15% of the RF/PF saw the country as better off than 5 years
ago and themselves as worse off.
Past and Present Positions of Self & Country
RF PF
Self Country Self Country
Wo rse
(today) 27% 19% 32% 17%
Same 14% 4% 12% 4%
Better 53% 63% 50% 64%
Don't know,
No answer 6% 14% 6% 12%
For some men in this marginal class being an RF/PF
was better than anything that had come before. It is
ironic to think of anyone being in the RF/PF as a job--
especially the PF--because they were so mistreated, abused
and poorly paid. Yet from the point of view of a peasant,
a soldier has a uniform, he has shoes, he has a salary and
he has a group of men to pass the time with instead of sitting
around the house or working in the fields for another man.
Some of the men could be called dedicated and were there to
defeat the Viet Cong for a reason, but the majority of men,
while they did not like the Viet Cong, were there for a job.
Military service was their adjustment to war and to the
opportunities available in their environment. When opportunities
changed, they could desert.
It is most important to note that a local orientation
in the way most RF/PF viewed the world did not mean that
they had a community orientation and felt a personal
responsibility to their village or hamlet. This can be
seen in the reasons given for joining the RF/PF.
Reason for Joining Unit
Drafted, Family Patriotism, Fight Protect Other
Ordered Reasons Duty Viet Cong Village,
No choice Hamlet
RF 35% 14% 10% 8% 3% 30%
PF 26% 27% 14% 6% 5% 22%
The concept of joining is really too 'Western' and
does not really describe what happens. It would have been
much better to have asked 'how did you end up in your unit'
because, as with the Viet Cong, recruitment is much more a
matter of circumstances than motives. 7 A random sampling
of the answers indicates the variety of conditions which
places men in the RF/PF, other than being near their families
or being forced to join.
7Pike, Viet Cong, oo. cit., p. 376.
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Why in RF/PF?
It's better to be enlisted rather than living
out of the army working hard.
I enlisted for some pay because I am poor.
I got enlisted because I like it.
I was threatened by some people, I joined to
meet them.
Being young we can't live outside the army.
Live with the Viet Cong I cannot do, and here
there are no jobs.
When out of the army I met many circumstances
in which the soldiers committed acts of violence
towards the innocent people. I don't like that.
If I am out of this unit the Viet Cong will
force me to follow them.
For several years I have had many actions in
resisting the communists therefore if I return
home they will kill me.
PF were simply not made to feel a part of anything
beyond their unit. They felt little identification with any
person or cause; they expressed a pervasive sense of violated
expectations and lack of recognition. When asked what the
government could do to aid them, PF seemed more concerned
about broken promises than anything but a salary increase
to raise them from a starvation level. In almost every
instance,what PF wanted were things they had been promised
and never received, especially uniforms and shoes, or their
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monthly ration of a few pounds of bulgar wheat and milk
powder from Catholic Relief Services.
That so much emphasis was nut on clothing by PF is
especially significant. Uniforms and shoes were so
important to the PF because they were a sign of status,
something the other soldiers had. So important were
these items to the PF that they sought them whenever
possible on the black market.
These men were very status conscious, but individual
rewards and honors, especially for PF, were seldom provided.
When a PF made an important military discovery, he was
sometimes promised a sum of money. Often, however, the
money simply never came; and even when it did come, it was
regarded as less desirable than a medal. One PF, for example,
was responsible for killing the Viet Cong district chief for
his area. He was given a reward equal to two months salary.
Yet, he still would have preferred a medal. "I'm so poor
anyway," he said, "that all I can do with the money is pay
some of my debts and have a celebration with my platoon.
Thus, the money is gone at once. If I had been given a medal
or a paper I would have it to keeP always and everyone would
know what I had done."
This stated preference for iedals and papers was not
simply an individual case of false modesty, for it was
repeated consistently:
One day we heard a horn sound and requested
permission to go on a search mission. As a
result we killed a Viet Cong and seized an Ml
carbine. As reward, we got 1,000 piastres. But
I thought even a single p, one piastre, would do
because it was an honor reward. A medal or
commendation certificate would have been welcomed
with greater gratification. (9701PF)
.About 7 months ago, while we were running to
look for a place to stay away from the rain, we
were able to capture two Viet Cong who were
teasing the girls. There was no reward.
Another time I found a mine. . .and the whole
platoon received a reward of 500 piastres. We
felt joyful when receiving the reward, we did not
think whether it was worth it. We were happy since
we had made known the platoon and that was good
enough. (9803PF)
PF did not even receive formal rank and insignia.
This ommission was especially embarrassing when RF or ARVN
units were nearby. When asked what he needed, one platoon
leader in Long An replied, "With five children my life is
very hard on such a small salary, but money is not what I
want the most. The thing I want the most is a real insignia
that shows I am a platoon leader. Now all I have is this
piece of yellow cloth pinned to my uniform, and the insignia
store in Saigon doesn't even sell this cloth. When I need a
new insignia my wife must buy the cloth in the market and make
it herself. When I go to formations with RF and the officials
I am very ashamed because all I have is this little piece
of cloth." (9706PF)
The PF could not even be sure of adequate medical
care if wounded. Most of the doctors in the country were
assigned to ARVU, and very, very seldom would treat wounded
RF/PF, even when there were facilities and doctors available.
Less than 50% of the PF thought they would get adequate
medical care if they were wounded.
If they were killed, there was also a good chance - as
they knew from experience -, that their widows would never
collect the widow's benefits, equal to full salary for
12 months. Death benefits were often filed late so that
district and orovince officials could collect extra pay, and
even when payments began they were sporadic. The application
procedures, in fact, were not even suited to rural reality.
Before a widow could receive her pension she needed a
marriage license. In parts of Viet Nam men often never
obtained the licenses, either because there was no legal
authority in residence because of the Viet Cong or because
it simply was not the custom. Yet nothing was done to help
new recruits obtain licenses for future use and widows
sometimes didn't receive their pension as a result. Saigon
bureaucracy conflicted with oeasant tradition to such an
extent that village officials attesting to the fact the
woman was indeed the actual wife were not always accepted as
a substitute for a license.
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Trust and Dependence
Thus the soldiers crucial to GVN success in the villages
were treated as marginal men in Vietnamese society; and,
not surprisingly, they held only marginal loyalties to any
unit of organization beyond that of their own families.
The lack of commitment to their units is reflected
among the soldiers by the fact that less than half of them
had been in their unit as long as two years and only 20%
of them had been in their unit more than 4 years. This
was not because these men were new soldiers, for 50% of them
had been in other military units previously. The reasons
for the lack of commitment lay in the nature of their support
system.
RF/PF, in fact, saw their units very much in terms
of families because of the nature of Vietnamese culture
and society. With no meaningful agencies of socialization
in most rural Buddist areas, men learn and adapt to society
through the family; there is no strong educational system,
no religious organization or youth movements to gradually
move them towards a less family-dominated socialization. The
value system produced by this family socialization helps to
explain the importance of non-military logistics to the PF
and emphasizes the crucial role of the district chief in
determining the immediate needs of the soldiers.
The importance of trust and support cannot be overempha-
sized for the RF/PF. They have been socialized in a value
system which emphasized interdependence and nurture
the primary group values to which all must become oriented.
Wolf 8 has pointed out the general tendency for societies
where food is accumulated periodically and then consumed
slowly over a period of time--such as a rice society--to
favor socialization techniques which render group members
dependent on the socialization group. Dependence training
aids in promoting repeated execution of routine tasks and
it emphasizes that the total product of the group is more
important than the workload of any individual. Peasants
will often pay more for a piece of land than it is worth
from a capitalistic standpoint because they have surplus
labor in the family which can be used free of charge.
Donaghue, for example, noted this in the Mekong Delta,9
where he found that a landowner could make more money by
renting land than by hiring labor. This is because each
laborer must earn enough to support his family. Renting
the land means that the land owner is receiving all of one
family's labor in return for supporting them whereas when he
hires a laborer he supports a family and receives only one
man's labor.
Harvest societies thus generally emphasize group
dependence. The socialization pattern of extended families
is even more dependency-oriented and places a great deal of
8Wolf, oo. cit., p. 69.
9 John D. Donaghue and Vo Hong Phuc, "My Thuan: The Study
of a Delta Village in South Vietnam." Saigon: MSUAG:
May 1961. mimeographed.
emphasis on oral gratification of the youngl0 --in effect
identifying authority and power with support. There is a
very practical reason for this because it is the children
who will eventually be required to support the aged, who
in peasant societies do not receive medicare and social
security.
Richard Solomon has provided insights into the
importance of trust and support in his analysis of Chinese
culture, 1 1 which is very similar to that of the Vietnamese.
Both societies have strong Confucian strains, similar
harvest and family patterns, and a common cultural heritage
reflecting the fact that Viet Nam was undar Chinese control
for 1100 years.
In Viet Nam, as Solomon's work on Confucian China
suggests, there is a very strong desire for unity but also
a very strong fear of conflict. This places emphasis on a
leader strong enough to satisfy the individual's need for
unity, a unity which is tested by seeing whether the leader
can give the needed support and gratify dependency needs
developed in childhood. To feel dependent is to feel secure.
One is productive when immersed in a meaningful system.
Dependence on the group overcomes personal passivity; one
1Wolf, op. cit., p. 69.
11Richard H. Solomon, "The Chinese Revolution and the
Politics of Dependence." Ann Arbor, Michigan: University
of Michiaan, Center for Chinese Studies, August 1966. mimeo.
fulfills group obligations via labor for the group. Autonomy
leads to fears of isolation, a sense of helplessness, and
passivity. To be used is to feel secure.
The RF/PF regard their military unit as a family unit.
This sense of support and trust, intrinsic to the family
unit, is essential to keep the RF/P7 system going as a
military unit. As can be noted time after time in the quotes,
the RF/PF use family-oriented terms for their units. One RF,
from a very good unit, who said he liked his company because
"We know each other. We are locked together as brothers
and will live and die together," offered further insight into
the problem of support and solidarity with a TAT (TAT:
Thematic Apperception Test) story about a Viet Cong defector.
The story indicated the way that even the most dedicated
anti-Viet Cong soldier is sometimes willing to accept and
trust defectors, but more clearly it indicated the importance
of group support and dependence. One leaves a group only if
there is another group.
The father is scolding his son, the mother
interferes, but she was scolded by her husband
too, so she gets angry, and uses her hand to
gag her mouth.
By the enticement of the Communist, this son
took money of his parent to follow them.
Presently he could not endure the hardship, so he
returns to his parents. The son thinks of hating
the communists, he hopes his father will absolve
his fault so he may live with his family. Finally,
the father forgives his son, and lets his son
join the RF to maintain security for villages,
hamlets. (770RF)
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Hierarchy-and dependence-oriented men will tend to
exhibit a sense of powerlessness and a lack of initiative
before authority. They will show reluctance to criticize
and a great desire to please those in Dower. 1 2 Yet, a
forceful and especially a just superior will inspire trust,
fulfill dependence needs, and hence insnire his subordinates
to great effort on behalf of the group. This places a great
responsibility on the man on top of the hierarchy--here, the
district chief--for it suggests that RF/PF generally will
not dare as]k for what they have been promised and that they
will wait to be asked what they need rather than initiate
requests.
To a remote, isolated, military unit, knowing that one
can count on artillery or reinforcements is all important.
However, since there is no way to know for sure that support
will come, one must simply trust. In Viet Nam the credibility
of this trust is tested by seeing whether or not the
authorities provide non-military care, and therefore sustain
the dependence linkage required for a feeling of psychological
(as well as physical) security, in the military unit. Thus,
one way the PF would test their linkages to the district chief
would be by seeing whether or not he assured their re-
ceipt of monthly food supplements of bulgar wheat and salad
oil, as well as certain nonessential items promised to them
Solomon, "o. cit., Part II, Confusion and the Need for
Strona Authority," pp. 145-6.
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such as mosquito nets, which PF often complained about even
when mosquitos were entirely out of season. The problem
here lay in the difference in attitudes about the importance
of whether items -arrived on time and as promised to the men.
To the district chiefs, usually urbanites, delivery of the
food supplement was perceived as a "big job for nothing"
since the food was so bad that many PF didn't like it very
much. But to the PF, it was the symbolic act of receiving
the allotment, maintaining the dependence linkage, and knowing
that the district chief cares which was so important. The
loss of this dependence relationship, the support and guidance
of a powerful superior is very threatening when there is a
war.
The PF were very apprehensive about their support in
part because they knew from experience that district
personnel were frequently remiss in their duties. As one
platoon leader said "Anytime the officer on permanent duty
is absent no quick support is available. It may come 15
minutes later or 30 minutes later or sometimes it even comes
after the battle has been fought..."
A short time before one unit was studied, it had been
mortared by the Viet Cong. No one was wounded or killed but
the attack still shattered the olatoon. The men's confidence
in the district's ability to support them was destroyed by a
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few words over the radio. As one PF stated in his interview:
I wish to attend a NCO training course
or to become a rural development cadre. The
reason is that we are fighting alone and cannot
live sufficiently on our salaries. I worry about
fighting alone. I fear that my leader will not
show a good understanding. For example, once the
deputy district chief swore at us 'God damn' in
his speaker (radio) and in that moment the VC
were shelling the fort.
I live in such narrow circumstances that
I want to join another branch. A lot of soldiers
have deserted here to join other branches such as
Division 25 of Infantry, Rangers, Marines. (1132PF)
One of the TAT's obtained from a squad leader in the
platoon seems to contain further insights into the un-
settling effect that a felt lack of support had on the men.
Lack of consolation or care seemed to be justification for
changing sides. When dependence needs are not fulfilled
there is no obligation to remain with the group.
This man is a VC--this woman is his wife. He
went out and was shot by our troops. The medic
comes to put a bandage on him because he is
wounded.
This man has fought against us, our troops have
shot at him. He has no medic so we bandaged for
him. Seeing that the husband is wounded, the wife
is thinking why he didn't join our troops. He has
followed VC and (she wonders) if there is a medic
to take care of him. Later this man will fight
against VC because he was wounded and VC didn't
bandage for him or say something to console him.
(1136PF)
In many instances, without the district chief's
knowledge, the PF were abused by corrupt underlings on the
district staff. In one instance, for example, the district
chief specifically spoke of the food he had sent one platoon.
The platoon had been studied, however, and had only received
a nart of what had been sent.
Nor did hamlet or village chiefs encourage the PF very
often. The village officials were appointed and responsible
to the district chief - not the village - and it was very
seldom that they ever helped the PF with any of their problems.
One PF complained about the hamlet chief he was protecting:
Although the village had provided rice for sale
at the hamlet the authorities here did not want to
sell rice to the PF families.
As to family affairs, although I have been
enrolled as a soldier and there aren't many people
at home the hamlet chief still ordered my wife to
do public works. If she refuses, he would bring
her to the Discipline Council of the Village and
fine her. (9687)
Yet when the PF were abused they were afraid to tell the
district chief because of the fear that revenge would later
be taken by the culprit. As another PF said:
The commanding officers help us to get our rice
if we meet them. With regard to rice sometimes we
get much sometimes we qet little. Usually we have to
sign a receipt to receive rice. Our officers would
take action if they knew that sometimes we were
forced to sign seven copies. (9701PF)
Nor could physical separation be always blamed. The
above quote came from a PF stationed less than 500 yard•
from the district headquarters.
Another platoon in a different province had a very
capable radio operator and several men who could read maps
precisely and accurately. When the platoon moved from its
post at night, however, they never brought their radio
with them. Instead, they left it in their post--where it was
useless--with three men to guard it. This platoon was
searching for and defending against local guerrillas with no
use of a radio. If they spotted a guerrilla band moving
towards another area it would be many minutes before they
could notify the district. If the platoon were under attack
from a large Viet Cong Unit - a life-or-death position - they
would have their radio, but they were doing without the radio
in their day to day work, against guerrillas.
Three years before, according to the platoon leader,
they had lost their radio in an ambush. Not only had the
district chief beaten him, the leader said, but it had been
six months before the platoon was given another radio. At
the present time this particular district had a good district
chief, but the platoon leader had not had enough contact
with him to know this. The district chief, in turn, could
not know of the platoon's fears of losing their radio, for
there was no one on his staff who had been with the platoon
when the incident occurred.
Nor were subsectors equipped to coordinate individual
platoons. In one instance, four Viet Cong guerrillas were
able to outwit four PF platoons for eight months because
the four platoons, though in the same area, were managed and
directed as four separate wars.
One village straddled a highway near the site of an
important bridge. Because of the bridge there were four PF
platoons located in the village. Each platoon was responsible
for patrolling around the perimeter of one hamlet, both to
secure the hamlet and to prevent any Viet Cong unit from
reaching the bridge.
The four hamlets were so close together that they
practically formed a square, like four coins clustered
together. The four Viet Cong, actually three guerrillas
and a female nurse, lived in a totally concealed, im-
possible to notice, tunnel near a grave marker in the
small open space between the four hamlets. Every few
nights the guerrillas would scatter a few leaflets in one
of the hamlets. Every time this happened, according to
the village chief, it was assumed by each of the platoons
that one of the other platoons had not been alert and had
allowed the guerrillas access to the hamlets. It was eight
months before anyone realized the guerrillas were already
in the four hamlet cluster and then they were uncovered
only because someone spotted their accomplice, apparently
the only man in the village who knew of the tunnel's location,
with some Viet Cong leaflets he was carrying to leave near
the tunnel with some food.
These few guerrillas could do no physical harm to the
bridge or the populace without being uncovered, but they
could still make everyone in the four hamlets think he was
being watched. According to the American advisors, in
retrospect it seemed that if anyone had been collating and
cross-checking the incidents from the four hamlets with
reports from the four platoons on their activities the
guerrillas would probably have been found within two
months at most.
The fact that the PF were so dependent on the
district and yet so open to abuse from its personnel was
sometimes more injurious to the district chief than to
the PF. As illustrated in the last chapter, PF faced with
assignments which to their minds were impossibly fearful
tended to try to avoid potential wrath by hiding thier pre-
dicament. The empty outpost was far more dangerous when no
one knew it was empty. There were many similar, but less
serious instances noted during the study. PF who had been
berated or abused for dereliction of duty tended not to
report all the Viet Cong incidents in their hamlets, a
situation far more dangerous to anyone seeking to assess the
current military situation. Thus, abuse which threatened the
PF's link to the district resulted in the PF avoiding con-
frontations in a way that was far more serious in the long run.
Given the distance, both physical and psychological,
between PF platoons and the district, competent olatoon
and squad leaders were an absolute requirement for effective
units. There were, however, few incentives available to
offer platoon leaders. Platoon 'eadership was a dead end in
the PF. A platoon leader could be the best platoon leader
in the country, clear 100 Viet Cong from his village, capture
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the infrastructure intact, win the love of all, and he
would still be a platoon leader. There was no promotion
beyond platoon leader, and it was very rare, if ever,
that a PF was even honored with so much as a minor
military award.
Despite the lack of real incentives, however, many
PF were so hungry for any recognition or status that they
very much wanted to be leaders. There were also, in fact,
many PF who had been well trained in elite units such as
the Rangers or Marines and had deserted to the PF to be
with their families. The promotions tended to go, however,
to the highest bidder or to a relative of the platoon leader
or village official.
According to me, the government must choose
those who are capable, having anti-communist
fighting spirit, willing to help their comrades-
in-arms, having good behavior and virtue.
Then there are many men who had had experience
in the other units and who long for a. training
course, but because they are not accustomed with
the PF office cadres in the district they have
not been selected for training. Many times they
felt rather sad, because they have made efforts
but the superior did not pay attention to them
and did not help them. (9333PF)
Everybody could attend training course if
he is in the platoon leader's relatives. According
to me the way of promotion should be based on the
seniority in service. We can't stand the fact
that people who just joined the army could attend
a training course just because they were well-
connected. (9104PF)
Bad leadership tended to perpetuate itself because
it was seldom that an incompetent leader was ever replaced.
One platoon which was studied had not received a casualty in
over a year despite the fact that Viet Cong regularly came
to their village to draft men and collect taxes. The men in
the platoon were for the most part terribly satisfied with
their personal relationships, and well they should have been,
because as one interviewer noted in jest, "The Viet Cong
would be crazy to attack them. They might kill the platoon
leader by mistake!" The platoon leader, in fact, was
53 years old. Only one man in the platoon was below 30
and half of them were over 40. It was more of a rest home
than a platoon, a good example of what could happen with
inadequate leadership incentives.
All of this was compounded by the poor quality of the
leadership training course and the fact that graduation from
such courses was automatic.
The reason, for example, that some platoons had poor
artillery support was that they had no one who could use a
radio or read a map properly. In fact, some men had been
platoon leaders for as long as 5 years and had still never
been taught how to spring ambushes or read maps. As one PF
squad leader said of his platoon leader:
Our platoon leader is a man with much
experience and virtue. He is fair and just in
distributing awards and he seeks to enlist our
aspirations. Truth to tell, though, I can only
rate him as an average leader because now he is
old (43) and his eyes are very poor. He cannot
read the map when it is dark and he has much
trouble with the radio. Perhaps if he had some
money for the glasses he would be outstanding,
but now he does not let the other men use the
radio or read the map because he is ashamed about
his eyes. (9708PF)
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No one in the district headquarters could know if this
particular leader was capable of reading maps accurately and
using the radio well. No one receiving his messages could
know how long it had taken him to get the radio working.
Furthermore, if a radio message had been sent to the platoon
a slow response would have suggested a problem, but this
platoon and many others kept their radio off when they were
not using it because they very seldom had a reserve battery on
hand and most district chiefs professed worry about batteries
falling into Viet Cong hands. Similarly, no one could know,
when he did call for supporting fire or to report a Viet Cong
troop movement, whether or not the Viet Cong were where they
were reDorted to be.
Further compounding problems was the fact that training
was very poor, militarily and motivationally. At best it
amounted to six weeks of lectures and some rifle practice.
Thirty percent of the PF had had no real training at all and
70% had had less than two months. With the high turnover rate
in soldiers there was often little or no time to send men to
training. As one soldier noted, "I was not trained. The
commander gave me a rifle, told me to fire it and when I could
fire he gave it to me." (1114)
Peasant logic is no substitute for military training and
tactics. The best example of this is how well and poorly
trained squad leaders dealt with two military problems that were
given to a small group of squad leaders in Long An and Binh Dinh.
The two problems given the squad leaders were concerned
with how to bring their squad safely across a stream and what
to do in an ambush.
When a squad of soldiers comes to a stream that must be
crossed the approach of the poorer leaders was to cross the
stream first themselves with three of the men while the other
soldiers guarded them. Their logic was that the squad leader
should go first at all times so the others "would know that I
am brave." Unfortunately, if there were any Viet Cong waiting
to shoot at the men the squad leader would either be killed
or separated from the other men. A good leader spends his
time leading, not going first. As one PF, with 8 years ex-
perience in the Rangers before joining the PF said of such a
leader, "When we have a fight he spends all his time fighting
when he should be directing the other men." (945PF)
Even more striking is the difference between the
"'natural" and the "trained" approach to ambushes. In a typical
ambush of a squad walking along a path the Viet Cong will open
heavy fire from one side of the path only. The other side
will be mined or manned with heavy weapons so that if the
soldiers try and avoid the first fire they receive by jumping
into a ditch they will be destroyed instantly. The only way
to beat a good ambush is to attack straight into it--but un-
trained natural logic says the opposite.
Dedication and spirit are simply no substitute for
good training, but as noted before 30% of the PF received
no training at all and what training there was included no
night training at all. Nor did American advisors provide
the needed training: they were forbidden to go on operations
of less than company size! 1 3
What is truly extraordinary is the fact that in 1967,
6 years after the sending of American advisors to Viet Nam
and 13 years after the United States assumed responsibility
for the training and equipping of ARVN, the night belonged
to the Viet Cong. There simply was very very little
aggressive and roving night patrolling by the U.S., ARVN
or the RF. Some RF companies, some U.S., and ARVN units,
and some PF platoons were active at night, patrolling over
wide areas to keep small Viet Cong units from being able
to form for attacks; but when they did so it was because
of an exceptional and inventive unit commander and not
because of any general policy. A study of the problems
submitted to MACV in August 1967 stated:
It is only by a full scale, direct confrontation
of the Viet Cong during the time they are active
that the degree of security essential for pacification
to succeed can be established.14
13R. 7. Apple, Jr., "U.S. Study Calls a Night Army Essential
for Victory in Vietnam." New York Times, August 6, 1967, p. 6.
14Apple, op. cit., Even sometimes when PF were mobile at
night it was to avoid trouble and not to be aggressive. As one
PF in a very poor platoon said, "I like to go on night ambush
patrols because it is more dangerous inside the fort." (1133PF)
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There was little effort made to motivate PF, even
though the opportunity for training was available. Generally
the PF only behaved well when they were in their home village,
subject to the sanctions and social pressures of families
and friends.
"The PF should be kind toward the villagers.
Formerly, because the soldiers of some other branches
had come to plunder and oppress them the villagers
became very suspicious. So we must try to win their
confidence. As for the PF soldiers in this area, they
are the children of the people so they are much nicer."
(8339PF)
Away from their village PF were generally no better behaved
than any other soldiers. Several platoons were observed that
were away from their home area or away from their families.
These men engaged in the same kind of small scale chicken
stealing and bad behavior as the larger ARVN or RF units. Said
a peasant of one platoon away from home:
"out of the 4 platoons here, only that of Mr.
is sort of undisciplined. For example, the day they
encamped in they lifted the villagers vegetables
and plundered the gambling den. The local people were
greatly chagrined. As I know, the 3 other platoons
behave very well toward the people except for that of
Mr. . To put the trouble right, the higher auth-
orities should transfer that platoon to another area
and give them some more training to please the people.
(8148V)
Their low pay, in fact, gave them little alternative:
. . . About the conduct of the soldiers here in the
hamlet. They are good fighters but because their salaries
are so low that sometimes they will try to make some more
money by gambling. It doesn't matter if they just gamble,
but when they lose money in gambling they will go to rob
from the people. This had happened once after the TET
New Year. A PF soldier robbed a man of his money, but
this man has a son who is a soldier in the ranger force
so he called his son in for revenge. They has a fighting,
at the end the PF shot and wounded this man's son. That
was all because of gambling.
In this hamlet, the soldiers' conduct is pretty good
but in other hamlets, the soldiers rely on their guns.
They are arrogant toward the people so the people are
very afraid of them." (8115V)
That the social sanctions of family and friends was
generally necessary for good PF behavior makes it very
difficult to have a balanced system, because it is often true
that the only way to secure one hamlet is by pacifying a different
hamlet, i.e. some hamlets are crucial to a whole area. In
addition it is also usually true that the hamlets that need
pacifying the most are the hamlets where it is hardest to
recruit local PF, such as hamlets where everyone has joined
the Viet Cong.
This poor behavior of GVN soldiers away from home is
also one of the reasons why it is so difficult for GVN to re-
claim hamlets from the Viet Cong, or gain allegiance when they
are in control. As long as officers can't control their men, it
is hard to convince peasants to work with the GVN in pacify-
ing their hamlets. That home-based soldiers were the ones
who most often had good relations with peasantry highlights
a major fault of the entire military control system. Either
some district chiefs and ARVN officers did not care how their
soldiers behaved with peasants, or they were unable to
control their own troops. As one villager said, when asked
what should be done in order to have a closer relationship
between the soldiers and the people:
"As for the RF soldiers, they should go to
learn more of soldier's conduct and virtue. Punish
those soldiers who are haughty toward the people
and there should be a change and reorganization
from the leaders down, the soldiers must behave
and dress properly and they should be forbidden
from drinking and gambling. The soldiers should
do something to help the reople and treat the
people like they do to their parents. Now the
soldiers' clothes are topsy-turvy, we can't tell
which branch of arms they belong to, their hairs
are messy and they don't have any conduct at all;
people are very much afraid of them. Furthermore
when they get drunk, they swear and break the
tables and chairs. And when they lost money in
gamble, they will go to rob from people.
[The PF] were also like this before but now
they are better. We can't blame them, it is their
leaders, the sergeants and the second lieutenants
[on the staff] who should be blamed." (8115V)
At least part of the blame is definitely due to lack
of concern by district personnel because there were opportun-
ities available for indoctrination which were largely unused.
One of the reasons soldiers away from home steal food
is because it appears that peasants would rather be thieves
than beggars. Away from home GVN soldiers are often without
any supply system to sustain them or any organized means of
obtaining food. ARVN supply lines are terribly jumbled and
leave the soldiers to provide their own food in the field.
RF and PF away from home are usually so poor and broke that
they can't afford to buy food. To a peasant's natural sense
of logic the two answers to the problem that seem to occur are
either to beg or to steal the needed food.
Marginal men can still have pride. Among the RF and PF
studied there was a great deal of shame associated with the
need to beg. Begging is humiliating and to be turned down
is even worse. This reveals the tension in a society that
stresses dependency. One expresses autonomy via stealing so
as to avoid the more dreadful fear of being rejected in a
dependency relationship. A frequent theme on the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT) was begging and the stories told by
the soldiers indicate their sensitivity towards begging. In
the picture about which these two stories were told, a young
man is shown talking with an older man, while a woman stands
in the background.
A disabled man comes to beg a richer and the wife
of the richer is near.
This man is disabled because it is his destiny so
he has no work and he must beg the money to live.
The beggar is thinking of his destiny and asks
himself why he is poor and hard; the richers cannot
spend all their money and as for him, he has no money.
The richer wonders whether he can help the poor men to
obtain blessings for his children.
In the future, this richer will still be rich, and
and his children will also be rich, and the poor will be
poor forever. (0348PF)
The poor man comes to beg from the big capitalist.
This man looks down at the man who's come to beg. The
daughter sees that the father's neglecting the poor
man and she pities him and she cries.
Our country has been ruled and exploited and people
become poor and had to go to beg. Together with this,
the rich men also exploit the poor workers.
This poor man begs for food, he also hopes that the
country will have peace so it can be equal with other
countries and people's life will not be so miserable and
they might have happier living. The daughter has a
pitying heart, she hopes that from now on, no poor man
will come to beg and get scolded by her father. As for
the father, he hopes no poor, dirty beggar will come to
beg and mortify his house.
The poor man will become a soldier and help the
government to destroy all the traces of feudalism.
This rich man hopes to become richer, but since the
government is destroying the vestiges of feudalism
and corruption he is put in prison and all his properties
are confiscated. (0168RF)
Training and indoctrination play an important role in shaping the
relationships between soldier and peasantry and the PF Motivation
Improvement Program (MIP), significantly improved the relations
and behavior of those platoons that received the training.
Begging and stealing are not the only resolutions to the
problem, and good training or indoctrination can teach soldiers
an approach which is more acceptable to all concerned. The
successful resolution to the problem--keeping soldiers fed
and protecting villagers from pillage--was to teach the soldiers
the importance of having good behavior and developing common
sympathies with peasants they have not known previously.
The MIP program was designed to teach the PF the value
of good behavior and diplomacy, the value of working with
peasants so as to develop common sympathies with them. It was
successful in as much as the behavior of PF platoons trained
by MIP groups was generally better than that of other PF
platoons. As one peasant commented on a platoon that had
just received MIP training:
The Viet Cong are unhappy. However knowing much
of politics they can win the people's sympathy. The
PF men have just begun to imitate them by learning
about the psychological warfare. Previously they
beat the people where they met them. (8229)
Teaching soldiers that good behavior and good deeds can
win sympathy and result in a free meal when needed is not
sufficient, however, to produce consistently good behavior
unless the leadership also accepts the importance of good
behavior and reinforces rather than undermines it. The program
only reached 60% of the PF studied, however, and was not well
received by some district chiefs.
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The value of the MIP training was seriously diluted
by the lack of commitment to the program at the district
level. As the program worked, teams of national cadre
trained a few platoons in every province and in the process
also trained a provincial team to carry on the program in
the same fashion so that each district would ultimately
have its own training team. At every level the program
became diluted and altered as each official tended to use
training teams as added soldiers who in reality did little
more than act as military reinforcements in many instances.
The units that actually received the training, however,
were substantially improved in their performance according
to the interviews.
In the absence of any checks on incompetence, with
poor training and apprehensive about support, it is not
surprising that the RF/PF system was basically defensive.
The absence of trust and support can prove crucial for the
soldiers are dependent on the organization to satisfy their
needs.
The Shils and Janowitz analysis of the Wehrmacht in
WW'7 I115 found similar variables relating to military
effectiveness. Their research showed that a soldier's
ability to resist was a function of the capacity of his unit
15Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and
Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in V7orld War II." Public
Opinion Quarterly, XII (Summer 1948), pp. 280-315.
to avoid disintegration, and that the main ways in which
units could be disrupted are through: 1) separation,
2) communications breaks, 3) loss of leadership, 4) depletion
of personnel, and 5) major breaks in food and medicine. 16
Furthermore, as Shils and Janowitz note, it was
necessary for structural integrity that the group possess
leadership with which the soldier could identify1 7 and
officers and NCO's be effective because of their consistency
with the personality system of the individual soldier. The
Vietnamese military system effectively guaranteed that a
great number of men could not identify or have personalities
consistent with their men because all district officers were
regular army officers, many of whom were urban, educated,
middle to upper class and indifferent or even contemptuous
of their men.
In the RF/PF, communications breaks were frequent,
there was inadequate leadership, personnel were depleted
and there were often major breaks in food and medicine.
In every case the major reason for this--more than the
Viet Cong--was the inherent working of the Vietnamese
military system. Leadership was often inadequate because
of leadership selection practices. Major breaks in food
and medicine often occurred because RF/PF equipment and
167•. cit., p. 281.
17o0. cit., p. 284.
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supplies were controlled by ARVN and often diverted to other
uses, including the black market where many PF bought their
uniforms. Communications breakdowns were frequently due to
negligent officers who didn't bother to communicate. Per-
sonnel were often deoleted because sons of rich men were
allowed to buy positions in the PF to avoid the draft and
then were not required to fight and because desertions were
often not reported by provincial authorities who collected
the money for the missing men.
How much separation could occur before PF felt
abandoned, and how much of a communications break could
occur before a unit felt cut off, certainly had a lot to do
with how much faith and trust the RF/PF had in the district
officers. What seldom happened, however, was the development
of the good personal relationship (as occurred in Hoa Hao
and Viet Cong areas) through identification with common goals
and frequent interactions, ritualized in the Viet Cong through
self--criticism or in Catholic and Hoa HIao areas through
religious ceremony.
Scarcity could even become an advantage to development
of such a system if the right climate of trust was created.
Early Viet Cong literature, for example, often cited the
importance of earning through one's own efforts the tools of
revolution and not depending on handouts, as in the story of
18
"Mother Carbine," the rifle that grew into thousands of rifles.
18Burchett, oo. cit.
Similarly Hoa Hao youth groups were often purposely
kept short of rifles and made to earn them by showing that
they deserved them and would care for them, even though the
Hoad Hiao stockpile had many weapons.
On the other hand, one unit in another province called
for supporting mortar fire during an attack and was told
"Mortar shells cost 5000 piastres, we can't waste them." Or
in still another province a district chief explained why he
did not give a light machine gun to an outpost in a very
precarious position. "I dare not risk it," he said, "be-
cause the outpost may be overrun and then the Viet Cong would
get the weapon." Scarcity can make for ritual and increased
solidarity, but it certainly doesn't have to! 19
It was not always the district chief's fault that
RF/PF were short-changed, but if the district chief did not
talk with them and explain the situation, there was little
way for the men to distinguish between scarcity and ex-
ploitation. A quality PF's found highly desirable in
officers was that they should attempt to "enlist the
aspirations of the men" to sympathize with, and try to
help the men with their problems. Instead, what happened
was that the favored position for "protected soldiers"
19See Chater IX, 'Ritual in Social Movements," in
E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels. 'New York: Norton and
Co., Inc., 1959.
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became the psy-war (information) cadre. As one soldier in
Long An stated, "We never see our psy-war cadre. Doesn't
the government ever have anything to tell us?" (1118RF)
CHAPTER VII
PROTECTION FROM WHOM?
"I have fears for the poisonous gas from
the bombs. Even the trees are destroyed
by this so I am worried for my child's
health." (8116V)
"The PF here can do nothing more for
our security. Hundreds of platoons would
remain ineffective against the airplanes and
artillery." (8342V)
"Mr. Nguyen Bay, the hamlet chief, was
killed about two months ago. It was said
that the VC killed him but actually it was the
soldiers from ARV•N who killed him. The
soldiers came to rob money and then killed
him...he went to someone's house to gamble.
They met him outside and killed him." (8112V)
As the RF/PF system was constituted, localism, a
family-oriented defensive outlook reinforced by poor
training, a lack of trust in the support system, and in--
adequate intelligence served as divisive influences that
tended to separate villages and hamlets rather than drawing
them together in a balanced system. The result of each
platoon suboptimizing its own values in this situation was
to make it easier for Viet Cong main force units to operate
and to increas the ability of the infrastructure - aided by
small guerrilla bands - to operate.
The prospects of long-range pacification were made
worse by the short-run problems created by the lack of
coordination with search-and-destroy operations, large
O1~~i
numbers of refugees, the presence of large military units,
and the frequent failure of Americans to understand the
imnortance of the Viet Cong infrastructure. Even when there
was no heavy fighting in an area, large-scale economic
growth, sometimes coupled with the presence of large U.S. -
GVN military units and poor police, helped the Viet Cong
cadres maintain themselves.
The district chief could not protect the peasants
from the brutalization, rape and pillage of the large
military units. The PF were protected from neither the
large units nor from inflation. Nor could the PF always
protect the peasants from the police that were being sent
into rural areas. The result tended to be a situation in
which the Viet Cong controlled less population and could
move less large units into an area while large units of
ARVN, U.S. or Korean troops were present. At the same time,
however, their local infrastructure could adapt and even
strengthen itself while the RF/PF local security structures
tended to show little improvement, and even eroded, during
the time large military forces were present.
Attrition and Security
At the same time that the RF/PF were fighting the
Viet Cong infrastructure and local guerrillas and attempting
to provide day-to-day security, large units were seeking to
destroy Viet Cong main forces. Lack of coordination between
the "big war" and the "little" - or village-war decreased
success in both wars and gave the RF/PF who were to be
present before, during and after the search-and-destroy
operations little better prospects of keeping their area
secure. The Problem was as much a lack of coordination
and failure to control non-combat violence as it was the
consequences of battle itself.
Search-and-destroy operations generally did not
affect the Viet Cong infrastructure because the large
search-and-destroy units employed on these missions often
stayed in any given hamlet or village only for a day or less
before moving on. Viet Cong cadres could hide nearby for
that short a period, returning when the soldiers left, or
they could stay in a tunnel, the whereabouts of which no
one else knew or dared to disclose.
Search and clear operations, however,
aggressive, do not achieve the dual pur-
pose of killing insurgents and destroying
their infrastructure... [do] not put the
government forces into the same element
as the insurgent forces opposed to them.
As a result, it does not force insurgent
units to fight in defense of their or-
ganization and infrastructure, because
it does not threaten these at all. 1
1Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency.
London: Chatto and ·Windus, 1966, p. 117 (emphasis added).
When large military operations did not destroy the
infrastructure, the losses to the government sometimes far
outweighed the gains. One especially graphic instance is
sufficient to illustrate this self-defeating strategy. In
one district which was studied GVN daylight control con-
sisted of district headquarters and one of the 53 hamlets
in the district -- and even the single hamlet containing
the district headquarters was not entirely secure during the
day. Once, while the interviewing team was in the hamlet,
a squad of seven Viet Cong entered it 200 yards away from
headquarters to distribute leaflets. (That day someone
warned the PF at once and the interviews were not interrupted.)
The district chief was an extraordinary man -- fearless
to the point of lunacy, he had the absolute loyalty of his
men and seemed totally dedicated to his district. 2
That the district chief had a local alias, Vietnamese
for fox, signified his stature in the district as a result
of his military exploits. He was honored with that pseudonym
by Viet Cong and PF alike. Not only was he the only district
chief studied who was held in such esteem by the villagers,
he was the only officer observed of low birth who had ever
become a district chief. This district chief, who could not
even read and write well, had been appointed only because
2The information in this examole was based on an ex-
tensive talk with district chief and was later validated by
cross checking with the U.S. ad&Tisors, the orovince chief
and the interviews obtained in the dis3trict.
the district's problem was sheer survival and his past
experience marked him for the job. A soldier for 27 years,
he had fought at various times for the French, the Japanese,
the Viet Minh and ARVN and had campaigned in Burma, Laos,
Thailand, India, and China.
The district chief had his deficiencies as a leader.
He ignored or scoffed at problems of defense, led attacks
personally when he should have been coordinating battle
plans, and never learned how to delegate authority. How-
ever, he did have a plan for the district.
During his tenure, the RF/PF often carried out local
ooerations that appeared to be fruitless, inefficient and
even cowardly. They sometimes moved very superficially
through Viet Cong hamlets, giving the local Viet Cong
plenty of time to avoid them. But the district chief
explained that he was slowly removing PF families from Viet
Cong areas and using his maneuvers to keep informed of local
Viet Cong activities and operations. Using the pretext of
stealing a chicken or threatening to beat a peasant, he would
get a minute alone with him and find out what was happening.
The plan was to slowly gather all RF/PF families where
they were safe from retribution, complete his knowledge of
the Viet Cong infrastructure and where they hid, and then
oick them all up on one detailed operation. Whether or not
this was a good plan, and whether or not he was a good district
chief, the plan at least made sense.
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Three months before the district was visited, however,
a regiment destroyed in one operation what he had been
developing for two years.
In the Viet Cong areas of the district, death was the
standard punishment for any peasant who gave any information
to GVN. The government regiment moved through the district
in search of a Viet Cong battalion dispersed there. The
soldiers spent 24 hours in each hamlet taking pigs and
chickens to eat and threatening to stab anyone who inter-
fered with them. During the night they stayed at one of the
villages where seven of them raped the widow and daughter
of a PF. They also abused PF and their families and caused,
at the district chief's estimate, one million piastres
(about $10,000) worth of damage - as much money then as 60 PF's
earned in a year. The senior American advisor -- killed one
month later -- found that in the hamlet where the rape had
occurred all the remaining men had cut off their trigger
fingers as an enduring protest. While the regiment was in the
district, the district chief and the nrovince chief had both
tried to intercede but the regiment was under outside control
and could not be influenced by local considerations. The
district chief and his RF/PF actually picked up and moved to
avoid unnecessary association with the rampaging government
soldiers.
Perhaps the regiment was right and the district chief
wrong. A complete analysis would require fuller knowledge of
what the regiment accomplished - it did not find the battalion -
and why it acted as it did. But while the study team was
present the mother of one PF and the sister of another were
killed by the Viet Cong. The PF said that this was in re-
taliation for the pillage of the regiment. In March, 1967,
250 Viet Cong overran the district, killing 31 of the 37
Vietnamese and 3 of the 4 Americans Dresent (the district
chief survived); and while no causal connection can be proven,
the search mission of the Government regiment had done little
to bolster the district's formerly strong will to resist, or
to cause warning to be given. Intelligence in the district,
according to the district chief, did dry up substantially
after the regiment's visit.
This not only shows how local relationships could be
destroyed by military brutalization on the part of the
government, but also how the Viet Cong on the other hand could
use force effectively to back up their demands, and actually
gain in the process. They claimed, without anyone's being
able to prove otherwise, that the regiment had come because
someone had betrayed their battalion's presence and that
this justified their strict penalties for talking with RF/PF.
Even the PF could understand the logic of this, especially
because the Viet Cong battalion was probably never in the
hamlet being brutalized anyway!
Force simply does not encourage unarmed peasants to
try and stop the Viet Cong, nor does the threat of force
always bring people together. The peasants needed someone
who could protect them and as long as the Viet Cong had
their infrastructure they still had some trumps.
From 1954 until the present, then, the relationship
between government force and the village has been a major
factor for the Viet Cong to exploit instead of a force to
bind the village to the nation. From 1965, the military
emphasis was mainly on destroying large units of Viet Cong
instead of containing them, often neglecting the Viet Cong
infrastructure and allowing the Viet Cong to profit from
the excesses of the large operation.
These operations may or may not have been winning the
larger war. But while the civilian tcll, both refugees
and casualties, was immense, less than two Percent of all
U.S. offensive operations produced any contact with Viet Cong. 3
Thus, as was noted by Brigadier General Richard M. Lee,
former Deputy Senior Advisor to II Corps RVT hit-or-miss
efforts "only operate to make the entire VC infrastructure
stronger" in the areas of GVN military operations. 4
3 Corson, op. cit., p. 147.
4Lee, B. G. Richard M. "A Program Against the VC Infra-
structure," July 27, 1967, quoted in Buchanan and Hyatt,
op. cit., p. 1-31
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Another result of the large scale search-and-destroy
war was the dislocation of hundreds of thousands of peasants.
These huge population movements (morally justified or not)
placed a. large strain on local government which it often
could not withstand.
Not all these displaced persons were "voluntary" refugees.
Often attempts were made to move large numbers of people from
Viet Cong areas so that the Viet Cong would be denied their
labor. This drove some people into the Viet Cong who other-
wise would have been government supporters. They sometimes
went out of hatred stemming from the bombing, but more often
simply because a very poorly run refugee program was un-
appealing and no jobs were available. One peasant in Binh
Dinh stayed with the Viet Cong when they took over his hamlet
because as a refugee:
I could not earn my living. In order
to work for the Americans I would have
needed some powerful man to help me.
Since my children are so many I have to
stay here to live on agriculture. (8228 V)
A PF also recognized that the government had to provide
for people if relocation was to work.
There are many reasons (why a man follows
Viet Cong). For instance, those nurturing
griefs against village officials follow the
Viet Cong to have the opportunity to revenge
on them. In general, those who follow the
Viet Cong were not lured by Viet Cong pro-
paganda into doing so. Up to 80% of those
who followed Viet Cong did because it was the
fault of the government authorities. The
government failed to arrange in advance shelter
areas for the villagers in case of Viet Cong
raids. Many had no other alternatives
than to follow the raiders. (9570 PF)
At the same time, the simple fact that the government
has had to move people may be interpreted as a sign of
weakness and can generate great hostility. As the refugee
study in Phu Yen found:
For a people as pragmatic as Vietnamese
peasants, the message implicit in refugee
movement is a clear one -- The GVN is not
able to protect even its supporters from
the insurgents so one had best withhold
making any overt commitment to the government.
The existence of such an attitude was
manifest in many refugee camps where the
population, despite a stated hostility to
the Viet Cong, refused to participate in
local self-defense forces. 5
Perhaps even more critical Nwere the repercussions the
refugee situation had on the more secure villages, where there
was frequently the same hostility by the refugees. As noted
before, Viet Cong contested and secured hamlets are often
located very near each other. Many refugees never went
farther than a few kilometers from their homes, hoping to
wait it out in nearby hamlets as best they could. There
they often became a source of great strain and tension as
they increased the demands on security, and the drain on
communal land and jobs. When they were rebuffed or poorly
treated by local officials they created great distrust and
suspicions among the villagers who feared they might be
Viet Cong. This was reinforced in many cases by the
Rambo, Tinker and LeNoir, on. cit., p. 63. emphasis added.
attitude of the PF who often made little or no effort to
overcome the hostility or to protect refugees.
These large-scale operations, then, often had result of
decreasing the intelligence flow to the district chiefs
drivina some men into the Viet Cong, and increasing the
strain on more secure areas, while often not even destroying
the Viet Cong unit being pursued.
The problems were exacerbated because American officers
frequently did not comprehend the Viet Cong system. The
American military system emphasized destruction and attrition
of main enemy forces and often completely misunderstood the
non-traditional roles assigned to large Viet Cong units,
and the importance of cadres. As Buchanan and Hyatt note:
In late 1966 a VC/Lt. Colonel defected
from the 5th VC Division then located in Phouc
Tuy province. His interrogation report listed
the primary mission of the division as inten-
sifying the revolutionary struggle. Secondary
missions were to harass government outposts,
interdict routes of communication, etc. The
MACV intelligence analysis which followed the
interrogation did not mention the division's
mission but instead analyzed the military
and therefore more understandable, tasks.
In another instance in Viet Nam, regimental
size NVA and VC units -were described as
"hiding among the population." It could be
argued that an appreciation of enemy missions
is necessary to the process of assuming enemy
capabilities and intentions. 6
In one province, despite the lack of a competent local
intelligence system, an American intelligence advisor was
6 Buchanan and Hyatt, on. cit., p. I-27, emphasis added.
still able to obtain detailed information on the infra-
structure of several villages from documents captured in a
large U.S. operation in the central highlands. When he
brought the detailed listings to the American advisor in
one district, the advisor's comment was "There couldn't
possibly be any VC in those villages! I've walked through
them without ever being shot at and all the peasants tell
me there are no VC there."
Problems were often even more complicated when large
units of ROK (ROK: Republic of Xorea), U.S. or ARVN troops
were situated in an area on a more permanent basis. The
district chief was usually without any means to control the
actions of these troops and the "punish-the-village" style
of these units was frequently exploited by the Viet Cong.
In Binh Dinh, for example, there were sometimes
entire companies or even battalions of Korean or ARVN troops
within one or two hundred yards of villages where Viet Cong
operated daily, disseminating propaganda and collecting taxes.
This happened not because the peasants were all supporters of
the Viet Cong, but because they were more afraid of the ROK
or ARVN troops than they were of the Viet Cong.
There was one village in particular where the peasants
were faced with a dilemma. A Korean unit was stationed about
300 yards away, and the peasants were terrified that some-
thing might provoke them to enter the village. There was a
rumor about the Koreans making the rounds in the village:
Koreans are people speaking a different
language from ours. The population is
excessively afraid of them, because they
could not tell the VC from innocent people.
In Phu Hung, one day, the Koreans herded
some 70 people into a trench and shot them
all to death. While on operational mission
the Koreans shot to death every people they
encounter, no matter it is a woman or child. (8461V)
In the same village that story was told several times.
As far as could be determined, it was seven not seventy
people in a mass grave and it was not certain that the
Koreans had definitely killed them. What counts, however,
is that the peasants thought they had. There are, however,
recorded instances of Korean brutality in Rand Corporation
interviews: one refugee from Phu Yen indicated that "all
the people in the village, including the [Viet Cong] village
cadres, were so afraid of the Korean troops that most of them
left the area to take refuge in Tuy-Hoa City." 7
In this particular village, what mattered was that the
Viet Cong could use peasant fear of the Koreans to collect
taxes. If any peasant complained, the Viet Cong could simply
shoot at the Koreans and bring them in to punish the village
as they already had done several times elsewhere. But the
Koreans were not the only ones who would brutalize peasants:
The thing I fear is that the VC will shoot
at the soldiers of Division 22 (ARVN) when
they walk by. When that happens the soldiers
come and beat the people.
7Rand Corporation, Studies of the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam, No. AGR-56, Saigon, 1966, p. 26,
as quoted in Rambo et al., op. cit.
So great was the peasant's vulnerability to outside
soldiers that in one area it literally seemed as if
the level of terror would not have been significantly
lowered had there been no Viet Cong in the area at all. At
least six different killings officially listed as Viet Cong
terrorism were thought by some of the peasants interviewed
to have been the result of ARVN soldiers killing local
officials who tried to stop their marauding, as the quote at
the beginning of the chapter suggests. Nor were the American
soldiers always free of suspicion.
To speak frankly, these Americans are helpful
to us. What I do not like is their intercourse
with our women. But this is to be blamed on our
women's eagerness to run after them for money.
I heard that [sic] one day some time ago the
Americans raped a girl to death. They abandoned
the victim's body in the mountains. I prefer
the Vietnamese soldiers. Because for all the
help they are aiving us, the Americans are a
foreign people. (hamlet chief)
American officers were generally concerned about
discipline and behavior among U.S. troops, but problems
of correcting and stopping pillage are even harder with
Americans if you don't have access to an interpreter who
will tell their officer.
The Koreans are very strict here though there
are only a few cases of their rascalities and raping
women. The conduct of the Americans is very bad.
When they are riding on a car, they often grasp
the hats or radios of the pedestrians who happen
to be near to their car. Sometimes they drive
in close to the people's houses and take away
the lamps that are hanging in front of the houses.
They have done many very wicked things. Three or
four guys used to fool around with bar girls. And
the soldiers who are responsible to search the
men who work for Americans. Once they searched
my pocket and saw the lighter that I had bought
in the open-air market and a pack of Salem
cigarette they took it away. If we have money
in the pockets, they will take some away for
going to the bars. If we want to go to the office
to ask the interpreters for interference, the
soldiers will point the guns at us and chase us
away.
Even when Americans were disciplined and "punished"
there were still problems. In one district the contrasting
ways in which two different large American units coordinated
with PF illustrates even more subtly how these large units
can affect the little war.8 In the district both American
units had programs for helping the local district in its
day-to-day war, although the major mission of both units
only indirectly involved the district. They both meant
well, but the difference in practice was striking.
The first of the two American units (unit 'k') arrived
in Decemrber 1966 and remained until February 7, 1967. Before
it arrived, unit A's brigade and battalion commanders paid
a courtesy call on the district chief, to which they did not
invite the American district advisors, but let the district
chief himself make the invitation. They requested the help
of the district chief in keeping out prostitutes, controlling
inflation, providing barber and laundry services, detailing
a ooliceman to control traffic near the local schools so no
8 Based on interviews in Mar-ch and April 1967, with Dis-
trict Chief and Assistant District Chief, American advisors,
one colonel and one major from each U.S. unit, PF and peasants
in three villages, and direct personal observation of the
second unit.
one would be hurt, and they asked his advice in selecting
and gaining permission to obtain snecific land for the unit
to occupy.
Every time a change in plans was made the unit in-
formed the district chief and they held a daily briefing
to keep him posted. In addition, a battery of the unit's
artillery was made available to the district, and all of
the unit's oatrols and operations were conducted with local
RF and PF units so that there would be no mistaking of
friend for foe. This, according to the district chief,
his advisor, and the units themselves, was a great help to
RF/PF. It increased their local prestige since they
associated with the powerful Americans, protected the local
population from problems of mistaken identity, and gave the
units on-the-job training in skills they had never before
been tauaht.
The commanders of the second unit (unit 'B') also
visited the district chief before coming to the district.
This time, however, the purpose of the visit was to inform
the district chief of already formulated plans, and,
although nothing happened on schedule, the district was
never advised of the changes. No one came to visit after
the introductory call. As the unit arrived whores and bars
followed close behind. At first the prostitutes were jailed
and the bars were closed, but the district chief, who had no
requests from the new unit's commanders and no rationale
for his policy was ordered to let the prostitutes and bars
operate--after bribes were paid to his superiors, according
to the interviews.
Part of the district had no notable water and was
supplied by a district water main. Without asking permission
or informing anyone, the unit turned off the water whenever
they couldn't supply their own needs, and eventually left
part of the district completely without water for two weeks
because they broke the pump.
When officers from the second unit were interviewed
they were asked what kinds of coordinating activities they
intended to carry out or were carrying out in the area.
They did, in fact, have plans and very good ones in as far
as they went. Unit B assigned two medical teams to work
in the villages, both of which were very popular and well
received. UWhat the unit never did, however, was to link
their soldiers in any way to the RF and PF forces. They
sent their patrols out alone because they saw no Dositive
advantage in working with the local men. For this reason
they aroused great anxiety among soldiers and civilians
alike about the possibility of mistaken identities. The
result was that after three different patrols from unit B
walked through PF and RF ambushes without knowing it, R
and PF drastically reduced natrolling for fear that they
would be shot by Americans.
~J-~ ) .i~ ~
Here, to illustrate the contrast between the two
American units are quotes from Vietnamese soldiers and
peasants about their differences:
All of us liked ["A"] because when they
go to operations they bring RF or PF so as
not to make a mistake.
(RF company commander)
Unit ["B"] frightens the people because
when they go on operation they, tell villages
they will kill all if there are any snipers.
(Another RF company commander)
Unit B are not friendly or diplomatic
with the people. The people here have fear
because they worry how can Americans know
to distinguish VC.
(PF platoon leader)
Unit A was very kind, sometimes they
even pumped water for people. Unit B
sometimes takes away all the water.
(Hamlet chief)
It would be a mistake to say that Unit 3 made an
entirely negative impression on the district. Their medical
units, for example, were very popular.
Unit B brings doctors here and the
people are very pleased.
(RF platoon leader)
Unit B does many nice things here.
They even give toothpaste to the children.
(Hamlet chief)
Yet, in snite of unit B's good actions, their military
style left gaping holes in the local security system that
allowed Viet Cong cadres much easier movement than before
unit B arrived. A Viet Cong squad distributed leaflets and
collected taxes in one hamlet less than 300 yards from the
unit's headquarters one night. Apparently the Viet Cong,
knowing that everyone feared being misidentified by the
unit, used good intelligence to walk into an unguarded
area. The usual practice of neglecting to cooperate with
local soldiers, despite the best of intentions, had made
all the difference.
In another district RF and PF on auard duty seldom
checked the identification of unfamiliar soldiers when they
passed by the sentry post at the gate to district head-
quarters. They had stopped challenging people, they said,
because three times in recent weeks they had been beaten or
humiliated by soldiers from the national army when they
challenged them at the gate. One day a soldier wearing a
uniform with no insignia walked through the gate carrying a
submachine gun and six grenades. Walking up to the district
chief's office he entered and said "I'm a Viet Cong and I
want to defect." He could just as well have been on a
suicide mission to kill the district chief, for when this
occurred the district was under severe oressure from the
Viet Cong.
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Prosperity and Decay
Mao's doctrine, and its extension by General Giap and
Truong Chinh, assumed that a disciplined, perfectly behaved
people's army and infrastructure could not alienate the
masses. Their doctrine could not anticipate that so large
a force would be pitted against the revolutionaries for so
long a time that forced drafting would be necessary, that
revolutionary taxes would be higher than those of the land-
lord, or that the revolutionary communities would be subject
to massive doses of artillery and defoliants, or to heavy
bombing. It could not foresee that the peasants might
develop a strong "pox on both your houses" attitude or that
the construction of huge numbers of foreign facilities could
create an artificial -- but still real -- war boom.
Mao's doctrine and its extensions tacitly assume, in
fact, that the quality of life and the quality of government
are identical and that the superior organization and quality
of the revolutionary cadres will be reflected in a better
life for the peasants under them. The peasants often pre-
ferred freedom, corruption and prosperity to justice, bombing
and poverty.
Inevitable or artificially sustained, there was
extraordinary growth of non-agricultural occupations as a
9 General Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War - People's Army.
New York: Praeger, 1962, and Truong Chinh (pseud.). The
Resistance Will Win, in Primer for Revolt: the Communist
Takeover in Viet Nam, facsimile edition, New York: Praeger,
1963.
result of the war, and there was also an increase in
military pressure against Viet Cong areas. The combination
of these factors, resulting in a boom in economic activity
which competed with agricultural oroduction, and at the
same time, in huge refugee flows, hurt the revolutionary
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communities badly. But this was not always reflected in a
corresponding growth in the GVN's ability to improve security
by destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure or improving the
RF/PF.
Perhaps most ironic is that that even before a large
American unit entered an area, local intelligence cap-
abilities were often rendered less adequate, RF/PF strength
was decreased, and Viet Cong recruitment made easier. This
could all happen before a single shot was fired or a single
bomb was dropped, so poor was the coordination of large scale
units with local needs. The relationship between the big
and little wars can be so delicate that even the preparation
for the arrival of large units themselves can markedly impair
local conditions.
Before a large American unit can base itself in a
orovince a considerable amount of local manpower will be
required simply to build facilities for it. Just providing
the manpower needed for this task can overload a local
security system or even undermine the local military.
10Samuel P. Huntington, "The Bases of Accommodation,"
Foreign Affairs, (July 1968), 642-656, and Frank Har, 1y,
Air War - Vietnam, New York: Bantam Books, 1967. and Jonathan
Schell, The Military Hal-, Vintage Books, New York: Random
House, 1967.
In Binh Dinh Province in 1966, for examolellthe larae
American and Korean buildup in the province required large
numbers of local laborers to build airfields, warehouses
and other facilities. Before they could be hired all
employees had to get clearances from the security intell-
igence system of the province which, according to one U.S.
advisor, was barely established and functioning in the
countryside. American generals placed so much pressure
upon the intelligence service to get men cleared for con-
struction work that for six months no effort at all was
made to keen track of members of the local infrastructure - a
task just as important to the security of the bases in the long
run.
According to the intelligence advisor in the province,
the already weak intelligence system was based on an informant
net created by two ARVN officers who never once left the
provincial capital, but depended instead on men they could
recruit there to send out for information. Once the demand
for personnel became so acute, all efforts were made to
clear prospective employees because there was a very large
profit involved in the selling of clearances, many of which
were never checked anyway.
This example based on extensive interviews in 1968
with former U.S. Intelligence advisor in the province.
In 1967 the pressure of getting facilities built for
Americans was still impairing the functioning of the rural
security system by depleting the ranks of its soldiers and
by undermining its organization and esprit de corps.12
One American contractor having trouble finding enough man-
power to complete a facility on time was recruiting men from
local PF units by offering them substantially higher pay than
they normally received. To get new identification cards
for them so they would not be punished as deserters he had
bribed a local village chief to go into the business of
obtaining counterfeit identifications. Once this had started,
of course, there was no reason why Viet Cong could not
obtain papers in the same way, either by threatening to
expose the fraudulent operation or by posing as deserters.
The economic growth from military spending and numerous
AID economic development programs led to many peasants
moving to the more secure district towns and nearby villages,
but the nroblems of local pacification were not solved because
in some areas prosperity eroded local structures for control
faster than it undermined the Viet Cong. The same economic
boom that led peasants to abandon Viet Cong villages for
new jobs also caused much higher desertion rates among RF/PF,
and led to more problems with police and their treatment of
suspected Viet Cong, and alienation of Deasants through their
treatment at the hands of soldiers.
1 2 Based on interviews with American Advisors in two dis-
tricts and verified with interviews of ARVN officer in charge
of an -RF/PF training center in Binh Dinh.
As the economy grew and large units appeared in their
areas RF/PF were given opportunities for jobs in which they
were subject to less personal risk, and could better support
their families. With no commitments to anything but their
families, and after years of enduring abuse when they had
few other opportunities, they deserted in ever larger numbers.
In.one province, in fact, the desertion rate was over 40%
and there were some units in which the turnover reached 80%.
There were also large-scale desertions from ARVN
units in the same area, as some men, tired of being away
from village life were willing to join the RF or PF. The
result was a constant large scale turnover of manpower
which made it hard for any unit to remain stable enough for
the men to develop the ability to function as a unit.
In such instances the lack of coordination between
ARVN, RF and PF worked against all. ARVN, RF and PF were
fighting against each other for manpower. Everybody wanted
able-bodied men so badly that they would take anybody they
could who stepped forward and said he wanted to fight--whether
he was a deserter from another branch or not. This put such
a big escape hole in the system that it was terribly difficult
to assign missions to many units. If a soldier didn't like
the job he was given, or if he decided that he might like
to get a pay raise he could, if he wished, simply join
another unit or even go off and buy a job with the Americans.
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If controlled and regulated, the flow of men between
RF, PF and ARVN would have been beneficial to the military
system. Men could get their introduction to military life
at home, gain confidence and perhaps come to desire a more
lucrative job in another branch. The option of a higher
paid position in ARVN or RF could have been an important
incentive for ambitious PF. Or, men who gained extensive
combat experience in the better ARVN units could have been
given a chance to return to their homes , assuming leader-
ship positions in platoons that drastically needed better
leadershio.
As noted in Chapter VI the very weak contacts between
the district staff and 'most PF platoons, often reinforced
by the lack of commitment to the local area among the district
staff which was largely composed of men on temporary assignment
to the area, resulted in a leadership selection process that
was largely inefficient and frequently corrupt. When new men
with wide experience and competence were not given positions
as leaders, an opportunity to upgrade weak leadership was
lost. In addition, it was also found that when men of
superior training and skill joined PF units with weak leader-
shio the nerformance of the units sometimes actually declined.
'or a platoon to perform as a well-coordinated unit,
observation showed that it was necessary for platoon and
squad leaders to work with their men, giving them the training
they had never received and meeting with them in frequent
discussion, where problems were discussed, errors pointed
out and recalcitrants chided.
It was observed that units in which many men felt
that the person best qualified to be leader -the "natural
leader" - was not the formal leader, less frequent training
and discussion sessions were held. This was true at both
the platoon and squad level. In one case, for example,
after a man with eight years experience in ARVN entered a
squad, the squad leader drastically decreased his work with
new men and held less frequent group discussions. It was
suggested by the PF that he was embarrassed to talk in
front of the new man who clearly knew more than he.
Similarly. it was noticed that poorly qualified platoon
leaders were reluctant, when they had the opportunity, to
recommend men as squad leaders who could out perform them
and be a threat to their legitimacy.
Nor would PF approach new men with competence
and experience on their own to ask for guidance and advice,
for they were clearly reluctant to upset their relations
with the formal leader. Thus, when formal authority and
natural leadership are out of alignment the value of the
natural leadership may be lost in a desire to satisfy the
man with formal authority on whom sustenance depends.
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Lack of a coordinated and. enforcealie :aanpower
policy was made even more self-defeating by the localism
and lack of commitment or positive identification out of
their own immediate world amona RF and PF. This aided the
Viet Cong in solving their draft problems because in most
areas ARVN was given first call on young men, and due to
the GVN's weakness, and its loose structure, even a man-
datory military draft was not always possible to enforce.
The most frequent reason encountered in both Binh Dinh and
Long An for boys joining the Viet Cong was to avoid the
national draft. ARVN service meant long years away from
home and some young peasants were afraid of this separation.
As one hamlet chief stated:
The Viet Cong told the young men that if
they were afraid of the six-pockets [paratroopers]
the Viet Cong would let them come with them.
They said that the six-pockets would take them
far from home but that the Viet Cong would only
take them to the hills for six months.
Given the need for the GVN to draft men and to have
men serve away from home, several compromises could have
been made which might have worked. One such compromise
would have been to make ARVN service more appealing and
less threatening to young peasants. Another would have
been to do as the Viet Cong did in early years, let every--
one start military service in local, village-based forces
and recruit soldiers for national service from amoncg the
local soldiers so that the two transitions, from neasant to
soldier and from local to national service, could have been
faced separately. A third way would have been to develop
a more powerful--and harder to avoid--method of drafting
the young peasants attempting to evade national service.
The third way, in fact, was attempted in some areas
and did not work very well because it also required more
effective linkages between the PF and district chief then
existed. In some areas district and province chiefs were
under orders to produce a given quota of men from the
villages to serve in ARVN. To do this they had to order
local Popular Forces to arrest and detain all local draft
dodgers hiding in their area. In at least one case, the
men simply did not carry out the orders with more than the
slightest effort. Concerned with the defense of their village,
it was more a threat to them to force boys who were doing
no harm to the village to serve in the national army which
the PF and the villagers often disliked and considered
useless. Trying to send reluctant boys to ARVN meant doing
more harm to their area than leaving them at home and
risking an undermanned national army, because they knew many
boys would sooner go to the local Viet Cong.
Finally, to Droduce the needed quota,. the province
chief had to conduct an oneration with outside soldiers in
the district where the draft dodgers were hiding. In one
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day 450 draft dodgers were found and taken for military duty. 3
In this one instance part of a district was totally safe
from Viet Cong intrusions so that draft dodgers did not
join local Viet Cong. Otherwise, at least some of them would
have gone with the Viet Cong.
In Binh Dinh, ARVN recruiting problems were eased
somewhat because the heavy military pressure on the Viet Cong
from U.S. and Korean soldiers had temporarily made local
Viet Cong service look :far more threatenincg than ARVN duty.
Military officers interviewed on the subject, both at the
district and provincial level, admitted that they strongly
suspected that once the heavy U.S. military pressure was
lifted in the area, some young men would find local Viet
Cong service more attractive than service in ARVNI. In fact,
interviews with two American officers who were in Binh Dinh
in June 1967 when 5,000 American troops left Binh Dinh to
support Khe Sanh indicate that this is exactly what did happen.
The increased flows of traffic and commerce gave the
Viet Cong new opportunities to exploit for sustaining their
own system while waiting for the large military units to
depart. The Viet Cong were clearly alert to this possibility,
for as Pham Ngoc Thuan, of the National Liberation Front,
told Jean Lacouture:
13personal interviews with province chief and assistant
province chief for military affairs.
We were very clumsy primitives. We tried
to oppose the colonial system and its Vietnamese
allies with a "counterstate" with its own ad-
ministration, currency, and educational system...
But our successors, wherever they could, have made
a great deal of proaress and utilized our experiences
and our failures by choosing another way: they make
every attempt to infiltrate the state and utilize
it. Rather than systematically oppose the existing
legal framework, they prefer to use it, in order
to substitute another one for it. In simple terms,
I would say that in the old days, we were cutting
roads to intercept vehicles. They prefer to step
into existing automobiles... 14
In one village outside a major highway with heavy bus
traffic,a PF explained that someone in his platoon always
watched the comings and goings of the buses because the PF
felt that there was something 'suspicious' about the be-
havior of the bus drivers. They did not report this to
district headquarters, however, because they were reluctant
to initiate discussion of problems not strictly assigned to
them. A week later, it was learned at the district head-
quarters that the police had just discovered the Viet Cong
had been using the bus drivers for over six months to trans-
port their documents and pamphlets between villages.
14jean Lacouture, Vietnam Between Two Truces. Translated
by Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael. New York: Random
House, 1966, p. 174. (emphasis added)
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The Residue
If every district in Viet Nam could have been
permanently saturated with a large military presence,
then the problems discussed in this chapter would have
been largely irrelevant. It would be unnecessary to con-
sider the long-range impacts on the RF/PF system that re-
sulted from search and destroy operations, poor refugee
programs, fear of foreign troops, economic growth, large
scale turnovers in manpower, poor intelligence and the
brutalization of the peasantry.
The fact is, however, that every district was not
saturated at the same time. Therefore, the impacts on the
basic local structures that needlessly impaired the long-
range ability of so many districts to develop security
systems are central to understanding the full range of pro-
blems confronted in security and pacification.
On paper there was supposed to be consideration of
local needs, there was supposed to be an adequate refugee
program, there was supposed to be control against large
scale desertion, there was supposed to be adequate intell-
igence, and there was supposed to be no possibility of
American soldiers pillaging.
Any governmental system too fragile to prevent an ex-
tensive insurgent movement from establishing itself, however,
can hardly be expected to have enough structural integrity to
control and coordinate the massive dislocations and excesses
of the injection--almost overnight--of millions of dollars
and hundreds of thousands of foreigners.
The basic problem which remains to be discussed, then,
is whether or not it was and is possible to introduce local
stability and create a system with the capacity to sustain
government control in the aftermath of the problems created
by the big war and economic booms (and the now pending with-
drawal of foreign troops).
This problem can only be considered in the light of the
peasantry and all that they had endured and their feelings
about the GVN and the Viet Cong "after the battle" moved on.
For that reason it is instructive to look at the differences
of opinion and the personal ambivalences of peasants interviewed
after they had been through the impacts and shocks discussed
in this chapter.
While it was generally true that peasants no longer
expected the Viet Cong to win the war, that did not mean
they had given their loyalty to the GVN. The grapevine that
once helped a small force appear to be thousands of men had
spread word of the massive U.S. presence throughout the country;
but force does not automatically translate itself into popular
support and/or security. As one peasant said,
"If the nationalist regime is exactly what the
government told at the radio, I prefer it. But
now although we were miserable with the VC we were
less oppressed by them." (8239V)
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It is important to remember that most of rural South
Viet Nam had been under Viet Cong control or strong in-
fluence at some time before 1965. This meant that the con-
tested areas had once been governed or organized by the
Viet Cong. Largely unaffected by the big war, their secret
cadres and contacts could still give them a trump. As a PF
said, "The people fear that the VC would come to assassinate
them, therefore they can only help us furtively, the VC will
kill them if they know." (9201 PF) , or as another PF said,
in an area rated pro-GVN:
"We want the villagers to have a clear-cut
stand. As long as we are in the area, there is
no trouble. But as soon as we leave the area the
villagers shift their loyalty if the VC come
again. This is the reason why you can't eliminate
the VC once for all. In Hung Thanh and Mien Hai
hamlets the VC cadres come often at niaht to
disseminate propaganda unimpeded." (9689 PF)
And, of course, once a village had been under Viet Cong
control or influence it wasn't always safe to trust even the
villagers who seemed friendly.
"Villagers do nothing to help us actually.
This area was a VC controlled area until two months
ago. Although the population shows sympathy to-
wards us, we suspect they are not sincere." (9454PF)
Some peasants did conform to the old mandate of heaven
pattern, just going along with the local powers.
"As to the non-aligned elements, they found
that the VC are cruel and the covernment cadres
are corrupt. So they don't know which side they
have to follow and would remain with the stronger."
(8603V)
"As a matter of fact my life would not be
affected if this area were occupied by VC or
government." (8578 V)
There were, however, large numbers of people in the
same villages who did care who won.
"The VC use good words and are very good at
politics. The people are forced to work hard for
them but are very pleased when hearing them talk.
I don't think people regret their wealth if they
have to give it to them. PF are inferior to VC
in politics." (8579 V)
"VC were very good to people but forced them
to participate in struggle movements. After life
under VC, government is now preferred." (8226 V)
"The Viet Cong and the Government are quite
different, because we're right and they are wrong.
Besides, the VC don't keen their promises." (8225 V)
"We (GVN) talk a lot and do nothing. Even in
case we did something it is not very practical.
Our policy is excellent but its executioners are
clumsy. As for the VC they didn't have a good
policy but the way they performed it was very
skilled. (GTN and VC are) quite different because
GVM brings back freedom to the people, for exampele,
we can freely express our opinion, while the
communists fettered us. We dared neither to eat
nor to dress ourselves. Everybody has to act
their way." (8339 V)
Sustaining the peasant's fear was the fact that
literally every hamlet had had at least one assassination,
and in the same hamlet one could find many opinions as to
the virtues of the deceased. As three men in one hamlet
stated:
"According to me the VC murder victim must be
a loyal servant of the government having rendered
many services detrimental to the VC. So they
murdered him for revenge." (8581 V)
"Those who are killed by the VC are corrupt
and overbearing. The VC would not kill them if
they work correctly." (8579 V)
"These people were serving the national cause
despite VC warnings. This was the only reason for
the murders." (8582 V)
As a man in another hamlet put it about the victims
in his hamlet:
"If they are people who volunteer for the
service of the people their assassination fills
us with deep resent for the communists. If they
are persons who oppress the people they deserve
being slain." (8345 V)
Thus, not all peasants were so numbed by war that they
had ceased to care about the outcome. In fact, many peasants
seemed to feel that a GVN victory would be to their advantage.
While by no means did all the peasants want the GVN to win,
the GVN certainly had a large potential base of support. The
problem of utilizing the support, however, was not trivial
because there were few peasants for whom the outcome of the
war was a life or death matter. As a Catholic refuaes from
North Viet Nam stated, "If the Viet Cong win I couldn't live
for my self and my family, but I might be able to live for
communism." (0179 V)
The problem, then, was how to mobilize peasant support
in the face of possible terror and assassinations, where open
support could mean death. Risk is a function of trust and
could substantially be reduced when the PF had the confidence
of the people.
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CHAPTER VIII
TME CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE
The previous chapters have suggested that there was,
in fact, very little concern or interest shown for the
protection and security of peasants by the GVN. Economic
programs, to be sure, had made many peasants prosperous
but they were often more abused by the government and its
allies than by the Viet Cong.
The government's only true and consistent interest
militarily was in crushing the Viet Cong. To do this
required two inputs from the village: manpower and
information.
National economic progress and powerful allies are
not enough to actually make peasants into soldiers and to
get an adequate information flow from the villages.
Peasants only become effective soldiers to the
extent that the government commits itself to their families.
Peasants only provide an adequate information flow
when the PF guarantee their security and satisfy their
sense of justice.
PF only provide security and satisfy the peasants
sense of justice when they are changed from marginal men
with no place in society into men who see themselves as a
part of the village and are themselves concerned with
the future welfare of its inhabitants.
In each district of Long An and Binh Dinh where
extensive personal observations were made it was possible
to find at least one hamlet or village where local
security conditions were much better than any other place
in the area, where peasants were unmistakably confident in
their PF and where PF were firmly committed to their
village. It was also possible to find instances where
poor, defensive and totally inadequate PF had been trans-
formed into units with the same success as noted above.
The techniques and sequences of events used were
similar enough to be presented as a composite. It was
necessary to stabilize the platoon, commit the PF to the
welfare of the other peasants, give them the needed train-
ing, convince the peasants that the PF were unwilling to be
driven out of the village, get the peasants to support the
PF with information and encouragement, and prove to the
peasants that their own sense of justice would not be
violated.
The reason that this happened so rarely is that the
sequencing was so crucial. When a platoon was outstanding
and had proved its ability peasants were glad to encourage
and aid the PF, for so many peasants desperately wanted
security and an end to the fighting. Similarly, once a
platoon had established security, it gained local stature
and desertion became almost nil. Similarly, once a platoon
became outstanding, district chiefs tended to treat the
unit much better than other units. In other words, once
a platoon established trust with both the distric chief
and the peasants there was little problem sustaining the
trust.
The problems were: how do you commit family men to
a military unit; how do you get peasants to give inform-
ation and trust to a unit before it proves itself; how
does one qet 'marginal men,' the occupants of the lowest
rungs of society, for whom no one has ever done anything,
to care about anyone outside their family or unit;
especially how does one get men with no strong feelings
for their country or for anyone outside their immediate
world to make the immense extra effort that is necessary
to go from a village that is nearly secure - a village
where the Viet Cong can occasionally make just enough
presense felt to keep everyone worried and where the Viet
Cong can easily pass by the outlying perimeters of the
village to attack elsewhere - to a village where the Viet
Cong cannot enter without severe risk?
All that was necessary was to take account of the
men's low status, family commitment and local orientation.
One 'merely' decreases the conflict between the state and
the soldier by commitina the state to the care of his
family, takes advantage of localism and marginality by
helping the PF earn status in the eyes of other villagers
and getting him to judge the progress and future prospects
of his country by something tangible and concrete that
any peasant can observe - the progress of and future
prospects for the village in which he lives.
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Family Care and Peasant Soldiers
As noted in Chanter VII, one of the results of the
tremendous competition for manpower among ARVN, RF/PF,
the American contractors and the booming economy, to say
nothing of the Viet Cong, is that RF/PF can desert their
units almost whenever they so choose. This means that
aggressive and competent military leadership is not
sufficient to force men in any particular unit to perform
the much heavier work load that is required for an adequate
security system. Since everyone is literally free to
desert, the commitment to the unit must be made by the
individual soldier. No amount of force can make a soldier
respond to force or remain in his unit if deserters are
welcome elsewhere.
The fact that RF/PF are family men with no national
commitment does not mean that such a personal commitment
is impossible. Family commitments are not incompatible
with military effectiveness, either for RF or PF. In fact,
the key to stable military in which the men identify with
the unit personally and remain with the unit, is to use
the family to advantage.
Stabilizing the army through the family is not a
new idea. In An Giang, for examole, soldiers of the IHoa Hao
cited as an example of why they liked being Hoa Hao soldiers -
the care given to their families when they were away from
home. In the Viet Cong, careful consideration is given in
the redistribution of the "revolutionary surplus" to
families of soldiers. This, of course, is "patronage," but
it does not in any way imply that the Viet Cong are less
revolutionary because they look after the families of men
fighting for them. As William Hinton noted of the Chinese
Revolution in Longbow Village:l
The biggest problem in recruiting for the
army was not to overcome fear of enemy bullets
or the hardships of campaigning, but to con-
vince the men that their families would be well
cared for and their livestock and crons well
tended. The village government undertook to
see that this problem was solved by organizing
a "Preferential Treatment Committee" which
set up a system of taikung or "substitute
tillage," . . . It was oreferential treatment
for soldiers' families that really made
possible a volunteer army in the first place
and gave such a solid base to morale in the
field.
When a peasant identifies his family's welfare with
his role in a particular unit, then the leader has a
meaningful sanction for making the soldier respond to his
commands, for leaving the unit hurts the family. Hard work
is not what makes peasants desert, it is family respon-
sibilities that conflict with military duty.
lWilliam Hinton, Fanshen, New York: Vintage Books, 1968,
p. 192 emphasis added.
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No 'objective' measure of the danger and risks
confronting and RF unit or the workload it assumed could
directly explain from which units desertions would occur.
If anything, the opposite was true! Units capable of
facing risks and able to shoulder heady workloads were
units that held their men. There is a very strong
relationship in the RF between agressiveness in battle,
the ability to keep manpower in the unit, and the ability
to recruit new men, the key to which is the family.
Contrasting bad, average and good RE companies, 2 the
bad comDanies are less able to obtain recruits or retain
their men even though they were paid the same, fight less
than the men in good companies and 'objectively' face less
danger because they are seldom used anytime success at a
difficult task is required. In the bad RF units, less
than half the men stay in their unit more than 6 months
while more than half the men in good units have been there
over two years, despite their much heavier battle load.
Comparing bad, average and good units, the percentage
of married men living with their families rises sharply
from 55% of married men living with their families in bad
units, to 75% in average units to 90% in good units. And
ironically 25% of the men in bad units are bachelors and
only 20% are bachelors in average and good units. A married
2 Ratings based on interviews with peasants, RF/PF,
district staff and Americin Advisors - who were much more
knowledgeable about RF than PF.
man with a secured family is a better soldier than a
bachelor, at least in the absence of any national
identity.
Effective military leadership is still needed, but
no leader can hold the men together long enough to train
them and gain their trust without somehow being able to
stabilize manpower. As the data showed no matter how
light the work load of a unit may be, men seldom remain
in the unit for long unless they identify their families'
welfare with the unit.
A comparison of two RF companies in the same district
can clarify this point.
The two RF companies being compared were both
stationed at district headquarters. 'A', a very good
company,3 was always given the most dangerous missions or
operations.
'B' was a different story altogether. In battle the
men often refused to follow orders and were generally
cowardly and negligent, so they were no longer used for
anything but defense of the district headquarters.
3The district advisor, who had previously been an
advisor to two different ARVN battalions and had also seen
numerous U.S. units in action felt that 'A' was as good as
any company he had seen in Viet Nam. One of the NCO advisors,
who had been personally awarded one silver and one bronze
star for his own exploits, agreed. 'A' was a good company.
In the last 18 months 22 men from unit 'A' and 110
from unit 'B' had deserted, mainly to join one of the
other units in the province, which contained ARVN and
Ranger units as well. Virtually none of the new men
received any training before joining the unit. In 'A',
however, each new man was given two days a week of training
by the company itself, while 'B' did nothing. In 'A' the
new men judged to be the best were put in the worst squads
and some of the poorer recruits were put in better squads
where they could be more closely watched and guided. In
the other company new men were simply put into squads
haphazardly with no training and no attempt made to balance
the squads and platoons.
An idea of the problems in the bad company can be
obtained by looking at a TAT story told by a squad leader
in 'B', one of the three original squad leaders who had
not yet deserted. Even he seemed to be considering desertion,
being held back only by the thought that he would be caught
in a deserter roundup and put in another unit.
I see a civilian standing with two people who
are harvesting rice, with 4 houses and a banana
plantation. The civilian does farming. The
civilian is looking at the plantation and 2 people
are harvesting rice.
This is war time and the draft age cannot
farm. This person joined the army but he deserted
and so he cannot farm because he is afraid that he
will be captured. This person was deserted because
he could not stay with the shortages, not enough
food, no clothes, so he deserted.
OI~ ~~ .$
The deserter is thinking to return back to
his unit, because it is not safe out here, and
cannot work.
The deserter will report himself, return
to the military life.
This man will be punished, for example, he
will be put in tiger cage. (lllORF)
The key difference between the two companies,
however, was not shortages of food and clothing--it was
families. The good company's men were housed in a
dependents compound at the district headquarters while
the bad company had not yet received dependents'
quarters. The bad company had been scheduled a year
previously to receive dependents quarters, but 'somehow'
the material never arrived. This was a key: without
leadership the men will not fight, but without families
they will not even stay!
If the families are cared for, however, the men will
endure immense punishment and abuse without deserting
even if they lose their leader. A third RF company was
attacked by a Viet Cong battalion. The ensuing fight
lasted four hours but an ARVN regiment less than one mile
away gave no support. Even though over half the men were
killed or wounded, including the leader, there were no
desertions. The men returned to their government housing.
They were dispirited and would not fight; but they were
still there. The government had a claim on their loyalties
and could slowly rebuild the unit. Stability is necessary
for improvement.
This was also true for the effective, hard working PF
units. In each case someone committed himself to their families
when they were away from home. Making each man's private problem
into a public issue stabilized the units. This is more success-
ful as a strategy than simply counting on all other officers
to be honorable and stop taking deserters because in the case
of an agreement among officers it is each man's interest to be
the one person who breaks the rules. In the case of family
care, the men who broke the rules and took care of families
were the ones who benefited. Once a PF unit was well taken
care of not only did desertion decrease, but the men actually
spent less time with their families than in less effective units.
In addition, the units with family care often attracted men who
deserted from other districts just to join a unit where they could
feel their families were secure--even though these men had to
then work much harder than in the defensive units.
One of the very worst of platoons, in fact, was stabil-
ized and transformed by reaching the PF through their families.
This platoon had been so bad that it had been little more than
a protective association for its members. Three of the nine
men interviewed from the platoon went so far as to state that
they had joined the unit only to avoid being drafted by the
Viet Cong. As one man stated, his life was better as a soldier
than as a civilian because "...as a civilian I was more menaced
by the Viet Cong." k916PF) So bad had the situation become in
the village that noone would take the position of village
chief or platoon leader--it was just too dangerous.
In five months one man chanqed the entire situation,
making a band of cowards and draft dodgers into one of the
best platoons in the province and almost totally securing the
village. The first clue that there was something special about
the platoon came during the interviews when the PF were asked
how many Viet Cong there were in their village. The PF
responded by saying "There are three left in the village and
we're going to get them too!" So unusual was it to receive
such a precise and optimistic answer that it was first assumed
that the platoon had been 'coached' on what to say, but the visit
to the platoon had been a total surprise because the decision
was conveyed to noone who could have informed the platoon of
the visit.
What had happened was that because the situation in
the village was so bad that no leaders could be obtained,
a national policeman had been sent to the village to become
both village chief and platoon leader for the time being.
This produced the rarest of all villages, a village in which
police, military and civil government were coordinated, and
actually integrated. At first the new leader 'appeared' to
be doing little to indicate his abilities. Quietly and
covertly beginning to put together an intelligence network
he was simultaneously siphoning AID materials to the PF
platoon so that they could build housing for their families
in a secure spot. This stabilized the platoon: deserting
now meant having to move one's family to new housing and
facing the social sanctions of the other families and the lead-
er. The standard excuse for desertion, and family trouble,
was no longer valid. Within the next few months, all the
Viet Cong cadres (in residence) and 12 of the 15 guerrilla
had been killed or captured. By staying himself, the leader
was even able to keep his entire platoon on duty over Tet.
The platoon spent most of their Tet visiting the Viet Cong who
came home to see their families assuring them that they would
be welcome in the village if they defected and stayed out of
trouble.
lI)
One advisor objected to securing families in military
housing because he felt that it would tie down the soldiers
and make them unwilling to fight elsewhere. As he noted,
it was generally true that when PF had their families with
them in isolated outposts, the outpost then became "their
village" and they would defend the outpost, defeating much
of the original purpose of the post. The difference is that
in the outpost, if the men wandered far, the families would
be left without protection.
RF/PF are good family men by Vietnamese standards which
emphasize assurance of family continuity, welfare and security.
When their families are fed and sheltered and they have
produced an heir they are free to roam and play as much as
they like. There can be no doubt that many RF liked going
on operations or to difficult posts--if the families were
secure. Going away from the unit's camp meant danger, but it
also meant a chance to have a second or third wife, or at least
an occasional affair.
When wives are secured elsewhere by the government,
even the most dangerous outposts could be used very effectively
by ingenious PF. One unit, all of whose wives were safe in the
district headquarters, boobytrapped their outpost every
night before going on patrol. Twice in one year Viet Cong
were killed sneaking into the outpost. Thus it was not
always necessary to go as far as actually building housing
for PF, but in every case of a platoon that made the extra
effort stability resulted only when the men's families
were provided for in their absence. In two cases leaders
helped wives get jobs in local markets so that the families
would not starve, which also served to stabilize bad units.
The crucial factor in all of these examoles is that some
attention was paid to providing for the security of RF/PF
families by the government. It is this security which is the
first prerequisite for transforming self-interestd peasants
into effective soldiers of the state.4
4 As noted in Chapter VI, when the soldiers themselves sent
their wives to a more secure area, they tended to desert soon
afterwards. It is the link between the family and the government
that counts for the marginal man.
'Barehands' Civic Action
True progress could still not be made without
gaining trust and cooperation from other peasants. As
noted, observation showed peasants were willing to
help once an area was secured and the platoon had proven
its long range commitment, but the essential dilemma was:
no cooperation without security, no security without co-
operation.
In a contested area where there has been extensive
activity by opposing forces the natural action of PF
platoon is to close in on itself, to stay in large groups
near its posts so as to provide themselves with the best
possible defense against an outside attack. The PF's
primary instinctive action is, after all, to protect that
which is his world -- himself and his family.
At the same time, the natural, rational way for a
peasant to act is to stay away from the PF as long as
there is any chance that going to the PF with information
or encouragement may be seen and perhaps remembered by any
covert agents. PF acting in an instinctive manner and
allowing peasants to do the same could not totally secure
an area.
What made a difference was what could best be
called barehands civic action-numerous small favors for
a great number of villagers which kept the PF in constant
contact with the population. It required a committed and
strong leader, and in practice it improved the self-image
of the soldiers, broke down barriers of suspicion between
peasants and PF, and generated a better information flow
to the PF.
PF could achieve 'confidence of the people' only
by using a combination of carrot and stick. In fact, a
well used carrot, in the presence of a stick, made any
use of force unnecessary. The initial carrot for the PF
units who won confidence was barehands civic action. It
was the most efficient and effective method observed for
making the transition from an area. with little Viet Cong
activity to one with no Viet Cong activity and no popular
support for Viet Cong.
Barehands civic action was simply continuous contact
between PF and all families in an area. It meant PF
spending a large part of every day making the rounds from
house to house and helping people in small ways with their
work. It appeared to be no more than PF acting like boy
scouts, helping people clean away rubble, helping widows
carry water, or visiting with children.
Simply the fact that there was continuous, PF-
initiated contact with all people provided much more
information than could be obtained otherwise. No one
could know who gave information to the PF and no one
could later be punished for collaboration and consorting
with the enemy. PF carry guns and that could always be
the peasant's rationale for not resisting them when they
came by.
But continuous contact without the added aspect of
helofulness was not very effective. If everyone were
friends, it might be possible for PF to just 'make the
rounds' and give everyone a chance to volunteer infor-
mation. In any village or hamlet, though, especially one
that is contested and thus usually somewhat fractionalized,
everyone is not friends and many people never talk with
each other. It is to break through the traditional dis-
trust that helpfulness is required. Helping with chores
and making small talk establishes identity and commonality
and breaks through the layers of reserve.
Platoons in continuous and friendly contact with
villagers were also a much more credible force to peasants.
Security is certainly one of the primary factors a peasant
considered in giving his allegiance to one side or the other.
In calculating how secure he is, a peasant is influenced by
how strong a PF platoon appears to him. Personal relations
with the platoon seem to be an important part of the cal-
culation. If the peasant knows and likes the platoon, he
will credit it with more deterrent value.
A platoon's effectiveness depends in large part
upon its ability to work closely with the peasants and
to inspire their confidence. Especially important is
gaining the trust and confidence of people close to the
Viet Cong and people who most hate the government. These
are the people with the most important information and
they can be won over only if they truly trust the PF to
protect them from both Viet Cong and GVN.
'Confidence of the people' really meant winning
over of neutrals and the neutralization of covert Viet
Cong support, and the establishment of a high degree of
population control which generated an active, continuous
flow of information to the PF from peasants who supported
them.
'Confidence of the people' does not necessarily mean
winning love, adoration or positive effect for one's side --
although it does not rule these out. It does mean, above
all else, information and neutralization.
The slow patient approach was often more productive
and effective than the military logic displayed by the
U.S. or ARVN. A comparison of similar incidents involving
a particularly outstanding PF platoon and an American
unit illustrates how resisting the temptation to rely on
an initial use of force enabled the platoon to escalate
an accommodation with Viet Cong sympathizers into a
situation where the Viet Cong communications system was
jammed, distrust was sown among the Viet Cong and pre-
vious Viet Cong sympathizers found themselves in a
situation where it was to their advantage to cooperate
with the GVN.
On September 9, 1968, after finding uniforms and
equipment from a North Vietnamese unit hidden in the homes
of peasants in a village north of Saigon, and after dis-
covering that the inhabitants had been sending signals to
the Viet Cong by moving around lamps which they had
placed in their windows, an American unit destroyed part
of the village and some livestock in retaliation, and to
"deny" the Viet Cong use of these homes again. 5  A far
more effective strategy would have been to take the un-
iforms and equipment and thank the villagers for their
help. That, as one ingenious platoon showed, would have
hurt the Viet Cong far more.
The PF platoon being discussed here was in a
similar situation to the American unit. They were sta-
tioned in a remote hamlet with numerous Viet Cong in the
5New York Times and Boston Globe, September 9, 1968.
area. The village had just been reclaimed from the Viet
Cong a few weeks previously, and less than thirty families
out of an original 300 were living at home that night.
After the platoon had rebuilt their headquarters
they made daily rounds of every family in the village,
entering each home, and always acting helpful. Anyone
observing such an encounter could not tell, without
overhearing the actual conversation, whether anyone had
said anything about the Viet Cong to the PF or not.
A few nights later the PF spotted a lantern being
moved from one window in a house to another window in the
same house. The PF did not beat the man who did this, nor
did they order him to put out the light. Instead they took
advantage of the fact that they knew a signal had been sent
to the Viet Cong, moved all their ambush positions and dis-
persed their squads in three man cells into a wide net over
the area around the man's house.
Within an hour a single Viet Cong walked through the
outer ambush cells without observing the PF--he had, after
all, received a signal. The PF did not act on his presence
immediately, however, because he might have been the
advance man for a very large unit, in which case the PF
would have used their prearranaed nlans to pull back into
a tighter defense position.
The man was alone, however, and while he was in
the house, the PF called the district and asked to have
artillery illuminating rounds ready so that they could
be fired immediately on request. It was an easy job for
the platoon to know just where the illumination was
wanted because they had plotted coordinates in advance
during the day. When the Viet Cona left the house, and
was out of the hamlet, the PF called for the flare round.
When it came, a hidden PF called on the Viet Cong to
surrender. Instead of surrendering the Viet Cong ducked
into a hidden tunnel and escaped out of a different exit.
The next day the PF required each family in the
hamlet to hang a lamp in its window so that they would be
better able to check on its safety at night. They did not
in any way divulge that they knew the Viet Cong had visited
one house after a signal.
A few nights later a second lamp appeared in a window
of one house. Rearranging their positions the PF, having
now discovered the tunnel system, were more successful,
killing one Viet Cong and capturing another.
The PF were not only able to jam effectively the
Viet Cong communications system, they were also able to
create a situation in which the Viet Cong, it would seem,
were the victims of mistrust and suspicion. Eventually the
PF were able to obtain very effective cooperation from the
villagers.
Because the PF moved constantly at night, no signal
given during the day at a market, for example, could tell
the Viet Cong where the PF were to be found. Because the
only signalling that could be done at night was simple
yes-no signals from lamps, and because any signal would
have to be sustained long enough for the Viet Cong to see
it, the PF could also see the signal and react. No one
could tell whether or not someone was tipping the PF and
no one could tell whether or not the captured Viet Cong
had talked.
The PF, in effect, created a situation in which the
Viet Cong were forced to devote large amounts of energy
to pattern maintenance, and worrying about who was reliable,
or what a captured prisoner had divulged to the PF. Whether
or not he had divulged anything, the local Viet Cong could
not know for a long time.
In developing a strategy based on the fact that there
were bound to be either Viet Cong or Viet Cong accomplices
in the village, the PF had acted outwardly, as if they
trusted everyone and had thereby given no one any reason to
believe that they were another group of "bandits". They had
also demonstrated that they would not use force except as a
last resort, because they had first called for the Viet Cong
to surrender.
If the Viet Cong were to come back to the village
every accomplice's life would be in jeapordy because no
one could tell whether or not anyone had said something to
the PF, and who might have said it. Therefore, in order
for the Viet Cong to alleviate the fears of their acc-
omplices and reinstate themselves in an operational way,
they would have to appear to know who the informer was.
This would require a show trial, and the murder of the
alleged "informer" in order to reestablish control.
The PF, however, refused to say whether or not
there were any villagers helping them. They would say
only that they moved lamps and that there were people
sending signals.
The PF were only willing to pass information beyond
themselves that could do them or the villagers no harm.
To say anything about whether or not anyone had talked
would create a more dangerous situation for all in the
village, by giving the Viet Cong useful information and
by impairing the villagers' trust in them. Even if they
had bluffed, giving the interviewers the wrong answer, it
would have compromised them with the villagers.
It is important to note that while the PF considered
it prejudicial to divulge anything about interpersonal
communications, they did not consider it dangerous to tell
outsiders that there were accomplices in the village. They
seemed to assume that anyone--even an American--would
know that complicity with the Viet Cong was impossible
to avoid in such a situation.
What these PF were doing, in effect, was agg-
regating the diverse interests of every person in the
village into a situation which provided, simultaneously,
for an overall accommodation with the Viet Cong at the
hamlet level, and a transference of individual deoen-
dences onto the PF. If the PF left the village or div-
ulged information, the villagers would be at the mercy of
the Viet Cong. The signallers might have been underground
Viet Cong agents, Viet Cong families cooperating for the
sake of their sons, people who needed access to the Viet
Cong areas for their livelihood, or refugees from Viet
Cong areas who were afraid to do anything that would pre-
judice their ability to return home in the future. To the
PF, however, the precise reasons for accommodation were not
relevant. What was important was to recognize the fact of
accommodation and adopt their strategy so as to take
advantage of it. Therefore, the PF, without forcing anyone
to go over his own personal threshold for risk, made the
hamlet into a community.
This PF platoon was ruthless, because it put peasants
in a very dangerous situation--but the danger was more from
the Viet Cong than from the platoon itself. They had co-opted
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the peasants by a cold and calculated manipulation of the
Viet Cong without ever giving any one a reason to believe
that they were being forced to do anything. No one
watching that village could possibly know whether the
peasants were all Viet Cong or not. No one could tell if
it was PF strategy or peasant information which was re-
sponsible for the deflection of the Viet Cong threat.
This was, in effect, using the Viet Cong's principel
weapon in the early years--using personal contact and
friendliness to sow distrust and suspicion among the enemy.
More important, it was creating a collective situation
in which it was much harder for the Viet Cong to play off
villagers against one another. As time went on these PF,
as their past successes indicated, would be able to de-
velope strong positive relations with the villagers. They
had foiled the Viet Cong without driving anyone into the
Viet Cong or making personal enemies. They had established
their intention to be a permanent part of the hamlet and
had made it easier for the peasants to work with them.
PF platoons that strengthened their relations with
villagers were able to gain significantly better intell-
igence than other PF. That villages resources are seldom
tapped to the same extent by the government intelligence
nets as by the good PF units is easily showm. In the good
PF units less than 1 of 6 men considered the official
intelligence services of use while in other platoons
more than half of the PF rated the government intelligence
services their prime source.
The PF with a goal, who were willing to help other
peasants and could thus establish trust had sources of
intelligence to take advantage of that were often not open
to others. One such prime source were the refugees in
their hamlets. While other PF ignored refugees and while
most village officials profited from them by charging
heavy fees to process their applications for relief pay-
ments the resourceful PF took care of the refugees helping
them with housing. This gave them a source of information
about Viet Cong hideouts and Viet Cong cadres in the
surrounding areas. As noted earlier, refugees were generally
hostile toward the Viet Cong, one reason being they were
afraid of being killed or punished for leaving their area
and leaving the Viet Cong short of manpower. Here, then, was
one group with a clear interest in seeing the cadres cleared
out, and with intelligence other villagers did not have.
Just as noteworthy was the fact that the good PF
were the most committed to the Chieu Hoi program and ex-
pressed to all in their villages a willingness to let
Viet Cong sons return home, if they behaved. This made it
possible for the PF to establish their credibility with
Viet Cong families and to bargain with them, agreeing not to
kill the sons when they came home to visit if the PF were
notified in advance of the visit. This cut Viet Cong
traffic to the minimum allowable without turning anyone
against the PF. And when sons did visit they would try
peacefully to convince them to defect.
Before the PF could enforce such rules with Viet Cong
families they needed bargaining power, specifically they
had to establish the fact that there was a good chance
they would find out the son was home without the families
cooperation. This required the assistance of the family's
neighbors and could only be obtained if the PF established
that they would not violate the sanctity of this trust by
using the information to unnecessarily kill someone's son.
A willingness to receive defectors into the village
was a sign of strength to the other peasants for it showed
them the PF were confident of their own ability. What the
PF did was to get other peasants to keep an eye on the
defectors - decreasing risk by increasing communication
and intelligence.
Another significant result of bare-hands civic action
was the change it produced in the attitudes of the PF.
When PF were educated to develop a community orientation it
had a marked effect on their self-image and attitudes about
their country. This change was borne out by the experiences
of Frank Scotton of the U.S. Information Agency who worked
in Viet Nam with PF motivation programs. As he stated it,
"The PF found that helping people was fun." 6
This aspect of self-help cannot be overemphasized.
The importance of winning the peasants is emphasized in
writers such as Mao Tse Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Che Gueverra,
but the emphasis is often interpreted in terms of the effect
on peasants. The effect on the soldiers themselves is also
very striking and immediate.
This same effect was observed in Malaya, where an
even more tenuous situation existed in Chinese villages.
The policemen were Malayan, not Chinese, and there were
obvious tension and suspicion between the two races. In
order to improve the attitude of the Chinese toward the
police, a propaganda campaign was initiated emphasizing
that the police were the friends and not the enemies of the
Chinese. The immediate effect on the Chinese was nil --
they still distrusted and disliked the Malayan police. But
the campaign gave the police a better self-image and a more
friendly bearing toward the Chinese. These two changes, in
turn, ultimately helped improve the attitude of the Chinese
toward the police:
6Personal Interview, April 1968. See also William A.
Nighswonaer, Rural Pacification in Vietnam, New York: Praeger,
1966, pp. 136-137.
"The campaign's effect was less on the Chinese
villagers than on the constables whose morale improved
when they saw themselves as friends, not enemies, of the
villagers. 7
Some of the American advisors in Viet Nam had been
exposed to the 'hearts and minds' approach to revolutionary
war. ~'1earts and minds' to these advisors, however, meant
something very different and far less meaningful than
'confidence of the people.' The American approach to the
problem is best expressed as civic action. In practice
this meant getting as many PF platoons as possible to
build things for their hamlets, such as schools, bridges,
markets or infirmaries. Such projects were nice, and were
well thought of by the peasants, but they did not make any
noticeable contribution to security and they made very
little, if any, contributions to stronger ties between PF
and peasants. Often, in fact, such projects had a negative
effect, for PF platoons resented being used as laborers for
programs which benefited themselves only indirectly if at
all, as long as they had no commitment to the village.
The key was to begin not by putting the PF to work
building roads and schools, but by first getting the PF
involved with other peasants. If they were not initially
7Richard Clutterback, The Long, Long War: Counter-
insurgency in Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger, 1966,
p. 85.
involved personally with others, such construction was
looked on as little more than heavy labor and was resented
by the PF. It was only after an initial low-key approach
to the peasantry that the large projects were useful. Once
the PF were committed to the village and had a long range
viewpoint, they took on the larger projects willingly as an
affirmation of their local status and commitment.
Separating PF platoons into good, average and bad
categories on the criteria of aggressiveness, discipline
and orovision of security q gives a further indication of
the importance of a civic orientation for the very best PF
platoons. The platoons which made the immense extra effort
to go from moderate, defensive security to a true, self
sustaining clearing of their area, were PF more interested
in helping peasants than in killing Viet Cong, although
in the long run these men actually did more fighting.
Two differences between bad, average and good platoons
give an important key to the way in which the local
community and national identity legitimacy are related for
peasants. First, men in good platoons are much less con-
cerned about Viet Nam's future and second, they are much
8Ratings based on interviews with peasants, PF,
district chief, district advisors, and subjective
imoressions of interviewers and team leaders.
more interested in the revolutionary development (rural
construction) program. In the good platoons, the platoons
that make the effort to really clear their village as
opposed to passively defending it, only 30% of the men are
concerned about Viet Nam's national status in the future;
in the average platoons it rises to 37% and in the bad
olatoons to 45%. At the same time these men are much more
interested in being RD cadre than they are in being either
ARVN soldiers or police.
Would You Like to be in:
Platoon ARVN RD POLICE
Rating
Bad 35% 31% 23%
Average 20% 23% 15%
Good 23% 39% 18%
The outstanding leader gives his men a meaningful
goal orientation towards society, provides a sense of
identity for men in good platoons, goes beyond what is
required of himself and identifies with and helps other
peasants, and thus gives to the PF an orientation they
can find meaningful. It is the outstanding man who had
learned for himself and tauaht his men to break through
the seething distrust and resentment of village life;
who has taught men for whom no one else has ever done
anything that helping others is good for PF and Peasants
alike; who gives PF a sense of future for themselves and
their country.
Elections, RD cadres and PF
The success of the properly motivated and led PF
suggests that similar results could have been obtained in
many more villages if the local elections conducted in 1967,
the PF and the revolutionary development program had been
integrated. Together they could have served to develop a
large base of support for the government.
Channeling the RD program through the PF, giving
local officials the ability to protect the peasants from
rape and pillage, and giving local officials the authority
to guarantee the peasants justice were all that was necessary
in most villages to produce local security and give the
district chief the intelligence he was so badly lacking.
Whereas the national elections in Vietnam received all
the attention, it was the local elections that were most
significant to the peasants, who had been living for years
with appointed officials whom many of them did not know or
trust.
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The pressures of war had made village and hamlet
officials terribly important to the peasants. The
official were responsible for countless papers and
permits and handled numerous AID programs including
fertilizer and rice seeds. The net effect of all
the programs and papers was to give the local officials,
despite the dangers involved in their jobs, opportunities
to become wealthy men. Whether or not a peasant liked
the GVN and whether or not he wanted them to win the
war, a friendly local official was a definite asset.
For this reason alone there was great interest in
the elections in every village visited during the
pre-election period.9 Most peasants knew the names
of the candidates, the number of persons running and
had definite ideas about what they expected of the new
officials.
In some cases, in fact, the elections even brought
corruption which served as an integrative force in the
village. In one hamlet all but a single-person--from among
10 PF and 10 villagers--was very enthusiastic about the
elections. The other peasant suggested why:
9Interest strong enough to truly shock the interviewers
compared with the apathy displayed towards most GVN programs.
All the officials think about now are the elec-
tions. They give the persons who come to the village
office wine and cigarettes. They help the refugees
to get their votes. They spend all their time trying
to win the votes. (8342V)
The elections, in fact, were very much more than Sir
Robert Thompson's opinion would suggest:10
Americans seem to have a traditional view, that
if you elect the sheriff, you fix the outlaws. The
sheriff fixed the outlaws not because he was elected,
but because he had a gun and was faster on the draw.
What Thompson has ignored is that being faster on the
draw is more productive with good intelligence, and that an
elected sheriff may be far more trustworthy and successful
because he is not as fast on the draw as a sheriff that was
appointed.
The main hope for the new officials in contested areas,
in fact, illustrates how wrong Thompson was in this instance.
The peasants main concern in insecure areas was with the fast
gun and bad justice. As discussed in Chapter IV, taking
account of circumstances and motives by district officials
required strong linkages of trust with the peasantry. The
elections brought forth a local resource that no outsider
could ever supply--long years of contact and knowledge of
10Sir Robert Thompson, "Can the U.S. ever win in Viet Nam?",
London Evening Standard, reprinted in New York Times, September
10, 1967.
the situation of the hamlet, and a local natural leadership
of considerable importance to the peasants. Even in cases
where the same officials were re-elected, there was optimism
from peasants because the fact that they had participated in
the process of selecting them signalled their rights to make
approaches to them: the officials now belonged to the peasants.
These high expectations created by the local electors soon
collapsed, under the weight of the unchanged realities of
village power distribution.
The elections may have given the officials local
legitimacy but they still could make a contribution to
security only through the local PF or through the district
chief.
They could not make an impact through the PF because
they were given no say at all in the use of the PF by the
district chiefs.
The local officials could still have made a contribution
if they had been allowed to protest the peasants from the
kinds of excesses that stopped information flows to the
district chief. However, while the committed PF could
guarantee justice in many cases because they had the guns,
the new officials could only provide justice if the district
chief let them. The failure to change the dependence of
local leaders on the district chief undercut the possibility
that improved government relations with the peasants would
result from the elections.
As with the elections, the concept of Revolutionary
Development was very well accepted and popular. The
individual teams were also relatively well received. But
the cadres were lacking in several important areas: they
did not have the deep trust of the peasants; they failed
to increase the legitimacy of the village government; they
did not succeed in weeding out infrastructures; they did
not produce any noticeable long-range effect in the village;
they did not have intimate personal contact with the
villagers; and they did not in anyway improve the local PF.
In the eyes of the PF and villagers, RD teams were
work forces to help rebuild the hamlets. Perhaps even more
than that, they were a welcome addition to village security.
In fact, many villagers gave military presence as the main
reason they liked to have RD teams in their hamlet.
I like them because they are helpful to the
people. They help the people in hygiene works. For
example, they help to keep the people clean. The
trash must be dumped into holes, the fences must be
put up neatly. (8111V)
For me the RDC are not necessary because I
see they could not do anything. If the government
wants to construct houses for us, they just have to
give us the money and we will build the houses by
ourselves and chiefly because we know what are the
most necessary things to be done. However, I do like
their presence here because we can get more security
forces. But frankly speaking, it is the same whether
they are here or not. (8339V)
Yes, because when they are here it looks as if
we have an additional PF platoon. But in reality, no
help is to be expected from them. (8345V)
Physical reconstruction and security were very relevant
in reclaimed villages and some respondents seemed to feel that
RD work would attract many more refugees back into their
villages. Respondents also recognized that RD teams had
better access to higher authorities and, hence, to materials
than did either village officials or PF.
I like it very much. Their presence is helpful
for us. With them, we can have roofing sheets, market
as in old times. The days they came they helped the
villagers to do anything they could, for example,
enclosing the fence, weeding, building roads for the
people. (8465V)
Besides hoping that village officials would know who
was innocent and who was guilty peasants when discussing the
elections also hoped that they would now have some say,
through the officials, in what projects were done in their
villages.
The RD teams generally disappointed them for local
officials were seldom consulted by the Cadres. That the
cadres had better outside access than the new officials
in fact decreased their legitimacy. The PF were also ignored
by the cadres, who tended to downgrade them as being of an
inferior status.
The origins of the RD program in fact had been in
experiments performed in central Viet Nam using local PF as
cadre. These experiments were extended and "professionalized"
by using well trained mobile cadre who moved from village to
village. Changing the program in this fashion removed its
main benefits for it no longer served to bring PF and villagers
together in common cause, which was essential for long range
pacification.
In fact the only effects RD had were inside the village
and as has been emphasized throughout the thesis pacification
is a matter of integration and linkage. No hamlet was
encountered anywhere where an RD team had made the changes
necessary to give PF a long range commitment to their village.
Thus cadres came to the village, security improved while
they were present, materials appeared, work got done and the
cadres left. But no technical or organizational skills were
transferred to the local population, and when they left, no
personal institution in the village had gained new strength
or enhanced support.
Attitudes of the peasantry toward the RD program showed
that rural development and security were important everywhere,
but while outside cadres rebuilding a village may have made
peasants look with favor upon the national government the
RD program did nothing to give a new orientation to the PF.
When the village was rebuilt by outsiders the marginal men
remained committed only to their families with no greater
committment to the village than before. It was only when
the PF themselves did the work and became a true part of the
village that long range improvements resulted.
Thus the dominance of military logic over peasant
reality severely limited the effectiveness of the two programs
with the most promise of extending the successes achieved
by committed PF.
The elections may have cut corruption and the RD
program may have convinced peasants of the essential good
will of the national government, but neither succeeded in
establishing the kind of system so desperately needed to
integrate village and national governments. As the
successful PF showed, the crucial necessities were justice,
rural development, security, trust and patience.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Those who are ignorant about government say:
'Win the hearts of the people.' If order could
be procured by winning the hearts of the people,
then even the wise ministers...would be of no
use. For all the ruler would need to do would
be just to listen to the people...
Han Fei Tzu
Every Saigon government since 1954 has tried to
work against the Viet Cong with highly centralized
command. To the extent that the governments have
succeeded at pacification in isolated instances,
however, the result has been due to a decentralized
approach that emphasized working within the lowest
levels of society in the village.
Logically, the more centralized the coordination
over the war the better the results should be. However,
this ignores the realities of an undeveloped society
with weak and ineffective institutions and almost no
trust between peasants and urban, upper and middle class
army officers.
In the context of guerrilla warfare these realities
mean that pacification is as much a political problem
as it is a military one. Rural security can only be
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achieved by building strong local institutions which
by fulfilling peasant needs would also be capable
of producing the outputs of manpower and intelligence
necessary for GVN military success against the
Viet Cong.
The various governments of Viet Nam have never
been able to make a bridge to the peasant because the
leadership they worked with inside the village has
seldom been responsive to the peasants and the government
at the same time. The local organizations required to
deal with the Viet Cong can only be successful in so far
as they are a bridge between the peasant and the state.
Neither village elders, marginal men, nor appointed
village officials have been allowed to make that bridge
very often.
In every case, weak powerless village organizations
have been expected to deal with the war locally. The
result has been favorable to the Viet Cong because their
ability to work between villages has always given them
an advantage against weakly organized villages required
to deal with the insurgency on their own. If the local
organizations been given control over the use of force
and the maintenance of justice then the strategy could
have worked. Local organization in Viet Nam, however,
has meant organization totally dependent on the district
chief and not strong local organization that could
handle their own problems as did the good PF who dared
to take the initiative uoon themselves.
The system designed by the Saigon government could
not suceed because it had no capacity for strategy. It
could not deal with the Viet Cong because the Viet Cong
were a political threat and as such were basically not
a challenge that could be met adequately by any village
organizations the government has normally developed.
Village elders could not deal with a political
threat because the very definition of their role re-
quired that they be aloof from the peasants and act as
a buffer between village and state.
Appointed officials often could not deal with a
political threat because they were chosen so as to
maximize their closeness to the district chief and thus
were unable to gain trust from peasants.
Marginal men were seldom a threat to the Viet Cong
for they were the lowest of the society and had no
personal motivations nor military incentives to be
anything but an impedence to the Viet Cong.
Elected officials could not be a threat to the
Viet Cong because they had no ability to control force
and dispense justice on their own. They could only
succeed if they could control the local PF or intercede
on the Peasants behalf with the district chief.
RD cadre could not defeat the Viet Cong for their
impermanence in the village could not assure peasants
of long term security and protection.
The only group that could ever compete with the
Viet Cong were the few PF platoons who identified
with the village and saw their personal future and the
future of their country tied to its progress. The PF
platoons which succeeded worked mainly within the
village in accordance with the reality and experiences
of the particular peasants they were trying to protect.
These platoons satisfied local criteria of justice and
gave peasants no fears about the need to deal with their
problems outside of the village.
What is significant is that these PF were not only
successful at security and pacification but that they
were also able to obtain significantly better intelligence
than the formal intelligence services.
In a situation where every communication up the
hierarchy is fraught with problems of distrust and
suspicion the decentralized approach is more successful.
The irony is that the men who were the most
successful in pacification-the good PF platoons-were the
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most marginal of all men, landless, poor and family
oriented. It was these very men, however, to whom local
status, a trusted leader and a home for their family were
sufficient incentives.
The most effective way to build a good army from
peasants is to build a society around them. A peasant
with a goal and a commitment that has meaning to him
is more likely to work hard and fight well. Such a
peasant can provide a better, more accurate flow of
information by helping refugees and Viet Cong families
than can official military intelligence officers who take
a short run view of their job treating suspects in such a
way as to alienate peasants.
A peasant who makes an effort to give potential
Viet Cong the benefit of a doubt often discovers many
Viet Cong are suddenly only penitent accomplices glad for
security.
A peasant told to build things for the village where
he resides is still a marginal man. A peasant who sees
the RF cadre rebuild his hamlet is still a marginal man.
When a peasant who has begun to identify with fellow
villagers through personal contact then builds schools and
roads he is an integral part of a community.
At the village level the Saigon government has been
mainly on the defensive because its village representatives
always dealt with the war in such a way as to leave each
peasant to deal as best he could with the Viet Cong.
The only times the Viet Cong were truly stopped in a
village were when an unusually dedicated leader taught
marginal men that there was a benefit for them in working
with the other peasants and bringing together all their
diverse accommodations with the Viet Cong into an
accommodation at the village level. What they did in effect
was to create a village by giving the peasants someone they
could trust.
This is the final irony of the "myth of the village."
Most Westerners assume that peasants .are devoted to their
local area. When told that the RF/PF take more casualties
and do more killing (per capita) than ARVN the standard
answer is "of course, they are fighting for their village."
This is nonsense for very few PF were in fact fighting for
their village. PF had to be taught to fight for their
village by showing them it was to their benefit to fight
for their village.
The RF/PF fight "'better" than ARVN is more a re-
flection on the incompetencies of ARVN than an indicator of
active DrFmordial sentiment. When local soldiers fight
more and behave better than a "National" army it may be the
sign of a weak state, not strong villages.
The government in fact, was never able to make
the basic concessions to peasant values necessary to
build an army capable of dealing with the Viet Cong
although this thesis suggests that few imputs were actually
necessary to do so. The costs involved in upgrading all
PF platoons would have been negligible, for as shown the
marginal man is so marginal that village status, a steady
job and a home for his family satisfies him.
What is important to PF is the small noticeable
improvements they can see. This was also true for most of
the peasants. As one peasant said:
"The Viet Cong propagandas is close to the
people, they propagandize on the small things.
They only promise the small things and then
they will fulfill their promise. They are not
like the Government propagandists who can
promise people many big things and then they
can't do according to their promise. The
Government's propagandists are not close to the
people. They talk about great and beautiful
but not practical things... (8116 V)
Security for peasants and a concern for their welfare
have never been items of high priority for any Saigon
government. 'What this thesis has suggested, however, is
that if the war had been fought as though protecting the
peasants were more important than killing Viet Cong the
result would have been far less favorable to the Viet Cong
than the present strategies have been.
APPENDIX A.
Study Plan
This thesis is based on a study of the Vietnamese
village soldiers, the Popular Forces, and of their big
brothers, the Regional Forces, conducted between October,
1966, and June, 1967, in nine orovinces of Vietnam.l Senior
Director of the project was Dr. PhilliD Worchel of the
University of Texas, and co-workers included Richard McWhirter
and Joseph Jackson, both also from Texas, and Douglas 3raith-
waite of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Conducted for the Advanced Research Projects Agency
of the U.S. Department of Defense, the purpose of the project
was to investigate the needs, aspirations, expectations and
frustrations which characterized the RF/PF. Using Vietnamese
interviewers recruited from the middle class milieu of Saigon
and trained for six weeks, three field teams were formed,
each of which spent approximately two weeks in each of six
different districts of rural Vietnam. A second follow-un
study was conducted with the six best interviewers to probe
further into the most critical areas uncovered by the study.
!Phillip Worchel, et al., Simulmatics Corporation,
Tinal Reoort: A Socio-Psychological Study of Regional/Popular
Forces in Vietnam. Parts I & (I. Cambridge, Mass., SepteŽmber
1967.
In each province two districts were selected for
study. An attempt was made to visit a district considered
as secure and a district considered averaae in each Province.
It was assumed that any district considered poor would be
too dangerous to study. As it turned out, however, the oro-
vinces had such varying conceptions of what good meant that
the widest possible variety of districts was actually studied.
When Phu Thu district of Thua Thien province was visited, for
example, it was impossible to qo more than 200 yards unarmed
-- at noon -- from the district headquarters, the only secure
piece of around in the district. Soon after the district was
studied, in fact, it was totally overrun by the Viet Cong.
Thirty-one of the 37 Vietnamese and 3 of the 4 American advisors
stationed there were killed. While there was sure to be some
bias toward the better secured areas, those studied are certain-
ly representative of at least 60% of rural Vietnam, possibly
even of 80% of the countryside.
Two provinces, Tuyen Duc and Ba Xuyan were finally
limited to one district for study so that a retest could be
made in Kien Giang and Binh Thuan Drovinces of districts
studied earlier. In each case, at least 10% of the soldiers
studied 6 months previously had been killed in the interim.
in the RF/PF Project 2
RF PF WIVES VILLAGERS
PROVINCE DISTRICT RF PF MALE FEMALE TOTAL
Vinh Loc 23 26 02 03 14 01 69
Thua
Thien Phu Thu 15 29 00 06 07 05 62
Ham Thuan 24 20 11 01 07 07 70
Binh
Thuan Hoa Da 20 24 05 09 09 08 75
Kien Tan 25 22 08 09 12 04 80
Kien
Giang Kien Thanh 26 21 08 09 10 06 80
Binh Khe 18 24 05 06 04 02 59
Binh
Dinh An Nhon 12 21 02 09 06 03 53
Thot Not 27 26 09 08 22 04 96
An
Giana Cho Moi 27 27 06 06 21 02 89
Phu Khuona 20 25 06 08 11 06 76
Tay
Ninh Hieu Thien 23 25 07 08 08 05 76
Thu Thua 19 19 01 04 20 03 66
Lona
An Ben Luc 21 19 01 04 23 04 72
Tuyen Don Duong 22 22 08 00 06 09 67
Duc
Ba My Xuyen 23 23 07 09 09 08 79
Xuyen
Total 345 373 86 99 189 77 1169
For the cross-validation study, 6 squads (3 "poor" and
3 "good" squads) consisting of 46 troops, and 57 villagers in
Binh Dinh Province were interviewed with a revised set of in-
struments.
2Colonel Bui Quang Trach of the ;VN Command Development
Test Center, .Mr. Douglas Pike of JUSPAO, Captain Jack Little
and others of the RF/PF stafF were consulted about the selection
of provinces.
The Number of Respondents
The nine provinces selected for study were chosen
to represent the diversity of rural Viet Nam and to provide
the wide variations in rural security discussed above. The
nine provinces were:
1. Thua Thien: Central Viet Nam. (Northearn South
Viet Nam). The capital of Thua Thien is Hue, the center of
considerable Buddhist unrest in recent years, in earlier times
the seat of the Imperial Vietnamese capital.
2. Binh Thuan: Representative of coastal Viet Nam
and the home of two small minorities the Gham, who until 1500
controlled most of South Viet Nam, and the Nuong, of Chinese
descent. The capital of Binh Thuan is Phan Thiet, a major
fishing port.
3. Kien Giang: Selected for its typical Delta
environment and culture and for the groupings of northern
refugees and Cambodian Vietnamese found here. Parts of the
province have been in Viet Cong hands almost continuously
since 1946.
4. Binh Dinh: A central coastal province of Viet Nam
which, with a population of one million, is the country's
second largest province. It was also selected because of
the year long presence of U.S. and Korean soldiers in the
mountainous areas of the provinces and the large numbers of
refugees from areas of heavy fighting. Binh Dinh was an
area of hiqh recruitment and control for the Viet Minh before
1954 and much of the province has been under Viet Cong control
for extended periods.
5. Tay Ninh: Representative of the rubber plantation
lower plateau area and also heavily Cao Dai religiously.
The headquarters of the Cao Dai Sects, once the most powerful
in Viet Nam, is in Tay Ninh City. The large wooded area of
the provinces also contains a key Viet Cong base, War Zone D.
6. An Giang: Once very insecure, An Giang is now the
most secure province in Viet Nam and the province where the
most development programs have been conducted. It is heavily
Hoa Hoa and, at different times it was the scene of fighting
which pitted Hoa Hoa armies against the French, the Viet Minh,
the Viet Cong and Ngo Dinh Diem.
7. Tuyen Duc: A highland mountain province with a
population composed largely of Montagnard tribes. Dalat,
the capital, is the center of the Vietnamese vegetable growing
"truck" farms which places high priority for the residents
on traversible, secure roads.
8. Long An: Previous anthropological, economic and
political studies done there by the Michigan University
Advisory Team, the Rand Corporation, and the Joint US Pablic
Affairs Organization (JUSPAO) make available a large amount
of background data on this heavily populated Delta province
near Saigon. It has been designated as a priority area for
an extreme effort by both the South Vietnamese government
and the Viet Cong because it controls approaches to Saigon
for the delta region.
9. Ba Xuyen: Typical of the lower delta and containing
large groupings of Cambodian-Vietnamese.
In each district interviews were obtained from ' squads
of soldiers, 3 composed of Popular Forces and 3 of Regional
Forces. Interviews were also obtained by the Vietnamese
interviewers with some of the soldiers' wives and with
villagers. When possible village records were used to
approximate a random sample. In insecure areas or areas
where soldiers were far from the village office, quota
sampling was used in an effort to get a cross-section of
villagers.
Each soldier's interview lasted approximately 3 hours
and covered personal background, military training, political
attitudes, relations with officials and population,
personal relations, local Viet Cong performance and certain
standardized tests, TATs and the Cantril Self Anchoring
Scale.3
Interviews were also obtained from American advisors,
district chiefs, Province officials, and village officials.
The American team leader lived with the interviewers in
whatever room could be found at district headquarters, (which
meant a temporarily empty morgue in one case), and was thus
able to spend evenings debriefing interviewers about their
observations developing more intimate contacts with individual
soldiers and observing more closely the district chiefs and
their advisors.
Working with the Vietnamese interviewers, in fact, was
perhaps the most revealing aspect of the entire project, for
it, more than anything else, revealed the extraordinary gulf
between urban, westernized Saigon and Vietnam's villages. In
time, however, it was possible to develoo in the interviewers
a fair ability to gain rapport with the peasants and to elicit
good quality information on most subjects. The biggest problem
3-,
3See Hadley Cantril, The Patterns of Human Concerns,
New Brunswick, N.J. Rutgers University Press, for patterns
and methods of coding.
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was not the villagers' suspicion as much as simply training
the interviewers to draw them out in conversation.
Peasants were quite frank, often brutally so, about
their attitudes towards Saigon and local officials. Most
candid and most bitter were the soldiers' wives - so that
it is certainly very difficult to assume that hatred of GVN
necessarily means support for the Viet Cong. When asked
about the VC, however, peasants and soldiers would be willing
to estimate how many were in the area, how close they came
to the soldiers and what the general security conditions of
their area were. Any time that a question seemed in the
slightest designed to find out the names of any particular
Viet Cong - the answer was silence; this was not to be told
outsiders. This lead helped (generally) to develop an under-
standing of the relationship of peasant and VC in contested
areas and to understand why peasants were so reluctant to
helo remove the VC infrastructure on some occasions. As
properly indirect questions were developed, however, it
became clear that in every contested village studied there
were still boys -- how many cannot be estimated -- deciding
to go with the Viet Cong. It was also generally the case,
again especially in the key provinces of Binh Dinh and Long An,
that peasants and soldiers alike were more familiar with
Viet Cong propaganda than with that of Saigon.
The conclusions of this thesis are based on computer
analysis of the coded interviews with RF/PF, wives and
villagers, and on reading of the approximately 300
interviews which were translated entirely into English and
of all the interviews with advisors and district officials.
It relies most heavily, however, on information from the
provinces which the author visited personally: Thua Thien,
Long An, An Giang, and Binh Dinh. Long An and Binh Dinh
were areas of strong Viet Cong concentration and hence in
many ways given a much less favorable picture of the war
than other provinces. However, because of their strategic
importance these two provinces were the scene of some of the
most extensive priority programs initiated by the U.S. and
the GVN. For this reason, the failings of these measures in
these provinces, perhaps most clearly illustrate the struggle
between political revolution and reaction in Viet Nam, and
show why the seemingly small and obvious changes needed to
produce a cohesive GVN system were really so difficult
to achieve.
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